The impact of the EU sugar trade reform on poor households in developing countries: A general equilibrium analysis

We use a modified version of the applied general equilibrium model GTAP, called GTAP_MH, to evaluate the impact of a reduction in the EU's support price for sugar on income distribution of African households. For LDC countries, non-ACP but participant in the EBA initiative a +2% change is indicated in term of income generation across all ten social strata identified within GTAP_MH framework, with positive percentage changes in supply prices at household level of endowment commodities, and positive percentage changes in price indices for private household expenditures. The big losers will be those countries that would no longer be able to compete at an international level as a result of the lost preferences.     

新产品供应链协调

定价和促销是新产品推出阶段的两个重要决策。有些产品可能在价格还未确定之前就已经在市场上进行促销宣传,而有些产品在完全上市价格确定之后才进行宣传促销。本文考虑由一个生产商和一个销售商构成的供应链,产品的需求受到价格和促销努力的影响,生产商决定产品的价格,销售商进行促销。我们考虑下列三种决策顺序:先定价后促销,先促销后定价,同时定价和促销。我们证明,促销成本分摊和收益共享结合的契约在三种情形下都能协调该供应链。本文进一步还分析了三种决策顺序对生产商、销售商和供应链的影响。结果表明:同时定价和促销的情形对生产商、销售商以及供应链最不利;对于生产商和销售商来说,先决策时具有主动权,能获得更高的利润,但是当需求对价格比较敏感以及促销成本较高时,后决策反而能获得更多的利润。最后,通过数值实验研究了参数对最优决策和供应链利润的影响。     

碳交易机制下零售商合作的费用分配研究

在一个由单供应商和多个零售商组成的二阶供应链中,研究碳交易机制下多零售商合作的订货决策问题。对完全信息下零售商合作的费用分配问题,应用合作博弈理论建立了费用分配的博弈模型,证明了博弈为子模博弈且设计了属于核心的费用分配方案,该方案不仅可通过总体单调分配机制实现而且可使大联盟长远稳定。对不完全信息下零售商合作的费用分配问题,证明了纯策略纳什均衡的存在性。研究结果表明,零售商的合作不仅能降低总费用,而且能降低碳排放量;各零售商在不完全信息下分担的费用大于完全信息下分担的费用。     

Single Crossing Properties and the Existence of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Games of Incomplete Information

This paper analyzes a class of games of incomplete information where each agent has private information about her own type, and the types are drawn from an atomless joint probability distribution. The main result establishes existence of pure strategy Nash equilibria (PSNE) under a condition we call the single crossing condition (SCC), roughly described as follows: whenever each opponent uses a nondecreasing strategy (in the sense that higher types choose higher actions), a player's best response strategy is also nondecreasing. When the SCC holds, a PSNE exists in every finite‐action game. Further, for games with continuous payoffs and a continuum of actions, there exists a sequence of PSNE to finite‐action games that converges to a PSNE of the continuum‐action game. These convergence and existence results also extend to some classes of games with discontinuous payoffs, such as first‐price auctions, where bidders may be heterogeneous and reserve prices are permitted. Finally, the paper characterizes the SCC based on properties of utility functions and probability distributions over types. Applications include first‐price, multi‐unit, and all‐pay auctions; pricing games with incomplete information about costs; and noisy signaling games.     

On the Generic Finiteness of Equilibrium Outcome Distributions in Game Forms

Consider nonempty finite pure strategy sets S₁,…,S_n, let S=S₁×⋅⋅⋅×S_n, let Ω be a finite space of “outcomes,” let Δ(Ω) be the set of probability distributions on Ω, and let θ: S→Δ(Ω) be a function. We study the conjecture that for any utility in a generic set of n‐tuples of utilities on Ω there are finitely many distributions on Ω induced by the Nash equilibria of the game given by the induced utilities on S. We give a counterexample refuting the conjecture for n≥3. Several special cases of the conjecture follow from well known theorems, and we provide some generalizations of these results.     

Binary 2 × 2 games

The 2 × 2 game is the simplest interactive decision model that portrays concerned decision makers with genuine choices. There are two players, each of whom must choose one of two strategies, so that there are four possible outcomes. Binary 2 × 2 games are 2 × 2 games with no restrictions on the players' preference relations over the outcomes. They therefore generalize the strict ordinal 2 × 2 games and the ordinal 2 × 2 games, classes which have already been studied extensively. This paper enumerates the strategically distinct binary 2 × 2 games. It also identifies important subsets defined by the number of pure Nash equilibria and the occurrence of dominant strategies.     

Exponentiality test based on alpha-divergence and gamma-divergence

In the present paper, we use the already defined alpha-divergence and gamma-divergence for constructing some goodness of fit tests for exponentiality. These divergence measures are very robust with respect to outliers. Since the existence of outliers among statistical data can be lead to misleading results, therefore utilizing these divergence measures can be of importance. In order to construct test statistics, two estimators are used for alpha-divergence and gamma-divergence. In the first one, we consider the alpha-divergence and gamma-divergence of the equilibrium distribution function, which is well defined on the empirical distribution function (EDF) and is proposed as an EDF-based goodness of fit test statistic. The second one is an estimator in manner of Vasicek entropy estimator. Simulation results indicate that in comparison with the other tests statistics, our mentioned test statistics almost in most of the cases have higher power. Finally, two examples containing outliers illustrate the importance and use of the proposed tests.     

Modeling Strategic Behavior in The Competitive Newsvendor Problem: An Experimental Investigation

This study experimentally investigates ordering behavior in the competitive newsvendor problem. We consider a duopoly market setting with two identical newsvendors selling the same perishable goods in a common market. Our experimental results show that average observed orders systematically deviate from the Nash equilibrium, and exhibit a similar pull‐to‐center pattern as in the classic non‐competitive newsvendor experiments: average orders fall below the Nash equilibrium in the high‐margin condition, and above the Nash equilibrium in the low‐margin condition. More importantly, the observed orders in the duopoly market are significantly higher than that in the non‐competitive newsvendor market, even in situations where standard inventory models predict no difference. We explain the ordering behavior using a strategic experience‐weighted attraction (EWA) model, which captures players' propensities for strategic thinking in game settings. Our empirical analysis suggests that the strategic EWA model generates more accurate predictions of future ordering behavior than an existing linear adaptive model without concerning strategic thinking. Further analysis shows that individuals are heterogeneous in their propensities to be a strategic player. Our research indicates the importance of modeling strategic behavior when analyzing behavioral decisions in competitive (game) environments.     

Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games

This paper contributes to the understanding of economic strategic behaviors in inter-temporal settings. Comparing the MPE and the OLNE of a widely used class of differential games it is shown: (i) what qualifications on behaviors a markov (dynamic) information structure brings about compared with an open-loop (static) information structure, (ii) what is the reason leading to intensified or reduced competition between the agents in the long run. It depends on whether agents’ interactions are characterized by markov substitutability or markov complementarity, which can be seen as dynamic translations of the ideas of strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity (Bulow et al. 1985, Journal of Political Economy 93:488–511). In addition, an important practical contribution of the paper for modelers is to show that these results can be directly deduced from the payoff structure, with no need to compute equilibria first. I dedicate this paper to Philippe Michel, who introduced me to the literature on differential games.     

基于畅通可靠性的连续道路网络设计

随着优质可靠服务需求的提高,发展设计高可靠性道路网络的方法成为一个急迫的课题.本文建立了一个新的分析连续道路网络设计问题的双层规划模型,其上层模型是最大化的路网整体畅通可靠性和路网扩张率的差值,其下层模型是随机用户均衡交通量分配.通过Hooke-Jeeves算法解算这个模型,得到了一组优化的路段通行能力扩张值.结果表明,该双层规划模型是设计高可靠性道路网络的有效工具.