物质激励有效性之博弈分析及其应用

物质激励作为提高企业生产效率的一种重要手段 ,一直是理论界所关注的问题。本文试图在Holm strom团队激励模型的基础之上 ,构建最基本的物质强化激励机制模型———通过对目标和行为结果的奖惩来修正或激发人们的行为的博弈模型 ,探讨以物质褒奖为主要内容的物质激励的有效性的根源问题 ,并根据模型结论进一步阐述其在对研发工作团队薪酬激励中的应用     

对偶理论在经济均衡分析中的应用

本文根据现代经济系统的特点,设计了一类优化模型体系,并运用对偶理论和该模型体系研究了三类主要市场;产品市场、货币市场和劳动力市场的均衡及其实现,指出了这三类主要市场同时实现均衡所需要的基本条件。     

借贷能力、风险收益与新型农业经营主体经营效率

通过构建一个新型农业经营主体与金融组织讨价还价的理论模型,在纳什议价均衡的基础上分析新型经营主体最优产出水平与其借贷能力、风险收益的关系。基于中国12省的微观调查数据,采用双边随机边界检验,对理论模型进行了实证研究,结果表明：借贷能力不足是新型经营主体经营无效率的主导因素,最终使平均净效率下降了8.13%;正规金融机构和民间借贷均对新型经营主体的经营效率有显著影响,并且民间借贷对经营效率的影响更强;新型经营主体的负责人能力、盈利能力、组织化程度等,与其经营效率呈正相关关系。提出应通过金融体系创新、完善民间借贷法规等途径,降低新型农业经营主体的融资约束,提高其负责人的经营水平,加强新型经营主体的组织化程度。     

Equilibrium probabilities for a production-inventory system maintained by a control-limit policy

Abstract

In this paper we consider a manufacturing system in which an input generator supplies at a constant rate a buffer with a raw material and a production unit pulls the raw material from the buffer at a stochastic rate. We consider specific control-limit policies for the maintenance of the production unit. We show that the equilibrium probabilities of the system can be computed exactly when the production unit after a maintenance remains idle until the buffer is filled up.     

产能有限的供应商主导的双渠道分销策略研究

在供应商产能有限的背景下,研究供应商的最优分配策略和双渠道分销的问题。根据期望利润最大化建立供应商渠道分配模型,依据纳什均衡确定供应商的最优定价、最优产能和最优分销策略。结果表明,在双渠道策略的情况下,供应商应该优先满足销售企业的销售量。若供应链的销售量恰好得到满足,供应商应该按最优产能生产。供应商的渠道选择与供应商产能、供应链各节点的盈利能力和生产成本有关。     

Building a mutually beneficial partnership to ensure backup supply

In today׳s complex global environment, it is very important for a firm to possess backup supply resource when facing unpredictable disruptions from its primary supply resource. To ensure the actual arrival of backup supply in cases of primary supply disruptions, a purchasing firm needs to work with its backup supplier to forge a strong partnership that not only protects itself, but also assures the backup supplier׳s economic benefit. In this research, we establish the structure of such a partnership based on real business practices. The interactions between the purchasing firm and the backup supplier are examined through a decision-tree approach that takes disruption situations at all levels into consideration. We then design the backup supply contract, find the Nash equilibrium contract parameters, and identify the critical conditions under which such a contractual partnership will be valuable. The contract parameters we find are functions of the moments of the demand distribution, which are independent of specific demand distributions and are easy to be estimated in practice. Our numerical tests support our theoretical results and demonstrate the robustness of the contract with respect to various demand distributions.     

新经济地理学视野下的空间深化与空间广化机理剖析

作为事物刻画的两个维度,时间和空间在经济学领域却命运迥异。较之于时间,空间在很大程度上被忽视。随着后现代主义社会的来临,时空压缩扑面而来,空间的重要性目益凸显。新经济地理学在吸收德国区位论关于空间集聚以及运输费用理论的基础上,强调由规模经济和运费的相互作用产生的内在集聚力,以及由于某些生产要素的不可移动性等带来的与集聚力相反的作用力二者对空间经济活动的影响;按照新经济地理学家马丁（Martin．R）的研究,新经济地理学的研究包括两个方面的主题：空间深化机制（经济活动的空间集聚）和空间广化机制（区域增长集聚的动力分析）。     

大股东控制下的股权再融资决策

不对称信息条件下,股权再融资的选择方式和认购量能作为信号向外部投资者表明公司的质量.本文发现:公开增发发行成本较高且大股东持股比例较小时,存在唯一的分离均衡,此时高质量公司定向增发,低质量公司配股;当公开增发成本较高且大股东持股比例较大时,定向增发是唯一的混同均衡;当公开增发成本较低且大股东持股比例较小时,公开增发是唯一的混同均衡.模型预测定向增发的公告效应为正,配股的公告效应为负,而公开增发的公告效应不明确,这与大量实证文献相吻合.     

工作搜寻理论、匹配模型及其政策启示——2010年诺贝尔经济学奖获得者研究贡献综述

本文首先简要介绍了戴蒙德、莫藤森和皮萨里德斯这三位诺奖得主的主要研究贡献.随后对这三位经济学家的主要理论--工作搜寻理论和匹配模型进行了简单回顾和梳理.最后,对上述理论的政策启示进行了讨论.     

Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two‐Person Games

This paper presents an algorithm for computing an equilibrium of an extensive two‐person game with perfect recall. The method is computationally efficient by virtue of using the sequence form, whose size is proportional to the size of the game tree. The equilibrium is traced on a piecewise linear path in the sequence form strategy space from an arbitrary starting vector. If the starting vector represents a pair of completely mixed strategies, then the equilibrium is normal form perfect. Computational experiments compare the sequence form and the reduced normal form, and show that only the sequence form is tractable for larger games.