福建茶叶批发市场推行拍卖制的探讨

拍卖是国际茶叶市场最主要的交易方式,中国作为世界第二大产茶国,至今却尚未形成比较完善的茶叶拍卖中心。福建是中国的产茶大省,在茶叶资源禀赋、消费市场以及基础设施等方面都具备了实行拍卖交易的条件。本文结合福建茶叶生产的特点,探讨了在茶叶批发市场推行拍卖制,以期推进福建茶叶产业化进程,从而发展壮大海峡西岸经济区茶叶经济。     

风险规避情形下第一价格拍卖的非参数估计方法

在拍卖实证研究的大量文献中,越来越多的证据表明投标人更趋向于风险规避,然而目前拍卖计量方法通常只考虑风险中性的情形。针对这一问题,推广了针对第一价格拍卖的非参数估计方法,给出了多个风险规避参数估计量来处理风险规避的情形,并总结了相应的估计过程。为验证估计效果,蒙特卡罗模拟实验被用于进行分析和评价。实验结果表明,无论是对风险规避参数,还是私有估值的估计,总体上都能取得不错的效果,验证了方法的有效性,同时为风险规避参数估计量的选择提供了一些指导性建议。     

“倒按揭”养老模式的精算模型构建与应用

为了推进“倒按揭”养老模式在我国的发展,本文通过对“倒按揭”进行概念解析,构建了个体“倒按揭”精算模型和家庭“倒按揭”精算模型;利用两个模型,测算了固定房产值时的给付标准和固定给付标准时对房产值的要求,研究发现,实行“倒按揭”养老的警戒线为房产净价值136576元;当拥有房产价值227627元时,给付标准可达到城镇居民人均可支配收入水平。     

Impact of product proliferation on the reverse supply chain

Product variety is one of the most important advantages in highly competitive markets. However, excessive product proliferation's reducing the profit margin has caused increased focus on developing a management method for maximal profit. In a closed-loop supply chain, product proliferation affects the reverse supply chain as well as the forward supply chain. Although increasing the number of product types can better satisfy diverse customer needs, complexity in the product recycling, remanufacturing, and resale processes may erode a firm's overall profits. In this study, we develop a mathematical model for analyzing a capacitated reverse supply chain consisting of a single manufacturer and multiple retailers. We reveal closed-form solutions for the optimal batch size and maximal profit, and discuss managerial insights into how the number of products and other factors can affect both batch size and profit. Finally, we investigate the relationship between product proliferation and the choice of logistics strategy.     

A pro-active and collaborative approach to reverse logistics—a case study

Reverse logistics is considered to be the key for re-manufacturing and sustainable development. It has gained increasing attention in the last decade and has been a new frontier of strategic management. One of the driving forces for firms to adopt the reverse logistics practice is cost saving from reverse logistics activities. Another motivation to put reverse logistics forward is probably due to environmental impacts on non-returnable materials. Reverse logistics, however, may require cooperation of more than one company and hence it is generally poorly managed due to self-interest of different companies. Therefore, a pro-active and collaborative approach to reverse logistics is demanded. This paper reports a case study of using returnable packaging materials between a manufacturer and an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) supplier. A cross-company team was established to pursue the goal of the reverse logistics project. Tangible and intangible benefits of reverse logistics from this case study are presented in this paper.     

The empirical analysis of the -bilateral optimized combinatorial auction model

This study proposes a new and highly efficient dynamic combinatorial auction mechanism—the N-bilateral optimized combinatorial auction (N-BOCA). N-BOCA is a flexible iterative combinatorial auction model that offers more optimized trading for multiple suppliers and purchasers in the supply chain than one-sided combinatorial auction. We design the N-BOCA model from the perspectives of market architecture, trading rules, and decision strategy for winner determination, the decision strategy for winner determination needs flexible optimization modeling capability. Thus rule-based reasoning was applied for reflecting the flexible decision strategies. We also show the viability of N-BOCA through Paired Samples T-test experimentation. It shows that N-BOCA yields higher purchase efficiency and effectiveness than the one-auctioneer to multi-bidders (1-to-N) combinatorial auction mechanism.     

交通BOT项目特许经营权竞标机制设计

本文从项目拍卖者的角度,对交通BOT项目进行特许经营权机制设计,设计了一套科学合理的竞标机制来提高项目拍卖者对特许经营权的配置效率。我们运用激励机制设计思想建立了竞标机制模型,在保证竞标企业参与投标和真实显示自己的经营能力的条件下最大化期望社会福利,通过求解此模型得到了最优的竞标机制;鉴于最优机制在形式上的复杂性,我们给出了得分规则拍卖和供应契约拍卖两种最优拍卖方式。     

Efficiency or Competition? A Structural Econometric Analysis of Canada's AWS Auction and the Set‐Aside Provision

In 2008, Industry Canada auctioned 105 MHz of spectrum to a group of bidders that included incumbents and potential new entrants into the Canadian mobile phone market, raising $4.25 billion. In an effort to promote new entry, 40 MHz of spectrum was set‐aside for new entrants. In order to estimate the implicit cost of the set‐aside provision, we estimate the parameters of the bidders' profit function via a maximum match estimator based on the notion of pairwise stability in matches. We find that all telecommunications firms valued both geographic complementarities across auction licenses as well as absolute spectrum. Under a reasonable alternative scenario, our results indicate that the set‐aside led to a total profit loss of approximately 10%.     

建设用地指标和建设用地的序贯拍卖定价机制研究

现行建设用地指标定价机制未能有效反映其真实价值,使得农民缺乏复垦闲置宅基地来提供建设用地指标的意愿。针对指标和建设用地的互补性特点,以及指标价值是开发商私人信息的特征,本文构建第一价格和第二价格两种密封拍卖下的互补品序贯拍卖模型,研究建设用地指标和建设用地的定价机制。理论和仿真分析得出两种拍卖下的建设用地指标和建设用地价格,并通过对比分析得出不同目标下的最优定价机制。研究发现,两种拍卖下,竞标人的建设用地指标报价均随着土地价格增值系数增加而提高,随着竞标人数递增而降低;序贯二价下的竞标人建设用地指标及建设用地的报价均高于序贯一价;序贯二价下,持有建设用地指标的竞标人获得建设用地的概率更高。因此,地方政府可采用适当提高土地闲置费用的方法,以此提高失地农民复垦权益,激励农民复垦闲置宅基地,增加建设用地指标供给;同时,采用序贯二价拍卖,提高建设用地指标和土地的利用效率。     

Strategic Supply Function Competition With Private Information

A finite number of sellers (n) compete in schedules to supply an elastic demand. The cost of each seller is random, with common and private value components, and the seller receives a private signal about it. A Bayesian supply function equilibrium is characterized: The equilibrium is privately revealing and the incentives to rely on private signals are preserved. Supply functions are steeper with higher correlation among the cost parameters. For high (positive) correlation, supply functions are downward sloping, price is above the Cournot level, and as we approach the common value case, price tends to the collusive level. As correlation becomes maximally negative, we approach the competitive outcome. With positive correlation, private information coupled with strategic behavior induces additional distortionary market power above full information levels. Efficiency can be restored with appropriate subsidy schemes or with a precise enough public signal about the common value component. As the market grows large with the number of sellers, the equilibrium becomes price‐taking, bid shading is on the order of 1/n, and the order of magnitude of welfare losses is 1/n². The results extend to inelastic demand, demand uncertainty, and demand schedule competition. A range of applications in product and financial markets is presented.