可公开验证的安全电子拍卖方案

在大多数电子拍卖方案中,如果第三方勾结,那么投标者的标价不再保密。在任何情况下保持标价的秘密性是非常重要的,它们很可能是投标者重要的商业秘密。该文提出了一种可公开验证的安全电子拍卖,结合零知识证明协议,使拍卖方案可公开验证并达到最小泄漏。该方案泄漏的只是中标价,其余标价及其相互关系在任何勾结情况下都是保密的,而且,标价的正确性可以公开验证。该方案的效率远远高于最近Brandit提出的方案。     

基于复合暗标拍卖的工程量清单招标模式

针对投标人在工程量清单招标的不平衡报价问题,文章在研究暗标拍卖理论招标的基础上,提出了将暗标一级、二级和三级密封拍卖结合起来建立复合暗标拍卖工程量清单招标合同清单招标模式。然后运用博弈论分析了投标人在工程量清单招标模式下的最优战略就是不平衡报价,接着证明了复合暗标拍卖工程量清单招标能有效减少投标人的不平衡报价给招标人带来的不利影响,节约工程投资。最后通过案例验证了模型的证明。     

修正上海私车牌照拍卖方式的建议

迄今为止,上海是全国唯一实行私人小汽车牌照拍卖方式来控制中心城区交通流量的城市。随着私人小汽车需求量的急剧增加,限量投放的上海牌照成为稀缺资源,拍卖中标价格大幅上涨。持续上升的中标价格不但增加了这项制度继续有效实施的困难和阻碍,也引发了新的不公平问题,即拍卖中标价格若无限制上涨会限制中低收入者购车用车的权利。因此,有必要在控制机动车数量、缓解城市交通拥堵这个大目标的前提下,进一步完善私车牌照拍卖方式,消除不良副作用,有效配置稀缺资源。     

Demand uncertainty and manufacturer returns policies for style-good retailing competition

This paper investigates the role of the returns policy in the co-ordination of supply chain: A manufacturer provides a return policy for unsold goods to two competing retailers who face uncertain demand. The problem is described with a game theory structure: The manufacturer, as the Stackelberg leader, first commits a returns price to the retailers under a given wholesale price. Upon receiving this information, two competing retailers, as followers, make decisions for their retail price and order size, in which the process of pricing and ordering is played as Nash equilibrium. Anticipated the retailers’ responses, the manufacturer designs his returns policy. Adopting the classic newsboy problem model framework and using numerical study methods, the study finds that the provision of a returns policy is dependent on the market conditions faced by the retailers. The paper also analyses the impact of demand variability on the decisions of optimal retail price and order quantity and profit reallocation between the manufacturer and the retailers. Finally, it investigates how the competing factor influences the decision-making of supply chain members in response to uncertain demand and profit variability.     

基于可变供给量的可分离物品拍卖及其应用

本文对统一价格下可分离物品的拍卖问题进行了研究。首先,在买者报价连续、买者和卖者风险中立、卖者采取可变供给量(将供给量看成价格的函数)的策略下,设计了一个新的基于可变供给量的可分离物品统一价格拍卖机制,研究了其信息激励性和分配的有效性,给出了卖者的最佳供给策略和买者的均衡报价策略。然后,将拍卖机制推广到风险中立、风险爱好和风险厌恶三类风险买者共存的情形,并给出了相应的均衡结论,该结论与现有的一些成果相比更具一般性。最后,给出了拍卖机制在环境规划中应用。具体地,结合"十一五"期间获得的"1+8武汉城市圈"环境规划中有关污染物允许排放总量分配数据和统计申报资料,利用拍卖模型来分析和评价了免费分配方案的有效性程度,并据此给出了关于目前排污申报制度和免费分配方法的若干结论和建议。     

电子拍卖市场中的“柠檬问题”研究

“柠檬问题”是信息不对称的具体表现,电子拍卖市场实现了信息流和物流的分离,在具备很多优势的同时也出现了严重的“柠檬问题”。笔者在搜集国内外电子拍卖市场资料的基础上,归纳出电子拍卖市场的特点,分析其市场中“柠檬问题”的特殊表现,并针对这些问题提出了相应的对策建议。     

在线拍卖欺诈防范机制比较研究

近年来,在线拍卖作为一种重要的电子商务模式在个人、企业、政府各个层面得到广泛应用,但是在线拍卖中欺诈现象的存在,在一定程度上阻碍了在线拍卖的进一步发展.在对国内外主要的在线拍卖欺诈防范机制比较研究的基础上,构建反馈评价系统的指标体系和二次评价系统,这对拍卖网站提高可信度、有效防范拍卖欺诈具有一定的现实意义.     

关键字广告位拍卖的收益等价性研究

拍卖是搜索引擎提供商为关键字广告位定价的新形式,实践中演化出了多种具体的拍卖操作方式.本文分析了在两种典型的不同拍卖形式-投标信息公开与不公开方式下,以及投标者具有不同的信息结构、关键字广告位和投标者人数相对数量不同等情形下,Winner-pay和All-pay支付规则下拍卖收益的大小,对比研究得出了在两种支付规则下卖方收益相等的结论.其中,投标者具有不完全信息的情况下,本文结论的两个特例分别是单物品和同质多物品拍卖在两种支付规则下拍卖收益相等,因此该研究结论扩展了已有的研究结论.     

Two Backorder Compensation Mechanisms in Inventory Systems with Impatient Customers

We study a compensation mechanism design problem with customer‐choice behavior in a continuous review setting where the production and demand processes are stochastic. When a stockout occurs, the firm controls backorders on the basis of certain compensation policies. Customers make decisions to maximize their utility, which is decreasing in the price, the waiting time, and the customer's impatience factor. We assume that the impatience factor is private information held by the customer only. Two compensation mechanisms are designed to control backorders, namely uniform compensation and priority auction with an admission price. Under uniform compensation, the firm offers the same discount to all customers, whereas under auction compensation, priority is granted according to the customers' bid prices. We obtain the optimal stockout price and base stock level under each mechanism, and analyze the properties of the respective optimal policies. Assuming linear waiting costs with uniformly distributed impatience factor, we find that the auction mechanism (1) maintains a lower base stock level and results in greater profit and (2) benefits customers with relatively lower or higher impatience factors, but customers with a medium impatience factor may be rendered worse off. We further show that both compensation mechanisms are suitable for products with a high unit profit, a high lost sales penalty cost, and a high holding cost.