TOT项目融资中国有资产转让定价的博弈分析

本文以TOT项目融资方式为对象,运用博弈的方法,从合理分配国有资产经营期内增值收入的角度出发,得出这样的结论,在国有资产转让过程中,政府与私营资本之间的谈判是一系列复杂的博弈过程,在博弈中政府的最优行为是对国有资产转让进行招标,同时给予某一招标企业一定的中标优先权,这样政府能够较现行的国有资产转让方式获得更多的收益.     

一种基于闭排队网络的集装箱码头设备配置优化模型

将集装箱码头龙门吊装卸工艺抽象为闭排队网络模型,采用估算均值法计算了顾客到达和服务时间分布为一般情况的闭排队网络系统性能指标.仿真结果表明,闭排队网络模型计算结果可以为集装箱码头设备配置提供一定的决策支持.     

基于主体不平等的跨国界河流水资源分配的破产博弈研究

基于破产理论和讨价还价博弈,构建水资源分配的破产博弈模型。借鉴国际水法,构建主体在水资源分配谈判中的议价能力评价指标体系,将议价能力运用到破产博弈模型中,突出主体在水资源分配中的不平等性,减少水资源分配量与贡献、需求量和对水资源依赖程度的非对称性;结合主体的谈判破裂点,根据主体满意度函数的联动函数寻找水资源分配的最优解,使分配能同时满足个体理性和集体理性,并对澜沧江-湄公河流域进行实例研究。     

论社会主义市场经济的三个根本问题

坚持和发展社会主义市场经济,必须紧紧抓住和解决好基本制度、生产目的和资源配置这三个根本问题.这三个根本问题也构成了中国特色社会主义政治经济学的核心内容.在基本制度方面,必须坚持公有制主体地位不能动摇,国有经济主导作用不能动摇;坚持按劳分配为主体、使改革发展成果更多更公平惠及全体人民.在生产目的上,要满足广大人民日益增长、不断升级和个性化的物质文化和生态环境需要.在解放和发展生产力的同时,保证被解放和发展了的生产力归人民所有,走可持续发展道路.在资源配置方面,社会主义国家由于有公有制经济的全力配合,政府对资源配置才能真正发挥“看得见的手”的作用,当然其效果如何还得看这只手有没有遵循经济发展的客观规律.中国特色社会主义追求的是共同富裕,公有制的存在和发展保证了经济发展成果由人民群众共享,从而中国特色社会主义的效率必然是也必须是最广大人民群众的效率,从而这个效率必然是与公平一致的.     

Points System:An Universal Beneficial System with Multiple Objectives of Reform on Household Registration System

Reform of China's Household Registration system(HRS) has been entering a new stage and deserves us to research.The paper argues that reform of HRS should have multiple objectives.It examines various local efforts and practices of the reform and claims that the point system is one of the most feasible alternative systems for the HRS that can fit those multiple reform objectives.The system could also be treated as the new institutional basic for public welfare provision and rights allocation,and a new governance means for population issues as well in China's transitional period.     

Inventory and transshipment decisions in the rationing game under capacity uncertainty

In this paper, we consider the inventory decisions of two retailers who are supplied by a single supplier with uncertain capacity. When capacity is allocated in proportion to the retailers׳ orders, the retailers compete for the capacity by inflating their orders (i.e., the rationing game). In addition, we allow the retailers to implement transshipment between them such that they cooperate by transshipping the surplus stock of one to another who is out of stock. Our analysis of Nash equilibrium orders shows that, while order inflation in the equilibrium orders persists in the rationing game with transshipment, it may not occur if the amount of capacity shortage is small and the transshipment prices are low. Thus, carefully chosen transshipment prices may alleviate order inflation behavior. We also characterize centralized orders that maximize the total profit of the retailers and compare them to equilibrium orders. In particular, we investigate coordinating transshipment prices that induce the retailers to choose centralized orders. Our numerical analysis shows that, even for two identical retailers, coordinating transshipment prices exist in a more limited range of parameter values in the rationing game than they do outside the rationing game due to capacity uncertainty and limitation.     

Bayesian analysis of multivariate stochastic volatility with skew return distribution

Multivariate stochastic volatility models with skew distributions are proposed. Exploiting Cholesky stochastic volatility modeling, univariate stochastic volatility processes with leverage effect and generalized hyperbolic skew t-distributions are embedded to multivariate analysis with time-varying correlations. Bayesian modeling allows this approach to provide parsimonious skew structure and to easily scale up for high-dimensional problem. Analyses of daily stock returns are illustrated. Empirical results show that the time-varying correlations and the sparse skew structure contribute to improved prediction performance and Value-at-Risk forecasts.     

Allocation of resources in asymmetric competitions: How do the weak maintain a chance of winning?

To maintain a chance of occasionally beating a stronger player in a competition waged over several fields, a weaker player should give up on some of the fields and concentrate resources on the remaining ones. But when do weak players actually do this? And which fields do they give up when the fields differ in their likelihood of being assessed? We report an experimental study of resource allocation in which asymmetric pairs of players compete over asymmetric fields. Symmetric players and symmetric fields are used for control. We find that players behave as follows: (1) Average wins are the same in the symmetric and asymmetric fields conditions and correspond to relative player strength. (2) The proportion of fields given up on decreases with a player’s greater relative strength, increases for asymmetric field likelihoods, and increases when competitions are framed in meaningful context; this proportion is related to wins. (3) When field likelihoods are asymmetric, players’ resource allocation is correlated with likelihood. Wins generally increase with that correlation but the relation is different for players of different strength. (4) The proportion of fields given up on and the correlation with likelihood change with experience towards the values corresponding to higher wins.     

高校人才资源与社会需求的合理配置

高校是重要的人才生产基地，必须根据社会的需求，对人才资源进行合理的配置。大学毕业生供给与人才市场竞争的局面给大学毕业生的职业指导工作带来了巨大的困难和严峻挑战。如何提高学生的综合素质和职业竞争力已经成为社会关注的热点，高校应当充分利用自身的人才资源优势，做好毕业生的职业指导工作，从而为社会提供高素质的优秀人才。     

基于优先权拍卖的产能分配机制研究

本文考虑一个供应商和两个独立零售商构成的供应链系统。当供应商的产能受到约束时，零售商可能会竞争有限的产能。本文提出将“优先分配权”作为一个有价值的标的物进行拍卖，按照出价高低确定优先分配顺序。本文证明了优先权拍卖机制属于共同价值模型，并提出了两类拍卖机制：事先拍卖和事后拍卖。本文证明两类优先权拍卖机制均会促使零售商提交真实的需求作为订单量，并且满足收益等价定理。而就供应商期望利润而言，事后优先权拍卖机制要高于事先优先权拍卖机制。