增价拍卖中投标者跳跃报价的收益效应研究

跳跃投标是增价拍卖一种普遍现象,而跳跃投标是否会带来投标方的期望收益的增加是一个值得关注的问题。通过运用博弈论方法,分别寻找单物品和多物品拍卖两种情形下的跳跃报价均衡,计算出跳跃报价均衡下的投标方期望收益,并将其结果与非跳跃报价情形进行比较,给出了投标方希望通过跳跃出价改善其期望收益的一般条件。     

手机铃声下载的著作权问题

手机铃声下载作为一种新型网络服务方式引发了一系列相关的著作权问题。通过对一起典型案例的分析,指出未经许可使用音乐作品作为手机铃声供人下载侵犯了作者的信息网络传播权,但是应当由网络内容提供商而非网络服务商承当由此产生的赔偿责任。此外,应当以合理方式确定著作权集体管理组织的相关收费标准,以促进作者利益与社会公共利益之间的平衡。     

招投标过程对政府购买社会组织服务效果的影响——以广州市为例

招投标是政府购买社会组织服务的重要环节,对社会组织提供服务的效果具有一定程度影响。招标过程透明度对社会组织提供服务效果的影响较为显著,招标标准与招标价格则具有一定程度的影响。提高政府购买社会组织服务效果,需要进一步增强招投标过程透明度,细化与合理化招标标准,以及确定合理的招标价格。     

政府投资项目中的不完全信息静态博弈模型分析

针对投标企业采取不平衡报价的投标策略,从政府的角度出发,运用不完全信息静态博弈模型理论来探索政府的最优策略.研究结果表明,政府投资项目避免不平衡报价招标的最优策略应为最大限度地吸引合格投标人参与竞标,并建立一种使不平衡报价受损、平衡报价受益的正外部效应机制.     

Collusion in Second‐Price Auctions under Minimax Regret Criterion

Collusion in auctions, with different assumptions on distributions of bidders' private valuation, has been studied extensively over the years. With the recent development of on‐line markets, auctions are becoming an increasingly popular procurement method. The emergence of Internet marketplaces makes auction participation much easier and more convenient, since no physical presence of bidders is required. In addition, bidders in on‐line auctions can easily switch their identities. Thus, it may very well happen that the bidders in an auction have very little, if any, prior knowledge about the distributions of other bidders' valuations. We are proposing an efficient distribution of collusive profit for second‐price sealed bid auctions in such an environment. Unlike some known mechanism, which balance the budget only in expectation, our approach (which we call Random k) balances the budget ex‐post. While truth‐telling is not a dominant strategy for Random k, it is a minimax regret equilibrium.     

Strategic Consumer Cooperation in a Name‐Your‐Own‐Price Channel

Supplier reluctance to openly advertise highly discounted products on the Internet has stimulated development of “opaque” name‐Your‐Own‐Price sales channels. Unfortunately (for suppliers), there is significant potential for online consumers to exploit these channels through collaboration in social networks. In this paper, we study three possible forms of consumer collaboration: exchange of bid result information, coordinated bidding, and coordinated bidding with risk pooling. We propose an egalitarian total utility maximizing mechanism for coordination and risk pooling in a bidding club and describe characteristics of consumers for whom participation in the club makes sense. We show that, in the absence of risk pooling, a plausible bidding club strategy using just information exchange gives almost the same benefits to consumers as coordinated bidding. In contrast, coordinated bidding with risk pooling can lead to significantly increased benefits for consumers. The benefits of risk pooling are highest for consumers with a low tolerance to risk. We also demonstrate that suppliers that actively adjust for such strategic consumer behavior can reduce the impact on their businesses and, under some circumstances, even increase revenues.     

基于碳减排调度的激励性厂网合作竞价机制设计

市场机制是建立碳减排长效机制的基本制度安排。现行的节能发电调度办法没有市场的价格发现功能,本文研究了基于碳减排调度的厂网合作竞价机制问题,并讨论了合作机制的最优参数。研究结果表明:合作竞价机制可以促进电力市场的稳定供给,优化市场运行指标,顺应发电调度政策的导向;合作竞价机制能够增加低碳机组的发电收益,提高发电商CO₂减排的积极性。期望该研究工作能为电力行业有效减排的实践提供方法依据。     

环的连通性与半自反模

本文利用连通性和半自反模刻划了环，得到了域，遗传环，priffer整环，Dedekind整环，VN正则环等常见环的连通特征及其相互之间的等价关系。     

环上典型群及其在Galois环上矩阵集合分类上的应用

简述了近期环上典型群及其应用的主要研究情况,论述了环上典型群在矩阵分类研究上的应用.     

中标通知书在建设工程招标投标中的法律效力

针对中标通知书在建设工程招标投标中的法律效力问题，采用比较分析的方法，从中标通知书的责任性质、法律效力以及完善立法等方面进行研究，明确了中标通知书具有使建设工程合同成立的法律效力，中国《招标投标法》和《合同法》的相关规定存在缺陷，应修改完善。