政府采购中损害公平竞争行为的认定

政府采购制度是一种制造竞争和利用竞争的制度 ,公平竞争是政府采购制度的核心原则 ,本文对政府采购中损害公平竞争行为的认定 ,有利于采购监管部门和司法部门最大程度地贯彻与实现公正原则。     

浅淡建设工程招标投标的备案制度

加入世贸组织 ,标志着我国改革开放和社会主义现代化建设进入了一个新的历史阶段 ,对于建筑业的发展也将产生重要影响 ,本文从招投标管理由审查制度转变为备案制后的总结分析 ,浅谈如何顺应入世要求 ,进一步转变取能、提高招投标工作的管理水平     

Ambiguity aversion in first-price sealed-bid auctions

Experiments on first-price sealed-bid auctions with independent private values have shown that submitted bids typically exceed Nash-equilibrium predictions for risk-neutral bidders. Existing bidding models explain this phenomenon by assuming that the bidders are risk-averse and capable of drawing complete and correct inferences about their winning probabilities. In this article, we use the Choquet expected utility (CEU) theory to demonstrate that the observed bidding behavior can also be attributed to ambiguity aversion which causes the bidders to underestimate their chances of winning the auction. Empirical support for CEU bidding models is given through an analysis of recent bidding data.     

再论“土地财政”与城市高房价

地方政府＂以地生财＂有其必要性和合理性,＂土地财政＂动机明确。政府垄断供地长久有之,可地价和房价飙涨却是近10年的事情。＂招拍挂＂只是发现了土地的真实价值和改变了土地利益的分配结构而已,本身并不抬高土地价值。＂土地财政＂过程合法、方式公正,＂土地财政＂收入的多少与增长速度更不构成房价上涨推动因素。＂土地财政＂与城市高房价无关。     

Increasing Revenue by Decreasing Information in Procurement Auctions

We report on results of several laboratory experiments that investigate on‐line procurement auctions in which suppliers bid on price, but exogenous bidder quality affects winner determination. In procurement auctions, bidder quality may or may not be publicly known to all bidders, and the effect of this quality transparency on the auction outcome is one aspect of auction design that we examine. The second aspect of auction design that we examine is the effect of price visibility on the auction outcome, and the interaction between price visibility and quality transparency. In terms of price visibility, we consider two extreme cases: the sealed bid request for proposals (RFPs), and the open‐bid dynamic auction event. In terms of bidder quality transparency, we also consider two extreme cases: a setting in which bidder qualities are publicly known and the case in which they are private. We find that in our laboratory experiments, the RFP format is consistent in generating higher buyer surplus levels than does the open‐bid dynamic format. This advantage is independent of the quality transparency. In contrast, the open‐bid format is highly sensitive to quality transparency, generating significantly lower buyer surplus levels when the information about bidder quality is public.     

带保修期的寿命型产品多属性招标采购机制设计——以大型医疗设备为例

产品的期望寿命是重要的质量属性之一,事前不可观察且不可验证,直接对该质量属性进行投标没有意义。针对此问题,以大型寿命型医疗设备招标采购为例,利用拍卖机制设计理论建立了一类具有信号传递功能的多属性招标采购模型。模型确定了最优投标规则,包括设备最优期望寿命投标、最优保修期投标与最优价格支付。模型确立了甄别投标企业技术类型与传递产品质量可靠性信息的机制。研究结果表明:首先该机制满足参与约束与激励相容约束,投标企业分别按自身期望利润最大化进行投标;其次该最优机制能保证企业承诺的保修期与期望寿命正相关,能保证技术类型最高、所提供产品期望寿命最大(保修期最长)的企业中标,并且中标企业创造相对来说最高的社会福利。构造一个算例说明新的多属性招标采购机制在实践中易于操作,是可实施的。当质量指标存在不可观察和不可验证的维度时,相关研究为解决多属性招标采购问题提供了一个新思路。     

规范城市雕塑项目招投标制度刍议

城市雕塑项目推行招投标制度可以破解城市雕塑项目诸多经济矛盾、保障城市雕塑的艺术美学性。我国城市雕塑项目招投标存在市场结构较为混乱、项目频受长官意志干预等问题,需要进一步规范城市雕塑项目招投标制度。通过引进专业策划人制度、规范招投标流程、加强城市雕塑竞标制度立法、完善专家评审制度等措施,可以解决城市雕塑项目招投标存在的问题,促进我国城市雕塑业健康有序发展。     

开放式逢低买入中买家数量确定的投标决策

逢低买入是一种新型的在线动态价格机制。本文以B2B开放式逢低买入拍卖为研究对象,在买家数量确定且独立投标的条件下,将已有的针对两个价格水平下买家最优订货决策拓展到更复杂的多个价格水平的最优订货决策问题。本文提出的零售商投标决策定理,不仅满足了买家的实际需求,也提高了决策的实用性。     

基于演化博弈的电力竞价市场均衡分析

基于非对称演化博弈原理,分别时MCP与PAB竞价机制下的电力竞价市场演化情况进行分析,在此基础上,从市场效率的角度对上述演化均衡进行政策分析,分析结果表明:在MCP机制下,选择适当的竞价上下限,可诱导电力竞价市场收敛于市场效率最高的竞价下限;但在PAB机制下,则不一定.最后,对由5个发电商组成的电力竞价市场进行了算例分析.