论毛泽东的区域经济均衡发展战略——纪念毛泽东诞辰120周年

实现区域均衡协调发展是中国共产党不懈追求的奋斗目标.毛泽东作为党的第一代领导集体的核心,从新中国建立到党的十一届三中全会的30年时间里,根据当时的中国国情和国际形势制定并实施了区域经济均衡发展战略,主张重点发展内地工业,通过均衡布局,实现共同富裕..这一战略既取得了一定的成就,但也付出了一定的代价.它是历史、时代和制度的产物,我们要辩证看待,它对今天仍具有重要启示和借鉴意义.     

论新时期思想政治工作的创新

思想政治工作是我党的优良传统和政治优势,是一切工作取得胜利的可靠保证。面对新世纪、新形势,创新是思想政治工作的时代要求。新时期要真正使思想政治工作的创新积极、主动、稳妥、有效地取得实质性进展,应重点抓好三个方面的创新:观念上的创新、内容上的创新与充实、方法上的创新。     

建设和谐世界与开放战略的调整

中国的开放型发展模式与世界经济是相和谐的。虽然中国的发展影响了世界市场的产品与资源能源价格,但这是经济全球化把中国放在生产制造分工的结果,“新殖民主义”没有理由。中国是在积极参与而不是挑战现存世界经济体系中发展的,同时科学发展观与和平发展道路的提出又证明中国是一个对世界负责任的大国,开放战略的调整和升级也证明了这一点。     

Water cycle algorithm for solving the reliability-redundancy allocation problem with a choice of redundancy strategies

Abstract

This paper proposes a new mathematical model for the reliability-redundancy allocation problem (RRAP) with a choice of redundancy strategies. To maximize the reliability of a system, this model chooses the best redundancy strategy from among both active and standby ones for each subsystem. For those with a standby strategy, a continuous time Markov chain model is used to calculate the exact reliability values. In order to solve the proposed mixed-integer non-linear programing model, a powerful evolutionary algorithm, called water cycle algorithm (WCA), is developed and implemented on three famous benchmark problems. Finally, the results of different benchmark problems are compared with those previously reported to show the superiority of the proposed model and the efficiency of WCA.     

Compensation or competition: Bias in immigrants' access to active labour market measures

Whether participation in active labour market programmes (ALMPs) pushes individuals back into employment depends on the programme's characteristics. On the basis of encompassing registry data that allow us to control for usually unobserved employability, we find evidence of a systematic access bias whereby jobcentre caseworkers in Switzerland assign unemployed persons to activation measures based on a competition logic that is mainly driven by an economic rationale and the jobcentre's performance evaluation. This practice seems problematic because it results in an overrepresentation of immigrants in measures with little efficacy rather than in measures that could compensate for employability disadvantages. Conversely, Swiss citizens are more likely to enter beneficial human-capital-intensive measures. It is plausible that this discrepancy in programme participation amplifies the general labour market disadvantages of immigrants.     

双寡头电力市场垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型

考虑单电网公司与双发电商所组成的渠道结构,构建了发电商投资减排、电网公司投资消纳的优势互补的异质型垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型,先后考察并比较了分散决策和集成决策下的反馈均衡结果。在此基础上,讨论了利润共享契约下系统增量利润的分配问题。研究表明：对于分散决策,电网公司选择性承担发电商的减排费用;两种决策下的发电商减排和电网公司购电价格以及分散决策下的减排补贴与发电商之间的减排竞争强度相关;在一定条件和范围内,合作博弈有利于提高电网公司购电电价,同时为此所带来的风险增大。     

国际投资汇率风险的综合套保策略研究

国际组合投资涉及多币种汇率风险,分别使用双边货币期货进行套保要承担较高套保成本。参考美元指数期货的实践,本文提出基于人民币指数期货的综合套保策略。实证结果表明,无论对于单个货币资产还是分散化投资的国际股指、债指组合,引入人民币指数期货能够显著降低收益率波动,提高抵御汇率波动的能力,同时拓展收益空间,是有效的汇率风险综合套保工具;人民币指数期货套保效率显著优于货币期货篮子,在发达国家股指市场表现更加突出。采用基于指数加权移动平均模型（EWMA）的动态套保策略,使得人民币指数期货收益对股指或债指市场波动敏感度降低,在市场极端状况时仍能保持相对中性。     

Strategic Sourcing in the Presence of Uncertain Supply and Retail Competition

This study develops an analytical model to evaluate competing retail firms' sourcing strategies in the presence of supply uncertainty. We consider a common supplier that sells its uncertain supply to two downstream retail firms engaging in price competition in a horizontally differentiated product market. The focal firm has a dual‐sourcing option, while the rival firm can only source from the common supplier. We assess the system‐wide effects of supply uncertainty on the focal firm's incentive to pursue the dual‐sourcing strategy. We find that the focal firm's dual‐sourcing strategy can create a win–win situation that leads to increased retail prices and expected profits for both firms. Furthermore, under certain conditions, we show that it is beneficial for the focal firm to strategically source from the common supplier, even if its alternative supplier offers a lower wholesale price. Overall, we identify two types of incentives for adopting the dual‐sourcing strategy: the incentive of mitigating supply risk through supplier diversification and the incentive of strategic sourcing for more effective retail competition.     

The Design and Introduction of Product Lines When Consumer Valuations are Uncertain

This article presents a model of the design and introduction of a product line when the firm is uncertain about consumer valuations for the products. We find that product line introduction strategy depends on this uncertainty. Specifically, under low levels of uncertainty the firm introduces both models during the first period; under higher levels of uncertainty, the firm prefers sequential introduction and delays design of the second product until the second period. Under intermediate levels of uncertainty the firm's first product should be of lower quality than one produced by a myopic firm that does not take product line effects into consideration. We find that when the firm introduces a product sequentially, the strategy might depend on realized demand. For example, if realized demand is high, the firm's second product should be a higher‐end model; if demand turns out to be low, the firm's second product should be a lower‐end model or replace the first product with a lower‐end model.     

Strategic Information Sharing in Competing Channels

We investigate strategic information sharing in two competing channels. The retailer in a channel can ex post decide whether to share private demand information with his upstream manufacturer after the content of information becomes known. We find that a retailer discloses low demand and withholds high demand to induce lower wholesale prices from his manufacturer. We show that a retailer should share less information when the retail market becomes more competitive, but should disclose more information when his capability to acquire information improves. When a decentralized supply chain competes with an integrated channel, we show that firms in the supply chain benefit from the rival channel's effort to improve information capability, that the incentive for the retailer in the supply chain to improve his information capability increases with the intensity of competition and with the rival channel's information capability, and that the retailer may not want to pursue perfect information acquisition even when doing so is costless. Extensive numerical studies demonstrate that similar results also hold for two decentralized supply chains competing with each other.