英文商标和英文商标的命名策略

英语作为语言帝国主义 ,它侵占到了商品流通领域中的一个重要方面 :商标的命名。商标是生产者和经营者的唯一最有价值的资产。在当今社会中 ,英文商标的命名在全球经济日趋一体化中显得十分重要。英文商标的命名当然有其英文表达的固有特点 ,但是它有些命名的战略需要人们不断研究。文章根据作者在澳大利亚对世界著名商品的英文商标在市场上的知名度所作的实地考察素材 ,研究了英文商标的重要性和英文商标命名中的一些规律性的东西 ,提出了英文商标命名的策略     

期权思想在企业投资战略中的应用

本文在对(实物)期权思想起源及实物期权与金融期权关系分析的基础上,对实物期权思想的涵义、作用进行了探讨,并对实物期权进行了分类。最后从对未来情形的预想和通过平台投资创造实物期权两方面说明了实物期权思想在企业投资战略中的应用。     

投资者法律保护、产品市场竞争与现金股利支付力度——来自中国制造业上市公司的经验证据

在股利代理理论的框架下,实证检验了投资者法律保护、产品市场竞争与企业现金股利支付力度的关系,以及在不同投资者法律保护水平(包括法律制度和法制环境)下,产品市场竞争对企业现金股利支付力度的影响.研究发现,在其他条件一定的情况下,投资者法律保护水平、产品市场竞争程度与公司现金股利支付力度呈显著正相关关系;当法律保护水平较低时,产品市场竞争对公司现金股利支付力度的影响更显著.研究结论进一步说明了在法律保护水平较低时,激烈的产品市场竞争可以弥补法律保护的不足,保护投资者的利益.     

集成化物流管理中库存路径问题研究综述

综合国内外多种参考文献,介绍了IRP的基本概念及其主要特征,从常见模型、求解策略及算法2个维度综述了当前国内外关于IRP的主要研究进展,最后指出了该研究领域在未来研究中应予以重视的几个研究方向,为进一步的研究奠定了基础.     

道歉承诺类管理反馈策略对顾客二次满意度的影响——基于顾客多样情绪调节效应

O2O模式下,众多学者和商家都关注何种在线管理反馈策略能提升顾客满意度,然而多数研究仅针对顾客负向情绪,忽略了顾客多样情绪对在线管理反馈策略影响的调节作用。实际上顾客在接受在线管理反馈时带有矛盾情绪,表现为多种情绪。因此本文针对消费者多样情绪,研究不同情绪调节下道歉承诺类管理反馈策略与顾客满意度之间的关系。通过梳理在线管理反馈策略、顾客满意度、顾客多样情绪等相关研究,提出代表顾客多样情绪的在线评论类型包括：积极评论、偏积极评论、消极评论、偏消极评论,研究不同类型评论（顾客多样情绪）对顾客满意度有不同影响;道歉承诺类管理反馈策略对顾客二次满意度有积极影响;不同类型在线评论（消费者多样情绪）对道歉承诺类管理反馈策略的积极影响有调节作用等假设。本文以国内某旅行网站99027名顾客二次入住酒店数据为样本,用机器学习的方法对顾客评论和管理反馈策略进行分类,通过多元线性回归模型进行实证分析,结果表明：（1）偏积极评论、偏消极评论、消极评论对顾客二次满意度有负向影响;（2）道歉承诺类管理反馈策略对顾客二次满意度有积极作用;（3）顾客偏消极、消极情绪能够加强道歉承诺类管理反馈策略对顾客二次满意度的正向影响,即道歉承诺在调节顾客的消极情绪方面具有一定的积极作用。研究结果丰富了在线管理反馈策略理论和方法,为服务商进行在线管理反馈时应采取的措施提供了一些参考,对服务商通过第三方平台加强顾客关系管理具有一定的指导意义。     

Agent‐Based Recovery Model for Seismic Resilience Evaluation of Electrified Communities

In this article, an agent‐based framework to quantify the seismic resilience of an electric power supply system (EPSS) and the community it serves is presented. Within the framework, the loss and restoration of the EPSS power generation and delivery capacity and of the power demand from the served community are used to assess the electric power deficit during the damage absorption and recovery processes. Damage to the components of the EPSS and of the community‐built environment is evaluated using the seismic fragility functions. The restoration of the community electric power demand is evaluated using the seismic recovery functions. However, the postearthquake EPSS recovery process is modeled using an agent‐based model with two agents, the EPSS Operator and the Community Administrator. The resilience of the EPSS–community system is quantified using direct, EPSS‐related, societal, and community‐related indicators. Parametric studies are carried out to quantify the influence of different seismic hazard scenarios, agent characteristics, and power dispatch strategies on the EPSS–community seismic resilience. The use of the agent‐based modeling framework enabled a rational formulation of the postearthquake recovery phase and highlighted the interaction between the EPSS and the community in the recovery process not quantified in resilience models developed to date. Furthermore, it shows that the resilience of different community sectors can be enhanced by different power dispatch strategies. The proposed agent‐based EPSS–community system resilience quantification framework can be used to develop better community and infrastructure system risk governance policies.     

Proactive international strategies of cluster SMEs

In this conceptual paper, proactive international strategies of small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) in the cluster context are discussed. The majority of cluster SMEs assume passive roles as network participants in the process of internationalisation. However, a smaller fraction adopts proactive strategies to foreign expansion acting as leaders of networks. SMEs as network leaders are embedded in the source clusters and dependent on local networks that provide them with complementary resources. We assert that this mutual dependence between a firm's resources and the development of industrial agglomeration should be reflected in the strategic options that SMEs adopt when going international. This paper contributes by synthesising and evaluating a comprehensive range of SME-strategic options and by proposing the proactive competitive strategies of SMEs in the international arena that are both feasible and effective. The feasibility of adopting a specific strategy means the suitability for this group of companies, considering their characteristics. The evaluation of the effectiveness of each strategy was performed according to the objectives of avoiding lock-in and of protecting and developing the core competencies embedded in cluster networks. We address the research gap in evaluating the outcomes of SME international strategies and in synthesising a comprehensive range of cluster SMEs' strategic options.     

Leveraging psychological contracts as an HR strategy: The case of software developers

This article studies the management of software developers through the lens of the psychological contract and from the perspectives of employees and employers. Data were gathered through interviews with software developers and their human resources (HR) and/or direct managers in French high-tech companies. Our findings show the crucial role of HR and direct managers who shape a balanced professional psychological contract with developers as a specific HR strategy in order to respond to their job specificities and values. Specific HR practices (nature of the processes, involvement of developers in these processes, credibility of HR/direct managers and career development opportunities) and the working environment contribute to the development of trust and fairness, which form part of the content of the balanced contract.     

基于消费者效用的生鲜农产品供应链生鲜度激励机制研究

生鲜供应链整体生鲜度的提升对减少浪费、提高供应链整体盈利水平及社会福利有重要意义。本文基于消费者效用理论研究了两供应商和单一零售商组成的供应链系统,构建了单周期下生鲜农产品生鲜度激励模型,模型以供应商为领导者,采用Stackelberg博弈方法求解得到了均衡状态下供应商、零售商的最优定价策略及供应商新鲜度努力选择。研究结果表明,供应商和零售商利润与消费者价格敏感系数呈反向变化,与新鲜度敏感系数呈同向变化。在价格竞争市场,供应商保鲜努力程度和利润与价格替代率呈反向变化;在生鲜度竞争市场,供应商保鲜努力程度和利润与新鲜度替代率呈同向变化。基于研究结论,厂商及政府应当联手引导消费者的消费观念,尽可能减少由于信息不对称引致的道德风险,在市场价格替代率不变甚至降低的情形下,提高生鲜度替代率,使得消费者的意愿支付价格上升,提高自身讨价还价能力,获取更多利润。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.