论所有权保留买卖制度中的利益平衡

随着分期付款买卖的大量出现 ,所有权保留这种非典型担保方式正在被广泛使用。实质上 ,出卖人只能保留形式上的“所有权” ,其真正享有的是一种担保权益。如何平衡这一法律关系中出卖人、买受人以及第三人的利益 ,摒弃传统的静态观点 ,而代之以动态的观察视角 ,是一有益的探讨     

早期改良派企业营销思想简论

早期改良派在长期的工商企业经营活动中,认识到企业营销的重要性。他们重视企业营销的外部环境建设,正确把握市场的发展方向;注重企业营销手段的运用,谋求企业赢利;着力培养企业营销人才,提高营销效率。早期改良派的企业营销思想颇具特色,是合乎时代发展的市场经济思想。     

论商业贿赂与相关行为

本文从我国《反不正当竞争法》的立法目的和立法精神出发 ,分析了商业贿赂与回扣、折扣、佣金及附赠等相关行为之间的关系 ,并认为回扣并非一定构成商业贿赂 ,且不以“账外暗中”为构成要件。另外不仅回扣行为能够构成商业贿赂 ,折扣、佣金及附赠等行为也可能构成商业贿赂。     

经济政策不确定性与公司社会责任信息披露

基于2008—2017年我国A股上市公司样本和中国经济政策不确定性指数,考察了经济政策不确定性对公司社会责任信息披露的影响。研究表明,当经济政策不确定性上升时,公司自愿发布社会责任报告的积极性显著增加,社会责任信息披露质量也显著提高。进一步研究发现,公司销售存在中介效应,经济政策不确定性减少了公司销售业绩,促使公司自愿发布社会责任报告的意愿提高,社会责任信息披露质量提升;而分析师关注存在掩饰效应,经济政策不确定性削弱了分析师关注,导致公司自愿发布社会责任报告的意愿减少,社会责任信息披露质量降低。此外,在产权性质、市场制度环境不同的公司中,经济政策不确定性与公司社会责任信息披露的关系存在异质性。经济政策不确定性并非公司提高社会责任信息披露的内在驱动因素,该信息披露决策只是公司在销售业绩下滑时的相机决策。因此,监管部门制定可以从本质上促进上市公司社会责任信息披露的政策才是长久之计。     

Selling with Money‐Back Guarantees: The Impact on Prices,Quantities, and Retail Profitability

In this paper, we consider a retailer adopting a “money‐back‐guaranteed” (MBG) sales policy, which allows customers to return products that do not meet their expectations to the retailer for a full or partial refund. The retailer either salvages returned products or resells them as open‐box items at a discount. We develop a model in which the retailer decides on the quantity to procure, the price for new products, the refund amount, as well as the price of returned products when they are sold as open‐box. Our model captures important features of MBG sales including demand uncertainty, consumer valuation uncertainty, consumer returns, the sale of returned products as open‐box items, and consumer choice between new and returned products and possibility of exchanges when restocking is considered. We show that selling with MBGs increases retail sales and profit. Furthermore, the second‐sale opportunity created by restocking returned products enables the retailer to generate additional revenues. Our analysis identifies the ideal conditions under which this practice is most beneficial to the retailer. Offering an MBG without restocking increases the new product price. We show that if the retailer decides to resell the returned items as open‐box, the price of the new product further increases, while open‐box items are sold at a discount. On the other hand, customers enjoy more generous refunds along with lower restocking fees. The opportunity to resell returned products also generally decreases the initial stocking levels of the retailer. Our extensive numerical study substantiates the analytical results and sharpens our insights into the drivers of performance of MBG policies and their impact on retail decisions.     

From knowledge to decision – a case study of sales and operations planning in health care

One of the most important challenges in health care management is balancing resources with fluctuating and uncertain demand. This study examines whether introducing a standardised process for sales and operations planning at a large university hospital improved specialty department managers’ knowledge of planning conditions and if so, whether decisions were made based on this knowledge. Using responses from a survey of 30 specialty department managers at Sahlgrenska University Hospital in Sweden, the analyses indicate that operational knowledge strengthens insights about the needs for strategic decisions, and vice versa. Moreover, knowledge is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for making decisions at the department level. An overall planning and decision structure is required and should be implemented first at the hospital level to effectively allocate resources.     

Pricing and Replenishment of Competing Perishable Product Variants under Dynamic Demand Substitution

I consider pricing and ordering decisions faced by a retailer selling a perishable product with a two‐period shelf life over an infinite horizon. In the first period, the product is “new”; in the next, it becomes “old.” The new product is perceived by customers to have a higher quality than the old product. Every period, the retailer makes three decisions: prices for the new and old products and how much new product to order. I first show, with some simple cases, that demand uncertainty can make the sale of the old product profitable. I then consider a more realistic case with dynamic demand substitution among customers. I recognize that the retailer's decisions may be constant or may vary across different periods, under different contexts. For instance, varying the price of the new product can sometimes be difficult due to the negative impact it generates among customers. I find that (i) the benefit obtained from selling the old product with constant decisions is much higher than the benefit from allowing all the decisions to vary; (ii) the former benefit increases with a higher procurement cost, a higher quality of the new product, and higher demand volatility; however, the latter benefit is non‐monotone in these parameters; (iii) most of the latter benefit can be obtained by just changing the order quantity; and (iv) as the inventory of the old product increases, when all the decisions vary, the optimal price of the new product may increase or decrease.     

VMI模式下考虑促销努力的销量回扣契约模型研究

本文在促销努力影响市场需求,单周期季节性产品销售环境下,分析了集中式供应链和供应商管理库存(VMI)供应链中的供应商供货量和零售商促销努力水平的决策问题。在无契约VMI供应链中引入滞销产品补贴的销量回扣契约,讨论了零售商参与合作的条件,结论表明该契约能够提高VMI供应链的绩效并改善其收益;而VMI供应链中的成员采用改进的销量回扣契约进行协调时,有可能实现集中式供应链的最优收益。最后,通过算例验证了引入滞销产品补贴的销量回扣契约能增加供应商供货量和零售商促销努力水平,大幅度地提升VMI供应链的总收益。     

我国保险公司与银行的业务合作研究

结合当前的经济形势及政策法规,参考保险业相关资料及业内人士的指导意见,通过比较分析近年来的银保业务发展形势及状况,并针对业务合作中显现的问题,从业务操作视角提出可行性建议。认为通过增强合作意识、加大产品开发及结构调整力度、加强自律与监督等措施,可促进保险公司与银行之间业务合作关系的改善。     

Motivating Retail Marketing Effort: Optimal Contract Design

We study a distribution channel where a manufacturer relies on a sales agent for selling the product, and for investing in the most appropriate marketing effort. The agent's effort is hard to monitor. In addition, the cost of effort is the agent's private information. These impose challenges to the manufacturer in its endeavor to influence the agent's marketing effort provisions and to allocate profit between the two parties. We propose two contract forms. The franchise fee contract is a two‐part price schedule specifying a variable wholesale price and a fixed franchise fee. The retail price maintenance contract links the allowed retail price that the agent charges customers with total payment to the manufacturer and sales level. Under information asymmetry, for implementing either contract form, the manufacturer needs to offer a menu of contracts, hoping to invoke the “revelation principle” when the agent picks a certain contract from that menu. We show that the two contract forms perform differently, and each party's preference toward a particular contract form is linked with the total reservation profit level and/or the sales agent's cost type. We provide managerial guidelines for the manufacturer in selecting a better contract form under different conditions.