多要素流动、内生产业空间波动与经济地理新均衡——基于新经济地理学自由企业家模型的比较研究

促进新经济地理学理论的发展，不仅要根据理论要求的逻辑完美性修改假设，更为重要的是，要根据空间经济发展的现实修改模型的假设条件。由此，在研究上突破了新经济地理学模型单一生产要素流动假设的局限性，认为企业家与普通劳动者在地区间都可以流动，并且，普通劳动者在行业间也可以自由流动。与新经济地理学可解的经典模型——自由企业家模型相比，新的可解中心-外围模型丰富了新经济地理学的研究结论，发展了新的理论观点：突破点与持续点的大小比较存在三种关系。随着贸易自由度的变化，产业空间结构的演化除了棒棒均衡的结果外，不仅可能出现内部非对称结构为稳定均衡的情形，也可能出现内部非对称结构与中心-外围结构稳定均衡共存的情形，而不仅仅是对称结构与中心-外围结构稳定均衡共存的情形；随着贸易自由度的提高，工业品支出份额的增加，工业品间替代弹性的降低，会引起产业空间的稳定结构由对称结构向非对称结构转化；一旦产业空间结构演化的“黑洞条件”得到满足，则产业空间的稳定结构只能是内部非对称结构或中心-外围结构，而不仅仅是中心-外围的稳态结构。     

Building a mutually beneficial partnership to ensure backup supply

In today׳s complex global environment, it is very important for a firm to possess backup supply resource when facing unpredictable disruptions from its primary supply resource. To ensure the actual arrival of backup supply in cases of primary supply disruptions, a purchasing firm needs to work with its backup supplier to forge a strong partnership that not only protects itself, but also assures the backup supplier׳s economic benefit. In this research, we establish the structure of such a partnership based on real business practices. The interactions between the purchasing firm and the backup supplier are examined through a decision-tree approach that takes disruption situations at all levels into consideration. We then design the backup supply contract, find the Nash equilibrium contract parameters, and identify the critical conditions under which such a contractual partnership will be valuable. The contract parameters we find are functions of the moments of the demand distribution, which are independent of specific demand distributions and are easy to be estimated in practice. Our numerical tests support our theoretical results and demonstrate the robustness of the contract with respect to various demand distributions.     

Modelling Building Societies Takeovers a Non-Cooperative Game

Takeover and acquisition of corporations is awell-researched area and has been becomingincreasingly important. Much less research emphasishas been devoted to takeover activity within thegeneral area of financial services with thisparticularly the case for the building society sector.The building societies being mutual companies havespecial characteristics. The building societies andother financial mutuals like the corporations doencounter an acute agency problem. This opens up apotential application of Grossman and Hart theory oftakeovers bids as the individuals have option to freeride, securing knowledge that the regulatory processrenders their deposits de facto risk-free investment.This free-rider problem, like the corporations can beovercome by inducing hostile takeover.Some empirical studies of mergers activities withinthe building society sector have dealt with onlyintra-sectoral mergers. However, they have not lookedat inter-sectoral mergers and have not addressedefficiency issues in a general equilibrium frameworkusing game theory.In this paper I suggest a mechanism for merger at parwith sales of stocks of a corporation to organisebuilding societies' takeovers. I develop a two-stagegame between the members of building societies and theraider. Analysis of non-cooperative voting behaviourof members of Cheltenham and Gloucester buildingsociety shows that the actions of the members of thebuilding society may also give rise to less thanoptimal results as they may not be acting in their bestinterests. The members of the building society cangain if a hostile takeover is induced rather than afriendly takeover. The paper also examines the freerider problem and ex-ante efficiency in a generalequilibrium framework.     

Computing Normal Form Perfect Equilibria for Extensive Two‐Person Games

This paper presents an algorithm for computing an equilibrium of an extensive two‐person game with perfect recall. The method is computationally efficient by virtue of using the sequence form, whose size is proportional to the size of the game tree. The equilibrium is traced on a piecewise linear path in the sequence form strategy space from an arbitrary starting vector. If the starting vector represents a pair of completely mixed strategies, then the equilibrium is normal form perfect. Computational experiments compare the sequence form and the reduced normal form, and show that only the sequence form is tractable for larger games.     

Clubs and the Market

This paper defines a general equilibrium model with exchange and club formation. Agents trade multiple private goods widely in the market, can belong to several clubs, and care about the characteristics of the other members of their clubs. The space of agents is a continuum, but clubs are finite. It is shown that (i) competitive equilibria exist, and (ii) the core coincides with the set of equilibrium states. The central subtlety is in modeling club memberships and expressing the notion that membership choices are consistent across the population.     

双寡头电力市场垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型

考虑单电网公司与双发电商所组成的渠道结构,构建了发电商投资减排、电网公司投资消纳的优势互补的异质型垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型,先后考察并比较了分散决策和集成决策下的反馈均衡结果。在此基础上,讨论了利润共享契约下系统增量利润的分配问题。研究表明：对于分散决策,电网公司选择性承担发电商的减排费用;两种决策下的发电商减排和电网公司购电价格以及分散决策下的减排补贴与发电商之间的减排竞争强度相关;在一定条件和范围内,合作博弈有利于提高电网公司购电电价,同时为此所带来的风险增大。     

金融发展差异与货币政策区域效应——以华东六省一市为例

选取华东六省一市作为研究对象,运用因子分析方法研究2012年该7个省市金融发展情况及其差异,并对其金融发展相似性进行聚类分析。在此基础上,采用1990—2012年数据,对聚类后的三类地区通过基于VAR模型的协整关系检验、Granger因果关系检验等建立变量间长期均衡模型,实证研究货币政策在华东地区不同省市效应的差异性。研究结果表明:三类地区经济增长和货币政策对于区域金融发展均具有明显的区域效应,经济发展和广义货币供应量与金融发展均呈正相关关系。鉴此,提出如下政策建议:正视区域经济发展差异,实施差别化货币调控政策;优化各区域金融结构差异,改善货币政策传导效应等。     

人力资源招聘模式的博弈均衡分析

招聘过程实质上是招聘方和参与应聘方相互决策的过程。文章应用博弈理论的相关知识,探讨了招聘过程中的博弈行为和存在的条件,分析了组织从内部选聘和外部招聘两种方式存在的博弈均衡。从而为组织和应聘方在这一决策过程中提供各自理性思考和分析的定量依据。     

Games With Discontinuous Payoffs: A Strengthening of Reny's Existence Theorem

We provide a pure Nash equilibrium existence theorem for games with discontinuous payoffs whose hypotheses are in a number of ways weaker than those of the theorem of Reny (1999). In comparison with Reny's argument, our proof is brief. Our result subsumes a prior existence result of Reny (1999) that is not covered by his theorem. We use the main result to prove the existence of pure Nash equilibrium in a class of finite games in which agents' pure strategies are subsets of a given set, and in turn use this to prove the existence of stable configurations for games, similar to those used by Schelling (1971, 1972) to study residential segregation, in which agents choose locations.     

On the Existence of Monotone Pure‐Strategy Equilibria in Bayesian Games

We generalize Athey's (2001) and McAdams' (2003) results on the existence of monotone pure‐strategy equilibria in Bayesian games. We allow action spaces to be compact locally complete metric semilattices and type spaces to be partially ordered probability spaces. Our proof is based on contractibility rather than convexity of best‐reply sets. Several examples illustrate the scope of the result, including new applications to multi‐unit auctions with risk‐averse bidders.