Public Disclosure and Dissimulation of Insider Trades

Regulation requiring insiders to publicly disclose their stock trades after the fact complicates the trading decisions of informed, rent‐seeking insiders. Given this requirement, we present an insider's equilibrium trading strategy in a multiperiod rational expectations framework. Relative to Kyle (1985), price discovery is accelerated and insider profits are lower. The strategy balances immediate profits from informed trades against the reduction in future profits following trade disclosure and, hence, revelation of some of the insider's information. Our results offer a novel rationale for contrarian trading: dissimulation, a phenomenon distinct from manipulation, may underlie insiders' trading decisions.     

Humanitarian Funding in a Multi‐Donor Market with Donation Uncertainty

This study analyzes the trade‐off between funding strategies and operational performance in humanitarian operations. If a Humanitarian Organization (HO) offers donors the option of earmarking their donations, HO should expect an increase in total donations. However, earmarking creates constraints in resource allocation that negatively affect HO's operational performance. We study this trade‐off from the perspective of a single HO that maximizes its expected utility as a function of total donations and operational performance. HO implements disaster response and development programs and it operates in a multi‐donor market with donation uncertainty. Using a model inspired by Scarf's minimax approach and the newsvendor framework, we analyze the strategic interaction between HO and its donors. The numerical section is based on real data from 15 disasters during the period 2012–2013. We find that poor operational performance has a larger effect on HO's utility function when donors are more uncertain about HO's expected needs for disaster response. Interestingly, increasing the public awareness of development programs helps HO to get more non‐earmarked donations for disaster response. Increasing non‐earmarked donations improves HO's operational efficiency, which mitigates the impact of donation uncertainty on HO's utility function.     

Liquidity in Asset Markets With Search Frictions

We develop a search‐theoretic model of financial intermediation in an over‐the‐counter market and study how trading frictions affect the distribution of asset holdings and standard measures of liquidity. A distinctive feature of our theory is that it allows for unrestricted asset holdings, so market participants can accommodate trading frictions by adjusting their asset positions. We show that these individual responses of asset demands constitute a fundamental feature of illiquid markets: they are a key determinant of trade volume, bid–ask spreads, and trading delays—the dimensions of market liquidity that search‐based theories seek to explain.     

基于会计信息披露的企业间流动性风险传染研究

从信息经济学视角,借助复杂网络理论构建了企业间流动性关联网络及其风险传染网络模型,综合分析了不同关联网络结构以及会计信息披露因素联动影响下的企业间流动性风险传染机制与演化特征。研究得到的主要结论有:无标度关联网络对于企业间流动性风险更具稳健性,并且在网络结构确定情况下,企业间流动性风险传染概率与会计信息披露的稳健性、透明度、及时性以及质量呈负相关关系,与市场噪音呈正相关关系,而与会计信息披露策略呈正“U”型关系。会计信息披露的稳健性、透明度、及时性以及质量同步增大,能够有效降低企业间流动性风险传染概率。会计信息披露策略是诱发企业间流动性风险传染的核心因素,并对会计信息披露的稳健性、透明度、及时性以及质量的实际效果发挥弱化效应。市场噪音对企业间流动性风险传染的强化效应强于其他会计信息披露因素的弱化效应。通过深入挖掘不同会计信息披露因素间联动性对企业间流动性风险传染的扰动效应,能够为金融监管部门制定流动性风险监管策略提供理论依据。