Group incentives or individual incentives? A real-effort weak-link experiment

Motivated by previous research on coordination problems and incentive design in organizations, we compare group incentives and individual incentives in a new experimental test-bed: a real-effort task embedding a weak-link technology. Comparing group-incentive and individual-incentive treatments, we find that the observed dynamics of both individual errors and worst performances within firms, after a phase of learning, are largely indistinguishable. Importantly, and possibly explaining our finding, more than 80% of our laboratory firms, notwithstanding initially widespread inefficiency, were eventually able to achieve and sustain efficient coordination despite the presence of an unforgiving payoff structure. This result, which may be due to the reduced strategic uncertainty so characteristic of chosen-effort weak-link game experiments, stands in stark contrast to standard results in the coordination game literature and provides an interesting challenge to test-beds currently used.     

The pric(z)e of hard work: Different incentive effects of non-monetary and monetary prizes

Do non-monetary or monetary prizes induce the highest work performances in competitions? We conducted a real-effort lab experiment to test for differences in the effect of both incentives on work productivity. Our main findings are that the performances of subjects in pursuit of a monetary prize exceed those of subjects in pursuit of non-monetary incentives. However, the work quality and the retrospective feeling of having had fun at work, which is associated with the received prizes, decrease in combination with greater effort. Furthermore, a competition with monetary prizes appears to label winners and losers. If non-monetary prizes are used, losers are, to a certain extent, more able to adjust their feeling of satisfaction by changing the subjectively perceived prizes.     

Behavioral implications of providing real incentives in stated choice experiments

This paper explores the potential impacts of introducing real economic incentives in choice experiments (CE). While many others have investigated such impacts before, the majority of the literature has focused solely on mitigation of hypothetical bias. We contribute to this literature by widening the scope of research to other behavioral aspects where consumers in CE are often found to deviate from homo economicus. We develop a theoretical model where not only Willingness to pay (WTP) measures but also decision processing can be affected by the introduction of an economic incentive. Specifically, our model allows for differential impacts on attribute processing, depending on the character of the attribute as well as self-image effects. In an empirical CE survey, we find some, though not unequivocal, support of our model. Even though we find no impact on WTP from introducing an economic incentive, we find marked benefits in relation to a number of behavioral aspects that together would favor the use of an economic incentive regardless of hypothetical bias being present or not.     

跨国双向供应链物流合作模型分析

针对中欧班列去回程商品双向流动的现实问题,构建了跨国双向供应链的物流合作模型。考虑境内外物流公司搭建合作平台,通过制定激励策略来缩小双向运量差和提升运载总量,对比物流非合作与物流合作下的双向供应链运作以及平台的激励作用,为中欧班列的市场化运营提供微观运作基础。研究发现：物流合作平台的建立在达到自身激励目标的同时还提高了供应链整体收益,有利于推动中欧班列市场化运营,但是,缩小运量差与提升运量总量这两个激励目标之间存在一定的“对冲效应”。     

Chemical Leasing Business Models—A Contribution to the Effective Risk Management of Chemical Substances

Chemicals indisputably contribute greatly to the well-being of modern societies. Apart from such benefits, however, chemicals often pose serious threats to human health and the environment when improperly handled. Therefore, the European Commission has proposed a regulatory framework for the Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals (REACH) that requires companies using chemicals to gather pertinent information on the properties of these substances. In this article, we argue that the crucial aspect of this information management may be the honesty and accuracy of the transfer of relevant knowledge from the producer of a chemical to its user. This may be particularly true if the application of potentially hazardous chemicals is not part of the user's core competency. Against this background, we maintain that the traditional sales concept provides no incentives for transferring this knowledge. The reason is that increased user knowledge of a chemical's properties may raise the efficiency of its application. That is, excessive and unnecessary usage will be eliminated. This, in turn, would lower the amount of chemicals sold and in competitive markets directly decrease profits of the producer. Through the introduction of chemical leasing business models, we attempt to present a strategy to overcome the incentive structure of classical sales models, which is counterproductive for the transfer of knowledge. By introducing two models (a Model A that differs least and a Model B that differs most from traditional sales concepts), we demonstrate that chemical leasing business models are capable of accomplishing the goal of Registration, Evaluation and Authorization of Chemicals: to effectively manage the risk of chemicals by reducing the total quantity of chemicals used, either by a transfer of applicable knowledge from the lessor to the lessee (Model A) or by efficient application of the chemical by the lessor him/herself (Model B).     

我国煤层气产业发展中存在的问题与对策

煤层气产业是一个新兴产业,是我国在十二五期间重点鼓励发展的产业之一。在分析我国煤层气资源现状的基础上,对煤层气产业发展中存在的问题进行了研究,认为我国煤层气产业存在着体制不顺、资金投入不足、专业人才缺乏等问题,提出了煤层气产业发展的对策,以期对我国煤层气产业的快速发展有一定的指导意义。     

Rent Control: An Economic Abomination

Rent control is a public policy which fails on both normative and positive economic grounds. In the former case, it violates all canons of equity, of both right (private property rights are sacrosanct) and left (it does not promote egalitarianism, rather, often, it enriches rich tenants and impoverishes poor landlords). In the latter, it leads to inefficiency, deterioration of rental housing, reduces incentives for upkeep and maintenance, reduces labor mobility, exacerbates landlord tenant relations, promotes housing abandonment and homelessness, and misallocates resources away from residential rental units. This sovietization of housing has effects similar to the sovietization of anything else: farming, factories, industry, forestry, whatever. This revised version was published online in August 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Efficiency Wages: Signals or Incentives An Empirical Study of the Relationship between Wage and Commitment

Efficiency wage theories arguethat firms induce their employees to work in a moredisciplined way by paying high wages. Two basicmechanisms have been pointed out in economics about how these wage premia motivate employees.The incentives-driven `shirking model' impliesthat employees who have a highly paid job workin a more disciplined way so as to avoid beingdismissed. The ``gift exchange' model is basedon the assumption that high wages change therelationship between employer and employee.Empirical evidence on the incentives approachis mixed and a thorough competitive testingagainst the gift exchange model was notpossible due to the fact that the latter wasnot worked out enough. However, there is a relational theory of efficiency wages which isworked out in detail in order to allow directcompetitive testing. This relationalsignaling approach, as it is called, is basedon framing effects and comes to specifichypotheses about the conditions under whichefficiency wages work. These hypothesescontrast sharply with predictions from theincentives approach. The paper presents anempirical test of the theories and shows thatthe data clearly reject the incentive-basedpredictions and confirm the relationalsignaling predictions.     

大学生网游成瘾案例引发的思考

通过分析一则大学生网游成瘾的案例及其心理诱因——人际交往受挫、学习目标迷失、抑郁人格特征形成、社会支持缺乏,找到矫正策略——认知重建,压力排解,责任归位,勇于“空杯”,以期引发对大学生网游成瘾问题的进一步思考。     

Spillovers from targeting of incentives: Exploring responses to being excluded

A growing set of policies involve transfers conditioned upon socially desired actions, such as attending school or conserving forest. However, given a desire to maximize the impact of limited funds by avoiding transfers that do not change behavior, typically some potential recipients are excluded on the basis of their characteristics, their actions or at random. This paper uses a laboratory experiment to study the behavior of individuals excluded on different bases from a new incentive that encourages real monetary donations to a public environmental conservation program. We show that the donations from the individuals who were excluded based on prior high contributions fell significantly. Yet the rationale used for exclusion mattered, in that none of the other selection criteria used as the basis for exclusion resulted in negative effects on contributions.