An intellectual history of NUD*IST and NVivo

Since the rise of qualitative computing in the mid-1980s, the field of qualitative data analysis has changed in a number of ways, which remarkably have been ignored in the methodological literature, to the detriment of the area's self-understanding. This paper provides for the record an account of the intellectual development of the two qualitative data analysis programs that I have designed, together with Lyn Richards. The theme behind the history is: (1) computing has enabled new, previously unavailable qualitative techniques; (2) some important pre-computer techniques and methods were not supported by computerization of the field, at least until recently; and hence (3) computerization encouraged some biases in qualitative techniques. I hope that this paper will act as a source for a revitalized and up-to-date debate on methods and techniques that recognizes computer use as an agent of change in the field.     

企业晋升公平激励与优化对策研究

我国企业晋升制度不健全、监督机制不完善、晋升文化扭曲等原因导致了我国企业晋升激励中存在性别歧视、玻璃天花板、看重关系等问题。企业要构建基于组织公平的晋升激励模型,并从培育正确的组织公平文化,不断完善晋升程序,选择和培训合适的晋升决策者,帮助员工树立正确的晋升观念,扩展我国企业晋升激励路径等五个方面保障企业晋升的公平激励效果。     

The Impact of a Mandatory Employment Program on Welfare Terminations

ABSTRACT

This longitudinal study analyzes the impact of one of the most ambitious employment and training programs in the nation, California's Greater Avenue for Independence (GAIN), on welfare terminations. The study isolates the effects of GAIN from other effects by controlling for AFDC program characteristics and labor market conditions. The findings suggest that, all else constant, GAIN increased terminations in a modest fashion. The paper discusses the difficulties future welfare-to-work programs are likely to have in substantially increasing terminations even with stringent mandatory work requirements.     

考虑动态损失厌恶的V2G市场交易激励机制设计

为推进V2G服务设想的实现,本文将电动汽车用户的动态损失厌恶特性考虑在内,分析了一般“保底收购,随行就市”市场制度下,电动汽车用户与电网公司间关于V2G服务交易的博弈行为,并提出了相应的激励机制。研究发现:在一般“保底收购,随行就市”市场制度下,电动汽车用户关于V2G服务的行为选择无法满足电网公司关于V2G服务电量的期望;电动汽车用户对V2G服务电量的决策受其对未来交易价格预期的影响,且存在违约风险。鉴于此,文章引入“激励保证金+违约金”的激励机制,并给出了对应的保底价格策略、激励保证金与违约金等策略,以使电动汽车用户的V2G服务选择与电网公司的期望相统一。算例分析结果验证了本文提出的模型与理论分析的可行性。     

对当前大学生激励的几点思考——以“90后”大学生为例

在《中国首份针对“90后”大学新生的调研报告》的基础上，对“90后”大学生的激励方式进行了思考，以加强当前大学生的管理工作。     

创新动力与R&D溢出

本文从产业组织角度,比较已进入市场的企业与新进入的企业在技术创新动力上的差异,主要从四个方面考察：沉没成本效应;转换效应;效率效应;代理成本与创新激励。此外,企业创新的动机还受到R&D溢出的影响,本文对产业内和产业间R&D溢出所导致的企业创新行为作了具体分析。     

内在动机与外在激励

本文结合管理实践系统论述了内在动机对于个体行为的激励作用,探讨了个体的内在动机与外在激励之间的关系,明确了内在动机与外在激励在激励机制设计中的地位。通过模型分析发现,内在动机对于个体的行为具有显著的激励作用,它能够提高个体的努力水平。内在动机对于外在激励具有替代作用,内在动机是个体努力的根源,应该成为激励机制的核心,而外在激励则是对内在动机的补充。     

Social Connections and Incentives in the Workplace: Evidence From Personnel Data

We present evidence on the effect of social connections between workers and managers on productivity in the workplace. To evaluate whether the existence of social connections is beneficial to the firm's overall performance, we explore how the effects of social connections vary with the strength of managerial incentives and worker's ability. To do so, we combine panel data on individual worker's productivity from personnel records with a natural field experiment in which we engineered an exogenous change in managerial incentives, from fixed wages to bonuses based on the average productivity of the workers managed. We find that when managers are paid fixed wages, they favor workers to whom they are socially connected irrespective of the worker's ability, but when they are paid performance bonuses, they target their effort toward high ability workers irrespective of whether they are socially connected to them or not. Although social connections increase the performance of connected workers, we find that favoring connected workers is detrimental for the firm's overall performance.     

CoPS创新用户对系统集成商的激励研究——模型与模拟分析

本文通过模型的建立和模拟,对CoPS创新系统集成商的激励问题进行了探讨。认为在信息非对称条件下系统集成商的创新风险规避度和未来创新收益方差的大小将影响CoPS用户对系统集成商激励方案的设计,进而影响系统集成商最优努力水平的选择以及激励成本和总代理成本的大小,最后,影响各自收益的大小。     

Threshold Incentives and Sales Variance

In this paper, we analyze the impact of two forms of commonly used threshold‐based incentive schemes on the observed sales variability. The first form of the incentive comprises an additional marginal payment on crossing a specified sales threshold and the second form of the incentive scheme comprises a lumpsum bonus payment on crossing the predetermined sales threshold. We model the effect of such incentives under two specific scenarios: an exclusive dealership selling a single product and a non‐exclusive dealer selling two competing products. For an exclusive dealer, we show that a bonus contract not only increases the expected sales, but, more importantly, decreases the sales (order) variance. Consequently, the bonus‐based scheme allows the manufacturer to regulate sales variance better. With a non‐exclusive dealer, the sales variance increases substantially with an additional marginal payment contract. However, our analysis suggests that the bonus contract continues to perform better in this case, too, if the threshold level is set appropriately using the underlying demand distribution.