论亲子关系双轨制的构建

我国现行法律在亲子关系的认定上实行单轨制，体现为身份关系严格要式登记主义以及单一的完全收养效力模式的设置。这可能导致现实中缺乏形式要件的事实亲子关系无法得到法律的有效保护；收养关系中收养人与被收养人的拟制亲子关系完全取代自然血亲亲子关系，也与我国传统亲情伦理传统相悖。而亲子关系双轨制的实行，可以兼顾自然亲子关系与法定亲子关系，更有利于儿童最大利益原则的实现，也更加符合我国当今社会现状。建议通过增设身份占有制度与不完全收养制度来构建亲子关系双轨制，作为我国现行亲子制度的补充，以满足纷繁复杂的社会生活之需。     

Collateral Avoids Ponzi Schemes in Incomplete Markets

Without introducing either debt constraints or transversality conditions to avoid the possibility of Ponzi schemes, we show the existence of equilibrium in an infinite horizon incomplete markets economy with a collateral structure.     

Complexity as a Contract Design Factor: A Human‐to‐Human Experimental Study

Despite being theoretically suboptimal, simpler contracts (such as price‐only contracts and quantity discount contracts with limited number of price blocks) are commonly preferred in practice. Thus, exploring the tension between theory and practice regarding complexity and performance in contract design is especially relevant. Using human subject experiments, Kalkancı et al. (2011) showed that such simpler contracts perform effectively for a supplier interacting with a computerized buyer under asymmetric demand information. We use a similar set of experiments with the modification that a human supplier interacts with a human buyer. We show that human interactions strengthen the supplier's preference for simpler contracts. We find that suppliers have fairness concerns even when they interact with computerized buyers. These fairness concerns tend to be even stronger when suppliers interact with human buyers, particularly when the complexity of the contract is low. We also find that suppliers are more prone to random decision errors (i.e., bounded rationality) when interacting with human buyers. In the absence of social preferences, Kalkancı et al. identified reinforcement and bounded rationality as key biases that impact suppliers' decisions. In human‐to‐human experiments, we find evidence for social preference effects. However, these effects may be secondary to bounded rationality.