“逸”作为审美范畴在唐宋时期的迁替

唐宋之际 ,社会审美思潮发生了很大变化 ,“逸”作为审美范畴在士大夫的观念中成为一种审美理想。“逸”是文人画的精神核心。宋代文人画 ,为了高扬主体情志 ,不仅要超越形似 ,而且要通过简化、变形等艺术手段 ,使画中的形象与所画的事物产生很大的间离感、陌生化 ,从而突出主体的情志。从创作主体的精神状态而言 ,“逸”是一种审美的自由创造 ,这种创造必然表现为对技巧规范的超越     

Is the beauty premium accessible to all? An experimental analysis

We conducted a trust game experiment to investigate whether women are trusted more when they wear makeup than when they do not. Facial attractiveness, which was manipulated through the application of makeup by a professional makeup artist, was measured before and after makeovers. Trustors were shown a photograph of their female counterparts before they made decisions about money transfers to trustees. The results showed that wearing makeup increased perceived attractiveness, which in turn led trustors to make larger transfers to female trustees during the trust game. Additionally, we discovered a pure makeup premium that was mediated by gender. Specifically, female trustees with makeup received larger transfers than female trustees without makeup when the trustors were men, even after controlling for female trustees’ levels of attractiveness.     

论成品油定价机制中的有限规制：基于合谋的视角

利用单期静态博弈分析法、有限期动态博弈分析法和无限期动态博弈分析法对成品油定价机制中寡头厂商的合谋行为进行了分析。研究发现：两家寡头厂商在合谋条件下的收益均高于双方各自独立定产条件下的收益，因此，双方存在进行价格合谋的利益激励。基于此，我国成品油价格形成机制的改革可以考虑采用有限规制等手段。     

双寡头电力市场垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型

考虑单电网公司与双发电商所组成的渠道结构,构建了发电商投资减排、电网公司投资消纳的优势互补的异质型垂直合作减排的随机微分对策模型,先后考察并比较了分散决策和集成决策下的反馈均衡结果。在此基础上,讨论了利润共享契约下系统增量利润的分配问题。研究表明：对于分散决策,电网公司选择性承担发电商的减排费用;两种决策下的发电商减排和电网公司购电价格以及分散决策下的减排补贴与发电商之间的减排竞争强度相关;在一定条件和范围内,合作博弈有利于提高电网公司购电电价,同时为此所带来的风险增大。     

高校突发事件网络舆情传播的博弈分析--以香港占中事件为例

高校突发事件网络舆情的管理关系到高校教学乃至社会发展的稳定。以香港“占中”事件为例,运用演化博弈分析方法,建立学生群体面对突发事件策略选择的博弈模型,通过模型分析学生策略选择对网络舆情演变的影响。该模型可推广到一般的高校突发事件,对研究高校突发事件网络舆情具有一定的借鉴意义。     

双边不确定性条件下制造商质量投资与零售商销售努力决策

已有研究较少同时考察供应链中制造商产品质量信号传递和零售商销售努力调整的问题。本文考虑零售商通过努力水平改变市场需求,且制造商分摊一定比例销售努力成本的情形,制造商在决定进行质量投资后,双方对制造商能否成为高质量类型各有不同的信念,零售商只能通过观察制造商提供的契约来修正关于制造商类型的信念,并确定产品销售价格与销售努力水平。构建博弈模型分析了双方的质量投资决策、销售努力决策、定价决策以及成本分摊比例。结果表明,在不考虑质量投资成本的情形下,制造商的质量投资能够达到帕累托最优。为了激励零售商付出最优促销努力水平,销售契约中规定销售成本分摊比例与惩罚措施,由于讨价还价的存在,实际的销售成本分摊比例小于对制造商最有利的成本分摊比例。对零售商而言,制造商承担的销售成本分摊比例并非越高越好,这意味着如果超过一定范围,制造商的成本分摊反而会损害零售商的利益。     

供应链企业碳减排投资策略选择与行为演化研究

基于当下气候变暖的背景中有社会责任感的消费者对低碳产品有特殊偏好的情境,研究上游企业主导的供应链在面对具有低碳产品偏好的市场消费者时,上下游企业的减排投资行为与策略。依照Stackelberg博弈模型,构建上下游企业采用不同的行为策略的支付矩阵。进而,应用演化博弈理论中双种群演化博弈模型分析得到上下游企业减排投资行为的演化稳定策略:当需要较大的投资或者下游企业分担减排成本意愿较强时,由处于主导地位的上游企业实施投资减排是稳定的;当需要较小的减排投资或者下游企业分担减排成本意愿较弱时,上下游企业组成的供应链中必然会有一个企业实施减排。最后,指出了减排投资系数和下游企业分担投资成本比例的不同对演化博弈稳定均衡的影响。     

Strategic Motive for Introducing Internet Channels in a Supply Chain

Rapid advances of information technology in recent years have enabled both the manufacturers and the retailers to operate their own Internet channels. In this study, we investigate the interaction between the capabilities of introducing the Internet channels, the pricing strategies, and the channel structure. We classify consumers into two segments: grocery shoppers attach a higher utility from purchasing through the physical channel, whereas a priori Internet shoppers prefer purchasing online. We find that when the Internet shoppers are either highly profitable or fairly unimportant, the manufacturer prefers to facilitate the channel separation either through his own Internet channel or the retailer's. In the intermediate region, however, the manufacturer encroaches the grocery shoppers and steals the demand from the retailer's physical channel. With horizontal competition between retailers, a priori symmetric retailers may adopt different channel strategies as a stable market equilibrium. The manufacturer may willingly give up his Internet channel and leverage on the retailer competition. When the manufacturer sells through an online e‐tailer, Internet shoppers may be induced to purchase through the physical channel. This reverse encroachment strategy emerges because selling through the e‐tailer leads to a more severe double marginalization problem.     

Coordinating Production and Marketing with Dynamic Transfer Prices

Decentralized decision making is a fact in the modern business world accompanied by extensive research that looks into its consequences for overall firm profits. We study the interactions of decentralized marketing and operations divisions in a corporation and explore their impact on overall firm profits in the case with and without coordination of the two decentralized units. We assume that the marketing department is responsible for the price that influences the demand (sales), and the operations department is responsible for the production rate. We allow for backlogging over time. We model the interdependence involving marketing and operations decisions as a non‐cooperative differential game, with the two divisions as strategically interacting players. We find that, without coordination, strategic interactions of marketing and production result in inefficiencies that can quantitatively be substantial. Next, we introduce a dynamic transfer pricing scheme as a coordination device and evaluate if it establishes efficient (first best and fully coordinated) outcomes. We show that if production and marketing play a game with pre‐commitment strategies, there exists a dynamic transfer price that efficiently (fully) coordinates decentralized decision making and hence results in Pareto‐efficient company profits. If the two decentralized divisions play a game without pre‐commitment, dynamic transfer prices can partially coordinate decentralized decision making but fail to fully eliminate overall inefficiencies arising from strategic interactions among decentralized divisions.     

Information Acquisition and Voluntary Disclosure in an Export‐Processing System

We study a strategic information management problem in the export‐processing trade, where the buyer controls the raw material input and sales and the producer is responsible for production. The production is vulnerable to random yield risk. The producer can exert a costly effort to acquire the private yield rate information and discretionarily share it with the buyer. We develop a sequential Bayesian game model that captures three key features of the system—endogenous information endowment, voluntary disclosure, and ex post information sharing—a significant departure from the literature. The optimal disclosure strategy is driven by the trade‐off between the gains from Pareto efficiency improvement and self‐interested overproduction. It is specified by two thresholds on yield rate: only the middle‐yield producers (with yield rate between these two thresholds) share private information to improve supply‐demand match; the low‐ and high‐yield producers withhold information to extract excess input from the buyer. The buyer in response penalizes nondisclosure with reduced input and rewards information sharing with a larger order. This strategic interaction is further exacerbated by the double marginalization effect from decentralization, resulting in severe efficiency loss. We examine the effectiveness of three corrective mechanisms—vertical integration, mandatory disclosure, and production restriction—and reveal the costs of information suppressive effect and overinvestment incentive and the benefit from concessions on the processing fee. Our study endogenizes the asymmetric supply risk and provides the first attempt to rationalize the strategic interactions of informational and operational incentives in the export‐processing system.