IT外包关系质量研究

建立高效率的关系,对于企业IT外包活动的成功有着重要的影响。营销学中的关系质量概念对于有效衡量IT外包关系以及关系的绩效,起了很强的推动作用。在文献梳理的基础上,通过结合当前研究的最新趋势,对IT外包中的关系质量研究现状做一述评,并在此基础上提出有关管理实践和研究的建议。     

收益激励的优化与最优工期的选择

对于科技研发等具有明显时间价值的项目以及水电站建设等大型项目而言,提前完工能够带来显著的经济效益,基于资源、进度和成本因素的考虑,外包成为此类项目的战略选择。当前对项目收益激励及工期优化问题的研究较多基于确定性工期或非合作视角,在实际施工中由于外生变量的影响工期往往不确定,因此分析工期不确定情况下,考虑参与各方的风险偏好,设计基于合作的激励机制对项目外包实践有重要的意义。基于此,从合作博弈的角度,分别制定了工期确定、工期不确定情况下的激励合同;通过模型对比,分析外界因素、承包商、分包商各自对激励机制设计的影响;并进一步提出基于收益最大化的联盟合作在工期确定时可以达到,在工期不确定时可以通过基于信任的Partnering项目管理模式达到。最后提出了对于外包项目激励机制设计的一些建议。     

IT服务业外包对服务来源国就业的影响

从外包服务来源国的角度出发,对服务业外包的基本理论进行阐述,从现状和特点的层面对 中国和印度服务业外包情况进行定性的比较研究;同时针对中国和印度,运用模型实证研究 IT外包对服务来源国就业的影响,得出IT外包受工资、外包系数、外国投资和外包利润四个 变量的影响;最后对中国外包的发展提出合理化建议。     

全球服务外包产业发展趋势及中国选择

在金融危机的影响下,全球服务外包产业出现一系列新趋势。尽管全球外包市场萎缩,中国服务外包产业仍然保持了快速增长态势。后危机时代,国际服务产业加快转移和重组,本土市场潜力加快释放等多方面有利因素为中国服务外包产业加快发展提供了重要机遇。"成本优势"是现阶段产业竞争力的主要来源,加快发展和提升水平的关键在于实现从"成本导向"向"价值导向"的转变。     

企业资源外包运作与管理研究

资源外包是企业培育和提升核心能力以获取持续竞争优势的一种战略行为.在归纳总结西方学者资源外包概念研究的基础上,进一步界定了资源外包内涵,划分了资源外包类型,分析了资源外包动因,从外包准备、外包业务确定、外包商选择以及外包分析与建议等方面研究了资源外包决策,针对外包实施中存在的问题,从管理组织模式和外包关系管理两个方面提出了成功实施外包的建议,并构建了一个六阶段外包运作与管理框架.     

企业物流外包中选取物流供应商的应用研究

本文针对企业物流外包问题,提出了选取物流供应商的一些指标因素.基于这些指标因素,给出了一种应用三角模糊数互补判断矩阵选取物流供应商的决策方法,并结合示例对该决策方法进行验证,为企业物流外包决策提供理论依据.     

中国企业品牌建设的困境与突破方向

“代工生产”发展模式形成的严重后果是使做为接受“代工”的中国企业只对产品进行低端加工,既没有技术创新,又没有自主知识产权的知名品牌,信息来源和销售渠道完全依赖海外供应商和进口商,赚取的只是低廉的手工费。加入“世贸”以后,中国企业尤其是东南沿海的制造业应从以资源消耗型的发展转向以创建自有知识产权为核心的企业品牌建设,其中,应主要解决企业自身观念的滞后和体制因素带来的障碍,通过推动国际品牌建设,实现中国企业的产业升级。     

On the Advantage of Quantity Leadership When Outsourcing Production to a Competitive Contract Manufacturer

This study investigates a supply chain comprising an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and a contract manufacturer (CM), in which the CM acts as both upstream partner and downstream competitor to the OEM. The two parties can engage in one of three Cournot competition games: a simultaneous game, a sequential game with the OEM as the Stackelberg leader, and a sequential game with the CM as the Stackelberg leader. On the basis of these three basic games, this study investigates the two parties' Stackelberg leadership/followership decisions. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are exogenously given, either party may prefer Stackelberg leadership or followership. For example, when the wholesale price or the proportion of production outsourced to the CM is lower than a threshold value, both parties prefer Stackelberg leadership and, consequently, play a simultaneous game in the consumer market. When the outsourcing quantity and wholesale price are decision variables, the competitive CM sets a wholesale price sufficiently low to allow both parties to coexist in the market, and the OEM outsources its entire production to this CM. This study also examines the impact of the supply chain parties' bargaining power on contract outcomes by considering a wholesale price that is determined via the generalized Nash bargaining scheme, finding a Stackelberg equilibrium to be sustained when the CM's degree of bargaining power is great and the non‐competitive CM's wholesale price is high.     

Outsourcing to a Powerful Contract Manufacturer: The Effect of Learning‐by‐Doing

The contract manufacturing industry has grown rapidly in recent years as firms have increasingly outsourced production to reduce costs. This growth has created powerful contract manufacturers (CMs) in several industries. Achieving a competitive cost position is often a primary motive for outsourcing. Outsourcing influences both the original equipment manufacturer's (OEM) and the CM's production levels, and, therefore, through learning‐by‐doing renders future costs dependent on past outsourcing decisions. As such, outsourcing should not be viewed as a static decision that, once made, is not revisited. We address these considerations by analyzing a two‐period game between an OEM and a powerful CM wherein both firms can reduce their production costs through learning‐by‐doing. We find that partial outsourcing, wherein the OEM simultaneously outsources and produces in‐house, can be an optimal strategy. Also, we find that the OEM's outsourcing strategy may be dynamic—i.e., change from period to period. In addition, we find both that the OEM may engage in production for leverage (i.e., produce internally when at a cost disadvantage) and that the CM may engage in low balling. These and other findings in this paper demonstrate the importance of considering learning, the power of the CM, and future periods when making outsourcing decisions.     

生产环节外包能否助力中国粮食安全？——来自粮食主产区的证据

在中国大力扶持和推进生产环节外包服务业发展的现实背景下,系统评估生产环节外包对中国粮食安全的影响具有重要的现实意义。聚焦粮食安全数量目标与环境目标两个维度,从农户是否参与外包、农户的外包横向参与度与农户的外包纵深参与度三个层面,理论剖析生产环节外包影响中国粮食安全的逻辑机理,并使用中国粮食主产区1211户农户的抽样调查数据和CMP方法进行实证检验。研究发现：①从三大主粮的总体估计来看,生产环节外包有助于中国粮食安全数量目标的实现,但不利于中国粮食安全环境目标的达成。在解决潜在的内生性问题后,这一结论依然成立;②从玉米、小麦和水稻的分样本估计来看,生产环节外包对中国粮食安全的多维影响在玉米和水稻生产中仍较为稳健,但对小麦的增产效果并不明显;从黑龙江、河南和湖南的分样本估计来看,生产环节外包对中国粮食安全的多维影响在三大粮食主产省均较为稳健。目前,从服务视角破解资源环境约束与农户行为约束暂未成为解决中国粮食安全环境问题的有效途径,仍需进一步推动生产环节外包服务市场的发育与完善,鼓励并引导外包供给主体的绿色生产导向。