从主权国家的兴衰看权力博弈形态的转型

传统的国际关系理论,无论是现实主义、自由主义、建构主义还是科学行为主义理论,都是把主权国家抽象成一个统一的国际关系行为体。这一行为主体有一致的利益,也自然要有一致的对外政策目标和手段。在20世纪,尤其是在两次世界大战和冷战期间,这一概念抽象是非常准确的。但冷战结束以后,尤其是进入21世纪以后,这一概念抽象逐渐与国际关系的现实相违背。一方面,国家综合实力并不能直接转化为具体领域的竞争优势;另一方面,很多国家,包括超级大国在内,其对外政策的主要阻力可能不是所谓的竞争对手,而是其国内不同的利益集团。这导致传统的国际关系理论,从假设到概念和推理层面,都已经无法解释和预测今天的世界,而权力小博弈理论可以为认识多元复杂互动博弈时代的国际关系提供一个新的解释框架。     

Price bias and common practice in option pricing

Generally, the semiclosed-form option pricing formula for complex financial models depends on unobservable factors such as stochastic volatility and jump intensity. A popular practice is to use an estimate of these latent factors to compute the option price. However, in many situations this plug-and-play approximation does not yield the appropriate price. This article examines this bias and quantifies its impacts. We decompose the bias into terms that are related to the bias on the unobservable factors and to the precision of their point estimators. The approximated price is found to be highly biased when only the history of the stock price is used to recover the latent states. This bias is corrected when option prices are added to the sample used to recover the states' best estimate. We also show numerically that such a bias is propagated on calibrated parameters, leading to erroneous values. The Canadian Journal of Statistics 48: 8–35; 2020 © 2019 Statistical Society of Canada     

Who Should Pay for Interdependent Risk? Policy Implications for Security Interdependence Among Airports

We study interdependent risks in security, and shed light on the economic and policy implications of increasing security interdependence in presence of reactive attackers. We investigate the impact of potential public policy arrangements on the security of a group of interdependent organizations, namely, airports. Focusing on security expenditures and costs to society, as assessed by a social planner, to individual airports and to attackers, we first develop a game-theoretic framework, and derive explicit Nash equilibrium and socially optimal solutions in the airports network. We then conduct numerical experiments mirroring real-world cyber scenarios, to assess how a change in interdependence impact the airports' security expenditures, the overall expected costs to society, and the fairness of security financing. Our study provides insights on the economic and policy implications for the United States, Europe, and Asia.     

不同冷链服务模式下生鲜农产品供应链决策

基于单物流服务商、单供应商和单零售商构成的生鲜农产品供应链，构建3种冷链服务模式：承诺模式、提前要求模式与延后要求模式，探讨不同冷链服务模式对定价与冷链服务水平、企业绩效的影响。研究发现：某种冷链服务模式是否有利于消减数量与质量损耗依赖于产品易腐性、冷链服务成本及其分担比例。供应链成员无法在承诺模式与提前要求模式下形成统一的模式偏好。当物流服务商承担的冷链服务成本比例较低时，相比于提前要求模式，供应商偏好承诺模式，否则，偏好提前要求模式。承诺模式比提前要求模式更有利于物流服务商，然而对于零售商，结果正好相反。数值实验表明，虽然供应链成员无法对冷链服务模式形成整体的一致性偏好，但仍可实现局部的一致性偏好。     

Security Investment in Contagious Networks

Security of the systems is normally interdependent in such a way that security risks of one part affect other parts and threats spread through the vulnerable links in the network. So, the risks of the systems can be mitigated through investments in the security of interconnecting links. This article takes an innovative look at the problem of security investment of nodes on their vulnerable links in a given contagious network as a game‐theoretic model that can be applied to a variety of applications including information systems. In the proposed game model, each node computes its corresponding risk based on the value of its assets, vulnerabilities, and threats to determine the optimum level of security investments on its external links respecting its limited budget. Furthermore, direct and indirect nonlinear influences of a node's security investment on the risks of other nodes are considered. The existence and uniqueness of the game's Nash equilibrium in the proposed game are also proved. Further analysis of the model in a practical case revealed that taking advantage of the investment effects of other players, perfectly rational players (i.e., those who use the utility function of the proposed game model) make more cost‐effective decisions than selfish nonrational or semirational players.     

农业投入中政府与农户的博弈分析

农业投入状况关系着农业生产和农村经济的发展。目前农业投入不足已成为制约我国整体经济发展的“瓶颈”。在是否增加农业投入的问题上,政府与农户之间存在着一种博弈关系。通过农业投入不足的现状考察,用博弈的方法阐释农业投入不足的原因,提出加大农业投入的几点对策。     

关于人性论的博弈分析

中国的人性论生发出的圣人治国,是对人性的否定,产生的是囚徒困境难题;西方的人性论产生的是法律治国,是对人性的肯定,破解了囚徒困境难题.从博弈论视角看,出现如此分野的原因是,中国古代社会政治家们试图设计一种仅有帕累托最优均衡的制度,但因为没有从现实的人性出发,导致只能依靠人治维护表面的帕累托最优均衡,实际上存在的却是囚徒困境;西方社会的政治家们则以承认人性为前提,设计了一种帕累托次优均衡的制度.     

中国医疗机构定价中的问题及对策建议

医疗机构医疗服务定价需要考虑因素是医疗卫生行业管理的一个重要内容,合理有效定价对实现社会公平和福利分配,保障居民生命健康、促进社会稳定的具有重要的现实意义。本文对国内外医疗定价的几种主要模式进行简要介绍,然后分析一下我国现行医疗服务定价存在问题的原因,并给出几点改革建议,讨论需要建立一个合理的定价体系和监管体系需要考虑因素。     

批判的视境：传媒作为世界（下）——西方传媒批判理论的四个世界

对于大众传媒作为世界的丰富内涵的阐释,则是传媒批判理论始终如一的目标。具体来说,最初是对于大众传媒作为文化世界的发现;继而,是对于大众传媒作为权力世界的发现;然后,是对于大众传媒作为文本世界的发现;最后,是对于大众传媒作为游戏世界的发现,它意味着文化世界、权力世界、文本世界的消解,也意味着全新的传媒世界的即将莅临。     

会计信息可靠性与相关性的产权博弈分析

从产权经济学角度对会计信息的产权属性进行分析,把会计信息的产权主体定位为所有的信息使用者,认为会计信息的产权主体与会计信息质量特征之间存在密切关系。不同产权主体之间为有利于自身的信息进行博弈,可靠性和相关性孰轻孰重取决于各方在博弈中的力量对比。最后,文章提出重构会计信息市场、实现可靠性和相关性协调发展的若干对策。