论成品油定价机制中的有限规制：基于合谋的视角

利用单期静态博弈分析法、有限期动态博弈分析法和无限期动态博弈分析法对成品油定价机制中寡头厂商的合谋行为进行了分析。研究发现：两家寡头厂商在合谋条件下的收益均高于双方各自独立定产条件下的收益，因此，双方存在进行价格合谋的利益激励。基于此，我国成品油价格形成机制的改革可以考虑采用有限规制等手段。     

Cross‐Milieu Terrorist Collaboration: Using Game Theory to Assess the Risk of a Novel Threat

This article uses a game‐theoretic approach to analyze the risk of cross‐milieu terrorist collaboration—the possibility that, despite marked ideological differences, extremist groups from very different milieus might align to a degree where operational collaboration against Western societies becomes possible. Based upon theoretical insights drawn from a variety of literatures, a bargaining model is constructed that reflects the various benefits and costs for terrorists’ collaboration across ideological milieus. Analyzed in both sequential and simultaneous decision‐making contexts and through numerical simulations, the model confirms several theoretical arguments. The most important of these is that although likely to be quite rare, successful collaboration across terrorist milieus is indeed feasible in certain circumstances. The model also highlights several structural elements that might play a larger role than previously recognized in the collaboration decision, including that the prospect of nonmaterial gains (amplification of terror and reputational boost) plays at least as important a role in the decision to collaborate as potential increased capabilities does. Numerical simulation further suggests that prospects for successful collaboration over most scenarios (including operational) increase when a large, effective Islamist terrorist organization initiates collaboration with a smaller right‐wing group, as compared with the other scenarios considered. Although the small number of historical cases precludes robust statistical validation, the simulation results are supported by existing empirical evidence of collaboration between Islamists and right‐ or left‐wing extremists. The game‐theoretic approach, therefore, provides guidance regarding the circumstances under which such an unholy alliance of violent actors is likely to succeed.     

Inventory and transshipment decisions in the rationing game under capacity uncertainty

In this paper, we consider the inventory decisions of two retailers who are supplied by a single supplier with uncertain capacity. When capacity is allocated in proportion to the retailers׳ orders, the retailers compete for the capacity by inflating their orders (i.e., the rationing game). In addition, we allow the retailers to implement transshipment between them such that they cooperate by transshipping the surplus stock of one to another who is out of stock. Our analysis of Nash equilibrium orders shows that, while order inflation in the equilibrium orders persists in the rationing game with transshipment, it may not occur if the amount of capacity shortage is small and the transshipment prices are low. Thus, carefully chosen transshipment prices may alleviate order inflation behavior. We also characterize centralized orders that maximize the total profit of the retailers and compare them to equilibrium orders. In particular, we investigate coordinating transshipment prices that induce the retailers to choose centralized orders. Our numerical analysis shows that, even for two identical retailers, coordinating transshipment prices exist in a more limited range of parameter values in the rationing game than they do outside the rationing game due to capacity uncertainty and limitation.     

土地征收进程中不同参与主体行为研究

城镇化进程中农民集体所有土地转变为城市国有土地,在该过程中产生大量的土地增值收益。地方政府、用地企业、村委会和农民在土地增值收益分配中有不同的行为表现,其根本原因在于利益分配冲突。从不同主体行为角度对土地增值收益分配中利益冲突问题进行研究,有利于探讨利益冲突背后的原因并提出有针对性的政策建议。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.     

基于消费者效用的生鲜农产品供应链生鲜度激励机制研究

生鲜供应链整体生鲜度的提升对减少浪费、提高供应链整体盈利水平及社会福利有重要意义。本文基于消费者效用理论研究了两供应商和单一零售商组成的供应链系统，构建了单周期下生鲜农产品生鲜度激励模型，模型以供应商为领导者，采用Stackelberg博弈方法求解得到了均衡状态下供应商、零售商的最优定价策略及供应商新鲜度努力选择。研究结果表明，供应商和零售商利润与消费者价格敏感系数呈反向变化，与新鲜度敏感系数呈同向变化。在价格竞争市场，供应商保鲜努力程度和利润与价格替代率呈反向变化；在生鲜度竞争市场，供应商保鲜努力程度和利润与新鲜度替代率呈同向变化。基于研究结论，厂商及政府应当联手引导消费者的消费观念，尽可能减少由于信息不对称引致的道德风险，在市场价格替代率不变甚至降低的情形下，提高生鲜度替代率，使得消费者的意愿支付价格上升，提高自身讨价还价能力，获取更多利润。     

Moral values and increasing stakes in a dictator game

Using data from a large representative US sample (N = 1519), we compare hypothetical moral fairness values from the Moral Foundations Sacredness Scale with actual fairness behavior in an incentivized dictator game with either low or high stakes. We find that people with high moral fairness values fail to live up to their high fairness standards, when stake size increases. This violates principles from consistency theories according to which moral values are supposedly aligned with moral behavior, but is in line with temptation theories that question the absoluteness of morality values.     

碳金融市场下基于模糊测度和Choquet积分的碳期权估值

基于投资者对投资财富和风险的偏好研究碳期权定价模型。运用λ-可加模糊测度表示投资者对碳期权价值模糊度量的差异性，借助Choquet期望积分构建投资者的期望收益效用函数；根据投资财富效用最大化推导无约束条件下碳期权的最优价；结合现实约束条件，构建投资财富效用最大化下的碳期权定价模型；通过数值计算分析效用函数、模糊参数和现实约束对碳期权定价的影响。研究结果表明:效用函数的选择会体现投资者对碳期权投资风险态度的变化，模糊测度参数的取值能够反映碳期权投资者个体的主观情绪和市场信息获取程度，现实约束会迫使碳期权投资者放弃部分投资隐含价值。     

形式与意义:儿童文学作品中的游戏精神

儿童文学的"游戏精神"主要是指在儿童作品文本中体现出的、通过人物游戏所传递的一种符合儿童心理需求和审美旨趣,并实现儿童内心愿望的精神。周作人认为儿童文学的游戏精神是"幻想精神""愉悦精神"和"自由精神"。儿童文学游戏精神具有快乐性、幻想性和自由性的三性特征"。游戏精神"在儿童文学中作品的主要呈现形式为:通过"顽童""小大人""、反派"等人物形象的塑造凸显游戏精神;通过故事情节蕴涵的笨拙与聪明、嬉笑与吵闹、虚拟与真实凸显游戏精神;通过语言夸张凸显荒诞美、语言颠倒凸显逆向思维、语言突转凸显惊奇,从而凸显游戏精神。游戏精神对于儿童文学作品编创的意义在于:游戏精神是儿童文学的基本属性和内涵所在,新媒介时代儿童文学的发展需要延续游戏精神。因此游戏精神是儿童文学的作品编创的重要依据和准则。     

生产者货币计价决定因素的实证研究

利用12个发达国家和发展中国家的非平衡面板样本数据,对微观、宏观和其他因素对生产者货币计价(PCP)的影响进行实证研究,指出经济规模、市场份额、金融市场的发达程度、币值的对内稳定性和产品差异化程度是最主要的影响因素,而出口商的谈判能力、币值的对外稳定性等因素也对PCP的选择有一定影响。根据实证检验结果,对人民币作为贸易计价货币的条件进行评估,发现其优势在于我国的经济规模、出口商的市场份额及其谈判能力以及人民币汇率的相对稳定性; 劣势在于相对落后的金融市场、不可预期性较大的通货膨胀水平以及产品的差异化程度。