高校声誉的培育与维护

良好的声誉是高校所拥有的独特资源,它能在各个方面增强高校的竞争力.文章从明确学校定位,提高毕业生质量,重视校风建设,实施名师强校战略和转变管理观念等方面,阐述了培育高校声誉的途径,提出了高校声誉维护的两个原则,即快速反应和高效沟通.     

对重庆南岸区中小企业信用担保中心的调查研究

在我国目前中小企业信用程度不高的情况下,通过担保机构为中小企业融资提供信用担保服务,是解决中小企业融资难的重要举措。重庆市南岸区中小企业信用担保中心经历了从1999年"破题"成立,2000年运作"开步",到2001年"走稳路"三个阶段,收到了良好的效果。本文对南岸区信保中心的运行情况进行了理论分析,并对存在的问题提出了对策建议。     

Alignment between Quality Enforcement Devices and Governance Structures in the Agro-food Vertical Chains

Using a Transaction Cost Economics framework, this paper studies how supply chain governance are aligned with the type of quality enforcement mechanisms used in transactions with consumers. Specifically we compare governance of supply chains when private brand assures quality to chains where official certification assures products’ quality for customers. To test our proposition, we conducted a set of 42 case studies in 3 agro-food sectors (processed meat, cheese, fruits and vegetable) from 7 European countries. We found that supply chain governance is closer to hierarchy-like modes of organization in cases where reputational capital is the main quality assurance device, whereas market-like governance is more prevalent in cases with public certification.     

《让县自明本志令》评议

《让县自明本志令》是曹操在政治气候极不利于自己的情况下写成的。文中谈其早年的心志是客观的,至于谈到迎汉献帝于许都以后如何诩戴汉室,绝无“不逊之志”云云,则纯属英雄欺人。那种认为曹操此文字字是实、句句是真的传统观点值得商榷。评价历史人物,尤其伟大的政治家,我们所凭据的只能是他的行为,言谈则只有在做评价的参考时才有其意义。     

高校教师激励机制的模式研究

从经济理论角度透视高等院校教师激励机制的本质,用委托代理、声誉理论等方法研究和揭示高等院校教师激励机制的内在规律,提出修正的工资激励模型及"知本市场"("教授市场")理论.     

Bargaining,Reputation, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Contracts

Consider a two‐person intertemporal bargaining problem in which players choose actions and offers each period, and collect payoffs (as a function of that period's actions) while bargaining proceeds. This can alternatively be viewed as an infinitely repeated game wherein players can offer one another enforceable contracts that govern play for the rest of the game. Theory is silent with regard to how the surplus is likely to be split, because a folk theorem applies. Perturbing such a game with a rich set of behavioral types for each player yields a specific asymptotic prediction for how the surplus will be divided, as the perturbation probabilities approach zero. Behavioral types may follow nonstationary strategies and respond to the opponent's play. In equilibrium, rational players initially choose a behavioral type to imitate and a war of attrition ensues. How much should a player try to get and how should she behave while waiting for the resolution of bargaining? In both respects she should build her strategy around the advice given by the “Nash bargaining with threats” (NBWT) theory developed for two‐stage games. In any perfect Bayesian equilibrium, she can guarantee herself virtually her NBWT payoff by imitating a behavioral type with the following simple strategy: in every period, ask for (and accept nothing less than) that player's NBWT share and, while waiting for the other side to concede, take the action Nash recommends as a threat in his two‐stage game. The results suggest that there are forces at work in some dynamic games that favor certain payoffs over all others. This is in stark contrast to the classic folk theorems, to the further folk theorems established for repeated games with two‐sided reputational perturbations, and to the permissive results obtained in the literature on bargaining with payoffs as you go.     

Understanding how corporate social responsibility partnership factors influence nonprofit supportive intentions

Public relations literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) has long detailed the impact of CSR outcomes for corporations. This study seeks to understand how CSR influences the nonprofit partners involved in these initiatives and what types of CSR partnerships lead to nonprofit supportive intentions. This study merges perspectives on organization-public relationships (OPR) with nonprofit management literature. An online 2 (NPO reputation: low vs high) x 2 (partnership duration: short vs. long) x 2 (CSR fit: low vs. high) experiment was conducted. A few key factors emerged in the analysis: Positive nonprofit reputation strongly predicted all OPR outcomes and mission accomplishment. Unexpectedly, the short-duration condition led to more positive outcomes and intentions. Fit did not seem to have a direct effect on outcomes, but the high-fit, short-duration partnership led to increased levels of all outcomes. For mediation, satisfaction and commitment had the strongest indirect effects on nonprofit supportive intentions (donation, volunteer, and word-of-mouth). This study expands the understanding of CSR effects on nonprofit partners, specifically by showing how different CSR partnership types play a role in the relationship-building efforts of nonprofits. Additionally, demonstrating how mission accomplishment can strengthen these relationships helps to disentangle the unique position of nonprofits in CSR, whose reputation and mission are at stake.     

浅议网络诽谤

网络的开放性、虚拟性和匿名性,产生了诸如网络谣言、网络诽谤等违法行为,严重侵犯了他人的名誉权和社会的安宁。网络服务提供商的诽谤侵权责任应当根据其在提供服务过程中扮演的角色进行区分。网络内容服务提供商承担直接侵权责任,和一般出版者责任类似。网络中介服务提供商分为接入、平台服务两种类型,其一般都是间接帮助侵权,负有事后被通知即制止侵权义务,另外在明知的情形下亦担责。     

Reputation and Mechanism Choice in Procurement Auctions: An Experiment

We experimentally study the role of reputation in procurement using two common mechanisms: price‐based and buyer‐determined auctions. While buyers are bound to buy from the lowest bidder in price‐based auctions, they can choose between bidders in buyer‐determined auctions. Only the latter buyers can consider the reputation of bidders. We find that bidders supply higher quality in buyer‐determined auctions leading to higher market efficiencies in these auctions. Accordingly, buyers prefer the buyer‐determined auction over the price‐based auction, while only half of the bidders do so. A more detailed analysis of buyers' and bidders' behavior and profits provides insights into their mechanism choice.     

电信运营商信誉对消费者移动支付的分析

为了深入了解电信运营商信誉对消费者移动支付使用意愿的作用机制,运用重复博弈对电信运营商信誉作为消费者使用意愿影响因素的原因进行分析,并从使用意愿形成的心理阶段对原因进行解释,进而提出电信运营商提升运营移动支付业务信誉的策略。