Knowledge and opinions of families regarding games—Toy selection for 6 to 12 year old children (the case of Northern Cyprus)

Games and toys are irreplaceable basic needs of children of almost every age. They are also some of the most significant traces of culture. Some of our games and toys lost their original functions, and it is not remembered why they were functionally significant in Turkish Cypriot culture. Families and cultural identity also play a major role regarding different factors leading to changes in toy selection. The purpose of this study is to explore the knowledge and opinions of families regarding games and, in particular, toy selection for 6–12 year old children of Turkish Cypriot families. A survey was administered to 100 households in North Cyprus, and was used as a data collection tool. It was found that the most important factors in the selection of children’s games and toys were (1) the economic opportunities, and (2) children’s desires for toys after seeing them with their friends. A considerable number of families in Northern Cyprus see game-toy selection as important in a child’s social, psychomotor, mental, and cultural construction. Families, especially those living with difficulties, indicated that they cannot afford enough time to encourage playing traditional games. Although new versions of traditional games and toys are being developed and used, it is seen that educated and high-income families are more conscious about the importance of having information about them than others.     

Sociolinguistic interaction and identity construction: The view from game‐theoretic pragmatics

Understanding the dynamics that characterize interaction between conversational participants is a fundamental goal of most theories of socially conditioned language use and identity construction through language. In this paper, I outline a class of formal tools that, I suggest, can be helpful in making progress towards this goal. More precisely, this paper explores how Bayesian signalling game models can be used to formalize key aspects of current sociolinguistic theories, and, in doing so, contribute to our knowledge of how speakers use their linguistic resources to communicate information and carve out their place in the social world. The Bayesian framework has become increasingly popular for the analysis of pragmatic phenomena of many different types, and, more generally, these models have become a dominant paradigm for the explanation of non‐linguistic cognitive processes. As such, I argue that this approach has the potential to yield a formalized theory of personal and social identity construction and to situate the study of sociolinguistic interaction within a broader theory of rationalistic cognition.     

移动应用安全监管中的合谋博弈分析与建议

移动应用安全状况日益凸显,亟需采取相应的监管策略.基于完全信息三方静态博弈模型,探讨移动应用安全监管中政府、移动应用商店以及移动应用开发商三者之间的博弈决策问题.政府通过对应用商店的监管发现存在应用商店与开发商合谋的情况.对于减少应用商店与开发商合谋,政府可给予应用商店未来的合作机会等间接激励,其作用优于现金支持的直接激励.而有效控制监管成本,增加应用商店和开发商合谋所产生的损失,是减少应用商店与开发商合谋概率的有效途径.从博弈角度出发,提出了政府从移动应用传播渠道入手的安全监管策略,即政府在何种条件下能更好发挥通过应用商店间接监管的作用.     

Bargaining over waiting time in ultimatum game experiments

While preference-based explanations play an increasing role in economics and sociology, the accurate measurement of social preferences deserves more attention. Most laboratory experiments measure social preferences by studying the division of “a cake that nobody had to bake” (Güth and Kliemt, 2003). This article reports results of the first ultimatum game experiment with bargaining over waiting time. The experiment was created to avoid effects of windfall gains. In contrast to donated money, time is not endowed by the experimenter and implies a natural loss to subjects. This allows for a better measurement of the inherent conflict in the ultimatum game. We implemented three anonymity conditions; one baseline condition, one condition with anonymity among subjects and one double-blind condition in which the experimenter did not know the division of waiting time. While we expected to observe less other-regarding behavior in ultimatum game bargaining over time, our experimental results rather confirm previous ultimatum game experiments, in which people bargained over money. The modal offer was half of the waiting time and only one offer was rejected. Interestingly, anonymity did not change the results significantly. In conclusion, our experiment confirms other-regarding behavior in the ultimatum game.     

进化博弈论视角下的制度分析理论

进化博弈论在制度分析中有几个突出的成果:其一,萨格登、扬、青木昌彦等人运用进化博弈论的演进稳定策略概念及内生博弈规则论证了制度的内生性,较好地避开了新制度经济学曾经遇到的制度循环论证问题;其二,青木昌彦通过对不同的域之间的嵌入与捆绑的讨论探讨了制度具有耐久性的原因,论证了制度的关联与互补特性;其三,扬和青木昌彦从博弈均衡的概念出发提出了制度演进过程的“断续均衡效应”和“刻点均衡”特性;其四,青木昌彦和扬提出了制度的多种均衡问题,并通过主观博弈模型和随机稳定策略分别论证了不同文化背景下制度出现多样性的可能性。     

互利共赢的博弈论分析

十七大报告指出要“始终不渝奉行互利共赢的开放战略”,博弈论是研究互利共赢问题的有力工具。国际关系中囚徒困境博弈的大量存在提出了互利共赢的必要性;无限重复囚徒困境博弈中合作均衡的实现表明互利共赢是可能的;在现实中合作的实现表明互利共赢是可行的;全球化为互利共赢的实现提供了现实基础;“一报还一报”是实现互利共赢的基本策略。     

知识型员工管理的博弈策略

如何管理知识型员工是企业实施知识管理的重要内容.本文认为知识型员工和企业之间的关系也是一种博弈关系,进而根据博弈论的囚犯困境模型和礼尚往来战略,提出了企业管理知识型员工的策略.     

基于博弈模型的“罪刑均衡”思想分析

罪刑均衡思想由来已久,作为刑法理论中最基本的刑罚原则,在对犯人进行科处刑罚方面具有的重要意义早已得到承认,而在预防犯罪方面具有的作用却长期被忽视。犯罪行为实质上是犯人和政府之间的博弈。政府先制订刑法,犯人在观察到刑罚后才选择是否犯罪以及犯何种性质的罪。经济分析表明,改变刑罚的确定性和严厉性就能影响博弈的均衡,从而影响犯罪,刑罚之外的其它措施如果能改变犯罪的成本和收益,也能实现同样的目的,这为预防犯罪提供了一种新的思路。     

说教与游戏之间：思想政治工作的路径选择

面对高校学子维护自身权利而引发的纠纷时。领导、辅导员各自采取不同方式来化解矛盾的功效不一。究其原因,传统思想政治教育的“说教”方式已不符合高校现代管理的宗旨,相反以“游戏”手段来解纷则是一种崭新尝试。从能动性、权力、媒介和心理学等层面比较“说教”与“游戏”,可以发现后者比前者更具优势。这一创新方法,也许不具有普遍意义,但并非不具有可借鉴性和可操作性,而为高校教育管理提供启迪性思维。     

农民分层与财政支农政策优化研究——宏观视域下的微观探讨

农民分层是在农业人口占绝大多数的中国农民迈入现代化的必然选择,也是发展现代农业、消除城乡差别的普遍规律和重要标志。改革开放以后,在一系列农村经济政治体制改革的推动下,传统同质化的农民开始分化为不同的阶层,呈现“分层化”的特征。自2004年起中央“一号文件”连续11年聚焦“三农”问题,凸显对提升农民收入、层次和地位的关注。然而,作为国家惠农支持的主要手段——财政支农政策,在农民分层上存在投入总量不足、结构失调、效率不高等问题。通过建立职业农民与农转非者、农业主产区与非农主产区政府之间的博弈模型,结合现实考察财政支农政策对农民分层行为的影响,提出优化财政支农目标、科学调整支农政策、实现农业资源配置和农民分层的帕累托效率。