吸收能力、研发合作创新激励与补贴政策

本文在前人的研究基础上建立了一个具有吸收能力的非合作研究与发展博弈模型,比较了有和没有吸收能力情况下的R&D投资影响,结果表明有吸收能力的企业R&D投资要更高,接着探讨了产品替代与互补关系下的技术溢出选择对产业的影响和社会最优选择的R&D投资水平及其补贴激励政策。     

无外部市场条件下中间产品转移价格的博弈分析与决策

本文首先用反例证明了文^[1]中在各分厂成本函数和最终产品需求函数已知的条件下,给出的中间产品最优转移价格的两个计算公式并不总是成立的,给出了这两个计算公式成立的充要条件,并分析了公司关于中间产品转移价格决策的动态一致性问题。接着,利用完全信息动态博弈对中间产品转移价格的确定问题做了进一步的分析研究。最后,针对文^[1]中给出的中间产品最优转移价格的两个计算公式不成立的情况,讨论了中间产品转移价格的确定问题。     

协调产品战略关系的企业兼并研究

本文在产品战略关系内生的基础上,研究了企业兼并所产生的社会效应;通过一个四企业在两市场上竞争模型对企业为获得产品协同的兼并动机进行了分析,结果表明:在本文的假设条件下,当企业兼并存在产品协同效应时,普遍存在兼并动机。     

同类异质产品市场博弈Nash均衡最优策略模型

本文按照Nash均衡解的要求,建立同类异质产品市场用户需求分布及效用结构模型,导出不同定位的企业所实施竞争策略的若干最优条件,通过计算不同策略设计下产品相应的临界功能效用值,参与竞争的企业可找到适合于市场需求的最优决策。     

Modelling Building Societies Takeovers a Non-Cooperative Game

Takeover and acquisition of corporations is awell-researched area and has been becomingincreasingly important. Much less research emphasishas been devoted to takeover activity within thegeneral area of financial services with thisparticularly the case for the building society sector.The building societies being mutual companies havespecial characteristics. The building societies andother financial mutuals like the corporations doencounter an acute agency problem. This opens up apotential application of Grossman and Hart theory oftakeovers bids as the individuals have option to freeride, securing knowledge that the regulatory processrenders their deposits de facto risk-free investment.This free-rider problem, like the corporations can beovercome by inducing hostile takeover.Some empirical studies of mergers activities withinthe building society sector have dealt with onlyintra-sectoral mergers. However, they have not lookedat inter-sectoral mergers and have not addressedefficiency issues in a general equilibrium frameworkusing game theory.In this paper I suggest a mechanism for merger at parwith sales of stocks of a corporation to organisebuilding societies' takeovers. I develop a two-stagegame between the members of building societies and theraider. Analysis of non-cooperative voting behaviourof members of Cheltenham and Gloucester buildingsociety shows that the actions of the members of thebuilding society may also give rise to less thanoptimal results as they may not be acting in their bestinterests. The members of the building society cangain if a hostile takeover is induced rather than afriendly takeover. The paper also examines the freerider problem and ex-ante efficiency in a generalequilibrium framework.     

国际工程承包市场竞争的博弈模型

本文对国际工程承包的市场竞争进行了实证分析并指出其基本特征,在此基础之上建立了国际工程承包的市场竞争模型。并给出了该模型的一个均衡解,最后对均衡解进行了解释并指出该模型带来的深刻影响。     

论政府与大学在公共支出中的博弈

在公共教育支出中，政府与大学各自的成本和收益影响着政府对大学的投资。政府投资于大学，需要大学为国家培养人力资本，从而支出经费的同时控制大学的人才培养。博弈分析发现，政府少投入和少控制是大学和政府的优势策略。但现实状况下政府投资于大学还受到其他因素影响，从而使大学与政府的利益格局有不同表现。     

自由与迷失——审美游戏论批判

所谓审美游戏论就是以游戏来描述审美存在,以游戏特性来确立审美的独立性、合法性与本体性的理论话语.从审美游戏论的话语历史出发,关注其理论建构的可能性与界限,才能把握审美游戏论所阐释的审美特性.     

反馈交易规则与股票收益自相关实证分析

研究了反馈交易规则与上证综合指数日收益自相关之间的联系，样本取自上证指数１９９２年９月２９日至１９９７年９月３０日的日收益率数据。此外，文中采用ＧＡＲＣＨ（１，１）处理收益波动的异方差性，模型参数采用极大似然估计。实证模型还考虑了非同步交易引起的工序列相关以及反馈交易的非对称性。结果表明，除以往文献涉及的正序列相关外，正反馈交易将导致收益负的序列自相关，且相关系数绝对值随波动增大而增大，从而整个收益表现出随波动变化的序列相关。     

Martingale generalizations and preservation of martingale properties

This article investigates circumstances under which seven important martingale properties are preserved by the following six martingale generalizations: quasimartingales, amarts, martingales in the limit, games fairer with time, progressive martingales, and eventual martingales.