农村突发事件中非正式制度对公众心理危机的影响研究

文章首先分析了非正式制度影响下的农村突发事件中公众心理危机的发生发展机理,然后对农村突发事件中公众的个体风险认知和群体风险沟通、风险认知中的非正式制度因素进行了识别,并在此基础上提出了规避非正式制度对农村突发事件中公众心理危机的负面影响的相关措施。     

基于公允价值的盈余管理动因及治理对策探析

公允价值是一种计量属性,它与盈余管理之间本没有必然的联系。但其在计量过程中的一些特殊性,使得公允价值在提高了会计信息有用性的同时,客观上增加了企业管理中会计处理的自由度,可能成为盈余管理的工具。文中通过探析公允价值在金融工具、投资性房地产、非货币性资产交换、债务重组等会计准则中的具体应用,指出可能存在的盈余管理行为。并提出了防范滥用公允价值进行盈余管理的相关措施,为公允价值在我国较好的运行提供帮助。     

内部控制的盈余管理抑制效应研究

能否有效降低上市公司盈余管理水平是内部控制研究的重要问题。以2007-2008年度A股主板上市公司为样本,对这一问题及资本市场对上市公司内部控制水平的定价效应的研究表明,我国现阶段上市公司内部控制水平与盈余管理水平存在显著的负相关,内部控制水平能够有效地抑制上市公司盈余管理水平。同时,市场对上市公司内部控制水平进行定价,内部控制水平较高的上市公司具有较低的资本成本,在控制了上市公司盈余管理水平之后,资本市场对上市公司内部控制水平的定价效应依然存在。这进一步验证了上市公司内部控制建设的重要性。     

A land of the ‘fair go’? Intergenerational earnings elasticity in Australia

This paper contributes to the existing literature on income mobility by developing and applying a two‐stage panel regression model and assessing the effects of using different levels of occupational (dis)aggregation and different earnings measures on the magnitude of father–son earnings elasticities in Australia. We find that the overall intergenerational earnings elasticity in Australia between 2001 and 2013 ranges from 0.11 to 0.30. Our preferred estimates lie between 0.24 and 0.28. Elasticity estimates vary depending on the level of occupational (dis)aggregation and earnings measure used: they are highest when two‐digit level occupations and hourly earnings are used, and lowest when four‐digit level occupations and annual earnings are used. We read these findings as indicating that elasticity estimates are sensitive to the use of different data and methods, and researchers should be careful when undertaking cross‐study, cross‐temporal or cross‐national comparisons.     

盈余管理的新策略:来自母子公司交易的经验证据

现有关于盈余管理的研究仅限定在合并公司层面,鲜有关注母子公司之间可能存在的盈余管理行为.以我国2007—2017年A股上市公司为样本,理论分析并实证检验了上市公司总体上是否存在母子公司之间的盈余管理行为.研究发现:母公司会通过转移非全资子公司少数股东损益的形式对归属于母公司所有者的净利润进行盈余管理;当上市公司避免业绩亏损或下滑、盈余达标和融资需求的动机越强时,母子公司之间的盈余管理程度越高;进一步地,母子公司间的盈余管理与真实盈余管理存在显著的替代效应,而并没有证据发现其与应计盈余管理存在替代或互补关系.研究结论表明,要格外关注盈余操纵的新形式,警惕更为隐蔽的母子公司之间的盈余管理行为.监管机构要增强对母子公司交易动机、过程及信息披露的监管,以更好地维护中小投资者的合法权益.     

内部控制、独立审计与国企费用归类操纵

"八项规定"引发的国企费用归类操纵行为严重降低了企业会计信息质量.文章利用"八项规定"实施前两年(2010-2011年)和实施后两年(2013-2014年)沪深两市A股上市公司为研究样本,实证了考察内部控制和独立审计对国企费用归类操纵行为的抑制效果.研究发现:相比于内部控制指数较高的国有企业,内部控制指数较低的国有企业的费用归类操纵行为更严重;相比于聘请四大会计师事务所的国有企业,聘请非"四大"的国有企业的费用归类操纵行为更严重.研究表明,完善的内部控制和高质量的独立审计均可有效抑制国企费用归类操纵行为.研究结论对于治理国企费用归类操纵行为,提升"八项规定"政策效果具有重要启示.     

经营者长期激励机制构建的思维模式

建立并完善经营者长期激励机制,对于解决两权分离所带来的委托代理关系问题,完善现代公司制企业制度具有重要意义。本文主要以整合经营者与股东的目标为切入点,着重阐述了构建经营者长期激励机制的思维模式,进而使经营者长期激励机制日趋完善。     

我国股市对盈利信息反应的一个实证检验

采用事件研究法,选取盈利信息作为反应事件,检验我国股票市场对盈利信息是否存在过度反应现象。考虑上市公司盈利的变动和不确定性,根据盈利变动指标值来划分赢家组合和输家组合,考察组合在年报公布后1年和3年两种检验期内的累计超额收益,用1992~2000年沪深两市的数据进行实证检验,发现我国股市长期对盈利信息不存在过度反应,与国外股市的反应模式不一致,实证结果可由中国股市发展的特征作出解释。     

关于会计盈余的信息含量的研究——兼论中国股市的利润驱动特性

信息含量表示年度会计盈余与年度股票收益之间的关系。本文基于1992－1998年间中国股市的全部数据样本，利用ERC模型检验会计盈余的信息含量，发现中国股市的信息含量十分显著且逐年增强；同时通过对上市公司盈余管理的探究，揭示了股市的利润驱动特性。     

The Phenomenology of Earnings Management within the Confines of Agency Theory

Agents' selective and acceptable reporting of economic events by different accounting systems, compounded by alternative accounting methods and estimates, make financial statements an approximation of economic reality. The tendency to delay accounting recognition of some transactions suggests that financial statements lag behind reality. The difference between reality and imaginary is often referred to as the agency problem. An essential characteristic of this problem is risk attitudes of principals (shareholders) and agents (management). Shareholders are considered risk neutral in their preferences for individual firms. They are in a position to diversify their shareholdings across multiple firms. Agents on the other hand have security and income that are inextricably linked to one firm. It would not be surprising to find agents exhibiting risk aversion in decisions regarding the firm. Immediately one's attention is drawn to the opportunity costs that arise for the risk-neutral shareholders who prefer that agents maximize their returns. The risk differential between agents and principals creates a problem in principal-agent relationship. It is within this framework that supervisory and incentive alignment mechanisms that alter the risk orientation of agents are set up. Powerful incentives act upon agents as they exercise their judgment, particularly when the judgment can trigger a stock market response that will, in turn, affect the firm in numerous ways. The responsibility of agents is to manage earnings. From a principal's perspective not all of the methods used to achieve this goal are equally desirable. Agents can either increase productivity or they can strategically manipulate accounting choices to affect earnings. The latter method need not come with any associated changes in productivity. Consequently, there is misstatement of the financial results and position. The calculus of earnings management is considered within the confines of agents' treatment of risk. Using an Agency Theory framework, this study examines the techniques used by agents to manage and manipulate earnings. The study initially tests the hypothesis whether earnings are really managed. For this purpose two manipulation indices were developed and based upon these indices the phenomenology earnings management was considered.