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971.
我国天然气价格管理体制及定价模式研究 总被引:4,自引:1,他引:3
谢晓霞 《西安石油大学学报(社会科学版)》2001,10(3):23-27
从我国目前的天然气价格管理体制存在问题出发,从分析长输管道行业特点入手,运用垄断竞争市场定价模式及市场供求关系对价格影响的理论,剖析并提出我国天然气价格管理体制改革思路,通过具体分析“西气东输”工程的天然气价格,来规范我国长输管道天然气的定价模式及新时期的价格水平。 相似文献
972.
973.
王金安 《集美大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2004,7(4):61-67
股票联系票据(EquityLinkedNotes)作为一种新型的金融创新产品在发达国家受到众多投资者的青睐,特别是进入20世纪90年代,股票联系票据在发行规模、品种创新和交易手段等方面取得了突飞猛进的发展,而目前国内尚未出现这类证券品种,投资者对股票联系票据还不熟悉,相关的理论研究还较为欠缺,基于这种情况,本文对股票联系票据进行深入的经济学分析,研究该投资工具的风险收益特征和定价原理,并提出我国发展股票联系票据市场的政策建议。 相似文献
974.
基于消费者策略行为的高新技术产品定价模型研究 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
随着技术更新速度的加快和市场竞争的加剧,厂商经常会采取降价促销的手段刺激高新技术产品的销售.久而久之,消费者自然形成一种等待厂商进一步降价的习惯.文章主要考虑基于消费者策略行为下,厂商实施的动态定价策略.讨论在需求不确定的条件下,厂商在面对消费者策略行为时,如何决定最优价格策略,以获得最大化利润. 相似文献
975.
高建刚 《北京交通大学学报(社会科学版)》2009,8(4):38-42,52
在有关独占厂商空间定价的研究中,许多文献假定市场范围外生给定。为在可变市场范围假定下,得到更为一般性的结论,放松买者固定概率分布假定,研究需求型态和买者分布型态与定价策略优劣的关系。研究发现,当市场范围内生决定时,厂商利润大小,与需求函数型态有关,而与买者分布无关,拓展了有关研究;消费者剩余和社会福利在FOB定价下恒大于CIF定价,与需求型态和买者分布均无关,与以往文献不同。 相似文献
976.
通过对村规民约在中国不同历史时期的表现分析,指出村规民约作为特定时期的历史产物,其存在与发展都与社会当时的具体环境,特别是政治需要及权力运行模式密切相关。作为乡村社会“小共同体”“私的法律秩序”,村规民约与国家“公的法律秩序”存在不可调和的冲突和矛盾。提出为保证中国法制统一,学界不应过高渲染村规民约的功能作用。村规民约作为一种文化遗产,伦理价值和道德教化的作用和意义是主要的。 相似文献
977.
Joseph M. Hall Praveen K. Kopalle David F. Pyke 《Production and Operations Management》2009,18(4):411-425
We consider a make‐to‐order manufacturer that serves two customer classes: core customers who pay a fixed negotiated price, and “fill‐in” customers who make submittal decisions based on the current price set by the firm. Using a Markovian queueing model, we determine how much the firm can gain by explicitly accounting for the status of its production facility in making pricing decisions. Specifically, we examine three pricing policies: (1) static, state‐independent pricing, (2) constant pricing up to a cutoff state, and (3) general state‐dependent pricing. We determine properties of each policy, and illustrate numerically the financial gains that the firm can achieve by following each policy as compared with simpler policies. Our main result is that constant pricing up to a cutoff state can dramatically outperform a state‐independent policy, while at the same time achieving most of the increase in revenue achievable from general state‐dependent pricing. Thus, we find that constant pricing up to a cutoff state presents an attractive tradeoff between ease of implementation and revenue gain. When the costs of policy design and implementation are taken into account, this simple heuristic may actually out‐perform general state‐dependent pricing in some settings. 相似文献
978.
Birendra K. Mishra Srinivasan Raghunathan Xiaohang Yue 《Production and Operations Management》2009,18(2):152-166
This paper examines the incentives of a manufacturer and a retailer to share their demand forecasts. The demand at the retailer is a linearly decreasing function of price. The manufacturer sets the wholesale price first, and the retailer sets the retail price after observing the wholesale price. Both players set their prices based on their forecasts of demand. In the make‐to‐order scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity after observing the actual demand; in the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer sets the production quantity before the demand is realized. In the make‐to‐order scenario, we show that sharing the forecast unconditionally by the retailer with the manufacturer benefits the manufacturer but hurts the retailer. We also demonstrate that a side payment contract cannot induce Pareto‐optimal information sharing equilibrium, but a discount based wholesale price contract can. The social welfare as well as consumer surplus is higher under the discount contract, compared with under no information sharing. In the make‐to‐stock scenario, the manufacturer realizes additional benefits in the form of savings in inventory holding and shortage costs when forecasts are shared. If the savings from inventory holding and shortage costs because of information sharing are sufficiently high, then a side payment contract that induces Pareto‐optimal information sharing is feasible in the make‐to‐stock scenario. We also provide additional managerial insights with the help of a computational study. 相似文献
979.
Glenn Ellison Sara Fisher Ellison 《Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society》2009,77(2):427-452
We examine the competition between a group of Internet retailers who operate in an environment where a price search engine plays a dominant role. We show that for some products in this environment, the easy price search makes demand tremendously price‐sensitive. Retailers, though, engage in obfuscation—practices that frustrate consumer search or make it less damaging to firms—resulting in much less price sensitivity on some other products. We discuss several models of obfuscation and examine its effects on demand and markups empirically. 相似文献
980.
We study the problem of combined pricing, resource allocation, and overbooking by service providers involved in dynamic noncooperative oligopolistic competition on a network that represents the relationships of the providers to one another and to their customers when service demand is uncertain. We propose, analyze, and compute solutions for a model that is more general than other models reported in the revenue management literature to date. In particular, previous models typically consider only three or four of five key revenue management features that we have purposely built into our model: (1) pricing, (2) resource allocation, (3) dynamic competition, (4) an explicit network, and (5) uncertain demand. Illustrative realizations of the abstract problem we study are those of airline revenue management and service provision by companies facing resource constraints. Under fairly general regularity conditions, we prove existence and uniqueness of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium for dynamic oligopolistic service network competition described by our model. We also show, for an appropriate notion of regularity, that competition leads to the underpricing of network services, a finding numerically illustrated by an example of intermediate size. Our proposed algorithm can be implemented using well‐known off‐the‐shelf commercial software. 相似文献