基于自适应大邻域搜索的鲁棒多项目调度方法

多项目资源管理有时需要采用一种资源专享-转移策略，该策略下可更新资源在多项目之间不共享，但在当前项目完工之后其资源可以转移至其它还未开始的项目。针对这一实际问题的理论研究非常有限。考虑活动工期的不确定性，从时差效用函数视角评价项目调度计划的鲁棒性，在考虑拖期成本-鲁棒性的多目标问题框架下，构建了一个资源专享-转移视角下的多项目资源分配(战术层)与鲁棒调度(运作层)双层决策优化模型。针对模型的NP-hard性质和多目标组合优化特征，设计了一种新的自适应大邻域搜索(adaptive large neighborhood search，ALNS)算法求解模型。该算法采用“项目-缓冲-资源-活动”列表的混合编码表示问题可行解，提出基于四类列表的destroy-repair邻域结构，设计一种超体积指标进行自适应搜索以提高算法性能。最后，为了验证ALNS算法的适用性和有效性，设计一种NSGA-II算法作为比较基准，通过大规模仿真实验对算法性能进行了对比分析，并探索工期不确定水平对多项目调度方案鲁棒性的影响。     

考虑风险因素的客户评价与选择研究

应用效用理论考虑客户终生价值的不确定性,根据客户的期望效用对客户进行评价,权衡价值与风险来优化选择客户组合.通过蒙特卡罗仿真方法得到客户终生价值分布样本,并以此计算期望效用;通过实际案例,揭示期望价值相近的客户可能表现出风险的巨大差异.对比期望价值和期望效用方法所得到的前30名客户组合,发现采用风险规避型期望效用方法得到的客户资产期望价值虽然有所减少,但风险大大降低.通过这种方法,管理者能体现自己对客户终生价值分布风险的偏好,根据当前的市场战略选择重点客户进行投资.     

基于“云排队”的经济效益分析

随着各种云智能排队预约系统的推出，顾客“排队难”的问题得到了极大的缓解。其简便的操作方式，受到了大量商家与顾客的好评。本文基于当下热门服务行业的运营模式，建立排队博弈模型，从理论上分析了“云排队”平台对顾客以及服务商的影响。本文主要得到了以下几个结果：(1) 给出了两类顾客的纳什均衡策略(包括进队策略与最优到达间隔)；(2) 发现当前的预约机制能够提高“线上”顾客的效用，并刺激更多的线上顾客购买该产品，但同时也降低了“线下”顾客的进队意愿；(3) 发现在云排队机制下服务商的收益将大大提高，同时该机制将刺激服务商收取更高的服务费用。     

Impulsiveness moderates the effects of exogenous attention on the sensitivity to gains and losses in risky lotteries

Does attention have a causal impact on risky decisions? We address this question in a preregistered experiment in which participants accept or reject a series of mixed gambles while exogenously varying how information can be sampled. Specifically, in each trial participants observe the outcomes of a mixed-gamble with gains and losses presented sequentially. To isolate the causal role of attention on the decision process, we manipulate for how long a specific attribute is presented before showing the next one (e.g., 600 ms/800 ms vs 400 ms). Our results partially confirm our preregistered hypotheses that longer exposure to an attribute increases its weight on the decision. While we find no effects on choice frequency, we observe specific effects on the decision weights of our Random Utility Model. Presenting losses longer (for 600 ms, but not 800 ms) than gains (400 ms) leads to increased sensitivity for losses. When gains are presented for longer (600 ms and 800 ms) than losses (400 ms), the participants show increased sensitivity to both gain and loss values in their decision. Loss aversion reflects this trend across attention treatments, but differences remain non-significant. Further exploratory analyses show that specifically participants with higher impulsiveness become more sensitive to attribute values when gains are presented for longer. Jointly, these results support the notion that attention has a causal impact on the sensitivity to specific attributes during risky choice. Moreover, our results underline the moderating role of impulsiveness on the relationship between attention and choice.     

第三部门及其与相关部门比较释义

第三部门是指以服务公众为宗旨,不以营利为目的,其所得不分配给内部成员,其自身具有合法的免税资格和提供捐赠人减免税的合法地位的组织.该文重点分析了第三部门的特征以及第三部门概念与非营利部门、中介组织和事业单位等概念之间的关系以及区别,同时针对第三部门当前的状况和存在的问题,应该完善法律,放松规制;依法管理,依法监督;提高人员素质,改善经营管理等措施,以便加深对我国第三部门的再认识,促进我国第三部门健康稳定的发展.     

Preference for Flexibility in a Savage Framework

We study preferences over Savage acts that map states to opportunity sets and satisfy the Savage axioms. Preferences over opportunity sets may exhibit a preference for flexibility due to an implicit uncertainty about future preferences reflecting anticipated unforeseen contingencies. The main result of this paper characterizes maximization of the expected indirect utility in terms of an ‘Indirect Stochastic Dominance’ axiom that expresses a preference for ‘more opportunities in expectation.’ The key technical tool of the paper, a version of Möbius inversion, has been imported from the theory of nonadditive belief functions; it allows an alternative representation using Choquet integration, and yields a simple proof of Kreps' (1979) classic result.     

基于鲁棒优化的突发公共卫生事件精准筛查策略研究

“精准筛查”是落实突发公共卫生事件精准防控工作的基础保障和重要手段，但是如何科学合理地制定突发公共卫生事件精准筛查策略尚未开展深入研究。本文根据传染病传播机理，将待检测群体进行分类，引入“检测效用”刻画各类人群在不同时间检测对突发公共卫生事件传播扩散的抑制程度，建立以检测效用最大化为目标的鲁棒优化模型，并将其转化为易求解的鲁棒等价模型，确定最优的筛查方案。最后通过算例仿真验证模型及其转化方法的可行性和有效性，为突发公共卫生事件的精准筛查策略提供了理论指导和决策支持。     

The Ex Ante Incentive Compatible Core in the Absence of Wealth Effects

In a differential information economy with quasi–linear utilities, monetary transfers facilitate the fulfillment of incentive compatibility constraints: the associated ex ante core is generically nonempty. However, we exhibit a well–behaved exchange economy in which this core is empty, even if goods are allocated through random mechanisms.