Morality De-Kanted or the Biological Roots of Moral Behavior

The ethical and moral behavior of Homo sapiens is no longer the exclusive domain of religion and philosophy because we recognize that such behavior affects the reproductive success of individuals within the species. We are a social species and therefore our survival is influenced by our capacity for cooperation and our willingness to take risks for kin. Emotions, some of which are found in other species, help to mediate our altruistic behavior. The reproductive benefits of helping kin, especially offspring, are readily seen. Helping non-kin can be beneficial if individuals can differentiate between ‘reciprocators’ and ‘non-reciprocators’ and direct altruistic behavior toward reciprocators. Also, if third parties are favorably impressed by observing altruistic behavior, the rewards need not come from the recipient of the altruistic behavior. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Deterministic versus probabilistic consequences of trust and trustworthiness: An experimental investigation

There is overwhelming evidence of reciprocal behavior, driven by intentions. However, the role of consequences is less clear cut. Experimentally manipulating how efficient trust and reciprocity can be in deterministic and uncertain environments allows us to study how payoff consequences of trust and trustworthiness affect reciprocity. According to the results for our modified Investment Game, trustees reward trust more when trust is more efficient but do not adjust rewards when the efficiency of rewarding is varied. Furthermore, higher deterministic benefits result in higher levels of reciprocity for all trust levels, whereas an uncertain environment diminishes reciprocity.     

Do your duty—demand your right: a theoretical discussion of the norm of reciprocity in social work

This article presents a literature-based critique of the principle of reciprocity in welfare and social work. The norm of reciprocity is in principle an ethical, universal norm related to the whole scope of human interaction. In this article the scope has been delimited to social work and the implementation of a policy of workfare in Norway. Emphasis is given to exploring mechanisms that may explain important characteristics of implementation practices that are not always clearly visible. The discussion includes the dialectics between overarching institutional relationships such as the body of laws and existing policies, institutional practices and the practice of social workers. The norm of reciprocity is analysed as a generative mechanism that sometimes implies problematic aspects requiring critical examination and discussion. By viewing reciprocity as a generative mechanism and as a ‘starting mechanism’, problematic aspects of implementation practices may be better understood.     

基于不完全合约的企业内部互惠机制研究

在不完全劳动合约的条件下,雇员对其劳动生产力水平的发挥有很大的选择空间,他们会出现逃避责任、偷懒等机会主义行为。为了减少雇员的机会主义行为,提高他们工作的努力程度、增强他们对企业的忠诚度,以及促进他们之间的相互合作,互惠性起到了重要的作用。互惠机制的作用主要体现在它对潜在的机会主义者的行为约束,使那些具有潜在机会主义倾向的人表现出合作的态度或至少限制了他们的不合作。因此,企业在制度设计、不完全劳动合约的执行等方面不仅要关注企业雇员作为一个经济人对经济因素的考虑,还要关注他们作为一个社会人对于制度公平性和正义性的需求,而企业的正义和公平主要体现在雇主和雇员之间以及雇员之间存在的的互惠性上,只有这样的企业制度安排才能使雇员对激励兼容的博弈规则做出一个合理的激励反应。     

Driving Forces Behind Informal Sanctions

This paper investigates the driving forces behind informal sanctions in cooperation games and the extent to which theories of fairness and reciprocity capture these forces. We find that cooperators' punishment is almost exclusively targeted toward the defectors, but the latter also impose a considerable amount of spiteful punishment on the cooperators. However, spiteful punishment vanishes if the punishers can no longer affect the payoff differences between themselves and the punished individual, whereas the cooperators even increase the resources devoted to punishment in this case. Our data also discriminate between different fairness principles. Fairness theories that are based on the assumption that players compare their own payoff to the group's average or the group's total payoff cannot explain the fact that cooperators target their punishment at the defectors. Fairness theories that assume that players aim to minimize payoff inequalities cannot explain the fact that cooperators punish defectors even if payoff inequalities cannot be reduced. Therefore, retaliation, i.e., the desire to harm those who committed unfair acts, seems to be the most important motive behind fairness‐driven informal sanctions.     

Adolescents' trust and reciprocity toward friends,unknown peers,and community members

Using a newly developed version of the Trust Game among 196 adolescents aged 11–20 years, this study examined whether adolescents distinguish between trust and reciprocity to unknown peers, friends, and community members. We also tested for effects of age, gender, and individual differences in attending to others' emotions, emotional support to friends, societal contributions, and institutional and interpersonal trust beliefs. Results indicated that adolescents showed the least trust and reciprocity to unknown peers, more to a community member, and most to friends. Reciprocity increased with age, and individual differences in societal contributions and interpersonal trust were positively related to trust and reciprocity. This study was the first to show that community members are a specific target in adolescents' social world.     

Revealed Altruism1

This paper develops a nonparametric theory of preferences over one's own and others' monetary payoffs. We introduce “more altruistic than” (MAT), a partial ordering over such preferences, and interpret it with known parametric models. We also introduce and illustrate “more generous than” (MGT), a partial ordering over opportunity sets. Several recent studies focus on two‐player extensive form games of complete information in which the first mover (FM) chooses a more or less generous opportunity set for the second mover (SM). Here reciprocity can be formalized as the assertion that an MGT choice by the FM will elicit MAT preferences in the SM. A further assertion is that the effect on preferences is stronger for acts of commission by FM than for acts of omission. We state and prove propositions on the observable consequences of these assertions. Finally, empirical support for the propositions is found in existing data from investment and dictator games, the carrot and stick game, and the Stackelberg duopoly game and in new data from Stackelberg mini‐games.     

破解渠道投机的恶性循环:合同治理与关系治理权变模型

基于交易成本理论、关系契约理论与相互性理论,实证探讨了合同与关系规范对渠道投机行为及其相互性的影响。从制造商角度收集数据,采用层次回归分析发现:经销商的投机行为会加重制造商的投机行为(相互性);经销商可以通过单独使用合同或关系规范减弱制造商的投机行为,也可以共同使用它们以达到更好的效果;不过在抑制渠道投机相互性方面,只有共同使用合同与关系规范才能将其有效减弱,减弱的效果随不同的组合水平而定。     

小农户与新型农业经营主体如何有机衔接——基于共生理论的阐释

党的十九大报告提出要实现小农户和新型农业经营主体的有机衔接,这为中国现代农业的发展指明了方向。但从目前学界的研究成果来看,构建何种模式有助于实现小农户和新型农业经营主体的衔接尚处于研究空白状态。基于此,本研究从共生理论的视角出发,认为农业经营对称互惠一体化共生模式是实现小农户和新型农业经营主体有机衔接的策略选择。在具体构建路径上,除了需要健全国家相关农业政策、加快推进信息技术运用、完善社会服务体系建设、培育农村先进人才成长以及破除小农意识的滞后性;更需要秉承小农户和新型农业经营主体两者共生单元的地位平等、共生模式的互利共赢、共生环境的协同发展以及共生界面的整体推进,才能真正实现农业农村的现代化目标。     

从休谟的正义理论看正义的多重特征

正义问题是人类永恒的问题之一,文章从休谟的正义理论出发,考察了亚里士多德和密尔以及罗尔斯的相关论述,刻画出正义所具有的多重特征——交互性、涵摄性、功利等级上的高阶性以及动机上的低阶性,并最终分析了这些特征之间的内在关联。