中国西部民族地区农村城镇化发展模式研究——以藏族地区九寨沟县为例

中国西部民族地区九寨沟县候鸟型的旅游推进型城镇化模式,与城镇化推进的经典理论,工业化是城镇化的根本动力,有截然不同的表现形式。城镇人口的增长,呈现明显的季节性,随旅游旺季淡季的变化呈现一种规律性的潮汐式的变化方式。前往旅游的流动人口数量是城镇常住人口的数倍甚至10倍以上。这种城镇化推进过程,所推进发展的,作为增长极的城镇,所产生的聚集扩散效应作用却是基本一致的。     

"三界"宇宙观与社会空间的建构——广西那坡县黑衣壮族群空间观念的研究

本文根据文化人类学社会空间建构理论对黑衣壮族群的空间观念加以分析,以民族志资料说明黑衣壮族群的宇宙观为社会成员对空间的划分和赋予意义的行为提供了认知基础,黑衣壮人通过房屋建筑的象征意义、空间方位的确定、生活空间和仪式场所的安排等途径表达出其族群文化中对空间概念的哲理思考。面对急剧的社会经济变迁,黑衣壮人传统的空间观念也在产生变化,体现出黑衣壮人对自身生存状态和文化变迁过程的反思。     

Consistent Probabilistic Social Choice

Two fundamental axioms in social choice theory are consistency with respect to a variable electorate and consistency with respect to components of similar alternatives. In the context of traditional non‐probabilistic social choice, these axioms are incompatible with each other. We show that in the context of probabilistic social choice, these axioms uniquely characterize a function proposed by Fishburn (1984). Fishburn's function returns so‐called maximal lotteries, that is, lotteries that correspond to optimal mixed strategies in the symmetric zero‐sum game induced by the pairwise majority margins. Maximal lotteries are guaranteed to exist due to von Neumann's Minimax Theorem, are almost always unique, and can be efficiently computed using linear programming.     

转型加速时期西部少数民族地区结构性贫困研究述论

文章认为西部少数民族地区在社会转型加快时期的贫困问题基本上是结构性贫困,并对这种结构性贫困问题的具体特征及其产生的社会危害进行纬度结构分析,最后系统地从建构现代国家治理体系和治理现代化的背景下提出了治理路径。     

An Exploration of the Need to Build an Evaluation Index System for Economic and Social Development in the Southwest’s Ethnic Region

An evaluation index system for eco￣nomic and social development is guiding the trends and actions of economic development in different countries or regions. However,the evaluation index system should b...     

Strategic Learning and the Topology of Social Networks

We consider a group of strategic agents who must each repeatedly take one of two possible actions. They learn which of the two actions is preferable from initial private signals and by observing the actions of their neighbors in a social network. We show that the question of whether or not the agents learn efficiently depends on the topology of the social network. In particular, we identify a geometric “egalitarianism” condition on the social network that guarantees learning in infinite networks, or learning with high probability in large finite networks, in any equilibrium. We also give examples of nonegalitarian networks with equilibria in which learning fails.     

Signaling to Partially Informed Investors in the Newsvendor Model

We analyze a signaling game between the manager of a firm and an investor in the firm. The manager has private information about the firm's demand and cares about the short‐term stock price assigned by the investor. Previous research has shown that under continuous decision choices and the Intuitive Criterion refinement, the least‐cost separating equilibrium will result, in which a low‐quality firm chooses its optimal capacity and a high‐quality firm over‐invests in order to signal its quality to investors. We build on this research by showing the existence of pooling outcomes in which low‐quality firms over‐invest and high‐quality firms under‐invest so as to provide identical signals to investors. The pooling equilibrium is practically appealing because it yields a Pareto improvement compared to the least‐cost separating equilibrium. Distinguishing features of our analysis are that: (i) we allow the capacity decision to have either discrete or continuous support, and (ii) we allow beliefs to be refined based on either the Undefeated refinement or the Intuitive Criterion refinement. We find that the newsvendor model parameters impact the likelihood of a pooling outcome, and this impact changes in both sign and magnitude depending on which refinement is used.     

Competition and Coordination in a Two‐Channel Supply Chain

We study competition and coordination in a supply chain in which a single supplier both operates a direct channel and sells its product through multiple differentiated retailers. We study analytically the supply chain with symmetric retailers and find that the supplier prefers to have as many retailers as possible in the market, even if the retailers' equilibrium retail price is lower than that of the supplier, and even if the number of retailers and their cost or market advantage prevent sales through the direct channel. We find that the two‐channel supply chain may be subject to inefficiencies not present in the single‐channel supply chain. We show that several contracts known to coordinate a single‐channel supply chain do not coordinate the two‐channel supply chain; thus we propose a linear quantity discount contract and demonstrate its ability to perfectly coordinate the two‐channel supply chain with symmetric retailers. We provide some analytical results for the supply chain with asymmetric retailers and propose an efficient solution approach for finding the equilibrium. We find numerically that the supplier still benefits from having more retailers in the market and that linear quantity discount contracts can mitigate supply chain inefficiency, though they no longer achieve perfect coordination.     

Supply Chain Consequences of Subsidies for Corporate Social Responsibility

The use of government incentives tied to market prices as means of boosting corporate social responsibility (CSR) has expanded notably in recent decades. Enhanced business tax deductions for charitable donations and credits for conservation easements are notable cases. While providing incentives for socially desirable behavior to achieve legislative goals has intuitive appeal, the broader economic consequences are not always fully understood. In this study, we examine such wider consequences for supply chains when subsidies for CSR are offered. One effect we identify is that since incentives are typically tied to market value, firms have not only an added incentive to achieve societal objectives (say by donating inventory) but also an incentive to raise output (retail) market prices. A second consequence is that since firms forgo potential revenues by engaging in socially desired behavior, they become increasingly sensitive to supplier pricing; in an uncoordinated supply chain this leads to input (wholesale) price concessions. Among other things, the results underscore that incentives put in place to meet broader societal objectives also have notable ramifications for suppliers, retailers, and consumers in primary markets.