Market economies and pro-social behavior: Experimental evidence from Central Asia

This study seeks to extend the body of knowledge of pro-social behavior in comparative market settings by reporting on a high-stakes ultimatum game and revelation game experiments in two transition economies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. While controlling for cultural differences and framing effects, we find statistically significant differences in fairness and honesty behavior between the two countries. Specifically, subjects in Uzbekistan (in an earlier stage of transition to a market economy) are fairer and more honest than their later-stage Kazakh counterparts. Our experimental findings have implications for the literature on pro-social behavior and market economies, and more generally, on the transmission process between formal and informal institutions.     

试论伦理思想在伊斯兰教中的核心地位

伊斯兰教是以道德为本的宗教。在伊斯兰教中 ,宗教信仰是基础 ,伦理道德是核心。离开信仰 ,道德无以寄托 ;离开道德 ,信仰无以落实。信仰之路也就是道德完善之路 ,信仰的最高境界也就是道德的至境。无论是伊斯兰兴教的出发点、最终目的 ,还是伊斯兰教的主旨 ,都说明伦理道德在伊斯兰教中居于核心地位。阐明伦理道德在伊斯兰教中的地位 ,对于我们正确理解伊斯兰教的真谛具有积极意义。     

哈萨克族的语言和文字

本文全面论述了哈萨克族语言的历史发展及其特点,也谈到了哈萨克方言的划分及方言与部落、民俗的关系。文章最后介绍了历史上哈萨克族使用的文字及近年来在这方面考古学上的新发现。     

明代中后期的撒里畏兀儿

从嘉靖七年（１５２８年）明朝兵部尚书王琼总制三边、安辑东迁后的 撒里畏兀儿诸部,至明、清之交。这一时期,撒里畏兀儿失去了自"黄头田纥"以 来的左右一方的相对独立局面,因受制于人而动荡不安、艰难求生,对今日裕固 族社会产生了重大影响。     

神奇母题的历史根源

关于民间口头流传的神奇幻想故事同原始文化、传统宗教信仰之间的关联 ,素为中外学人所关注。本文作为“中国民间故事类型与传承研究”这个重大课题的一个侧面 ,对此做出了较有新意的阐释     

"天书降神"新议--北宋与契丹的文化竞争

宋真宗"天书降神"一事,不但为当时"不语怪力乱神"的儒者反对,亦为今世秉后见之明,崇尚"理性"、"科学"的学人严厉批判.但元儒修撰<宋史>,于此曾表"同情之理解".本文即以此为起点,以考据为基础,试图揭示"天书降神"背后的文化意蕴和实际效果,并提出与亨廷顿"文明冲突"(the clash of civilizations)不同的观念--"文化竞争"(the cultural struggle).     

论西域文化与民族关系的发展

文章从汉文化在西域的传播条件、西域的屯垦移民促使汉文化的广泛传播、西域教育使汉文化逐步植根于少数民族文化等方面论述了文化维系力的重要性。     

纳西族空间观念之色彩表象

空间是抽象的 ,只有对它们进行具体的表象 ,才能将抽象还原成具体。无论在纳西族民俗中 ,还是在其他民族的民俗中 ,色彩常常成为对空间方位进行表象的具体手段之一。由色彩所表象的空间不仅决定着民俗活动的性质 ,也规范着民俗活动的形式与内容。本文从前空间、原空间等方面对纳西族民俗中空间的色彩表象作了介绍和分析     

POLITICAL SELECTION IN CHINA: THE COMPLEMENTARY ROLES OF CONNECTIONS AND PERFORMANCE

Who becomes a top politician in China? We focus on provincial leaders—a pool of candidates for top political office—and examine how their chances of promotion depend on their performance in office and connections with top politicians. Our empirical analysis, based on the curriculum vitae of Chinese politicians, shows that connections and performance are complements in the Chinese political selection process. This complementarity is stronger the younger provincial leaders are relative to their connected top leaders. To provide one plausible interpretation of these empirical findings, we propose a simple theory in which the complementarity arises because connections foster loyalty of junior officials to senior ones, thereby allowing incumbent top politicians to select competent provincial leaders without risking being ousted. Our findings shed some light on why a political system known for patronage can still select competent leaders.