国有土地上房屋征收中的利益博弈

《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》已经实施,但是野蛮强拆和暴力抗法事件还是不断出现,在房屋征收行为中,政府、被征收人的利益始终是双方在征收中矛盾的焦点。在这场利益博弈中,谁获得的利益最大,谁又是利益的最终的受害者呢?本文试从《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》(以下简称《条例》)的实施方面分析,在各种利益博弈的作用下,新的《条例》和司法权的介入方式能否解决国有土地上房屋征收中的矛盾问题。     

如何在新媒体时代提高国际传播力

传播能力是国家软实力的重要组成部分,是党的执政能力的重要体现,关系到国家利益和国家形象,关系到改革开放和社会主义现代化建设大局。发展现代传播体系,增强国内国际传播能     

论我国消费者公益诉讼的必要性

新《民事诉讼法》、《消费者权益保护法》增设了消费者公益诉讼制度,这既有利于实现消费者实质自由,又有利于将公民的结社自由、诉权的可让性以及消费者协会的功能有机结合起来,真正发挥法律作为调整利益关系的手段的整体性功能,同时突破了传统民事诉讼中起诉人必须与案件具有直接利害关系的理念,为受损消费者提供了一种更安全有效的防护性保障制度。     

渝东北生态涵养发展区治理模式创新探索

作为重庆五大功能区之一的渝东北生态涵养发展区,面临着生态环境保护和经济社会发展的双重压力,新的功能定位,需要新的发展思路和治理模式,科学合理的治理能激发社会发展的动力,推动生态涵养发展区又好又快的发展。从渝东北的社会基础和治理传统出发,顺应人类社会治理的发展趋势,就要走一条政府主导——多元治理的模式,从而兼顾生态涵养发展区的各个利益主体,以政府为核心,调动社会相关主体积极参与到渝东北生态涵养发展区的治理中来,开创一个科学合理的治理格局,实现生态保护和经济社会发展的双赢局面。     

历史人物伦理思想的指认依据--以梁漱溟为例

堪称伦理思想者，当有指认依据在。以梁漱溟为例，提出伦理思想的三个指认依据：一是基本稳定的形上基础；二是相对系统的伦理主张；三是较为广泛的实际影响。只有坚持论从史出，我们才有可能靠近历史人物伦理思想的历史真实和价值真实。     

工程质量政府监督多层次利益分配与激励协同机制探究

The implementation of the government supervision of the quality of the project is an international practice. The basic form of government supervision of engineering quality is government supervision on the quality behavior of the engineering main bodies and its results by the competent government department entrusted. Its essence is a dual principal-agent process. The frequent accidents of the engineering quality reflect the loss and failure of the government law enforcement supervision of the engineering quality to some extent. Its root lies in the lack of endogenous power in the law enforcement supervision of the project quality government supervisors in the law enforcement supervision. Therefore, the incentive coordination mechanism of the government supervision based on the multi-level interest distribution is worth explored. In views of the multi-level management system which is formed by the government departments, government quality supervision organizations, quality supervision team (or group) for the government supervision of engineering quality. The benefit distribution function between every party is constructed, and the game model of the multi-level incentive and coordination for the government supervision in engineering quality is built. To solve and deduce from the first stage of the cooperative game and the second stage of the non-cooperative game, the cooperative game can obtain the reward coefficient: . The coordination degree of the best effort can be obtained by the non cooperative game. The result shows that:the coordination degree of government engineering quality supervisor is related to the coordination costs, and had nothing to do with fixed costs. The benefit distribution coefficient not only depends on the efforts of the quality government monitors, but also on the efficiency of other parties' efforts. The quality supervisors of the project will also focus on the coordination with other parties when enhancing their management capabilities to improve the overall performance of project quality government supervision. The strategy of the incentive coordination mechanism for the supervision and cooperation of the project quality government is:the government quality supervision team should set up the supervisory team properly, improve the coordination efficiency and reduce the cost of supervision-coordination to maximize the value of self-motivation. Quality supervision team (or group) should establish the partnership to improve the coordination efficiency for achieving the maximization of their own incentive value.The model and conclusion of incentive synergy mechanism based on multi-level benefit allocation mechanism are researched. It can provide theoretical support and practice reference for the market governance and supervision of general public goods.