试论五言诗的成立及其形成的三个时期

五言诗成立于建安十六年之后,曹丕的《黎阳作》其三为延康元年六月的作品,刘桢的《赠五官中郎将》四首是建安十七年正月的作品,五言诗的成立,分为曹操的探索期、二曹六子的成立期和曹植的完成期三个阶段。     

第16届男篮世锦赛中国队与对手各位置球员技术对比分析

运用文献资料法、数理统计法、录像观察法和对比分析法,对第16届男篮世锦赛中国队与对手不同位置队员攻守技术进行分析,可以找出中国队与对手所存在的差距以及原因。中国队中锋和前锋位置与对手不相上下,在得分和抢断方面明显领先对方,然而二分球命中率与对手有着较大差距。但是后卫队员与对手除了三分球命中率、犯规次数和失误方面相关不大外,其它各项数据统计差距较大。中国男篮需要重视体能的提高,特别要注重力量、速度和耐力等素质的强化;提高在对抗中出手的稳定性和命中率以及突破到内线上篮得分的能力;在防守上重新树立先进的防守理念,加强防守基本技术的训练,提高防守动作速率;完善内外结合,逐步构建以中锋为核心,以外线进攻为重点的战术体系;重视人才梯队的培养,保持球队拥有不同竞技阶段人员的合理人才结构。     

日本政府处理“冲绳问题”的战略构想与对美交涉

"冲绳问题"在战后日美关系中占有重要地位。战后初期美国在冲绳实施军政统治,日本政府无力收回,遂将冲绳作为与美国进行媾和谈判的筹码,以牺牲冲绳的方式达到维护日本国家安全的目的,同时又竭力通过外交交涉的途径将冲绳的主权保留给日本,为日后从美国手中收回冲绳埋下了伏笔。     

Foreign Direct Investment,Trade, and Skilled Labour Demand in Eastern Europe

In this paper, we study the effects of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade on relative skilled labour demand in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Our estimates show significant heterogeneity in the FDI effect across the three economies: the effect is always significantly positive for Hungary, weakly negative for Poland, and negligible for the Czech Republic. As to trade, we find much more homogeneity in coefficient estimates, which are generally negative for all countries, although significant only in the case of Hungary.     

HAS DEMOCRATIZATION REDUCED INFANT MORTALITY IN SUB‐SAHARAN AFRICA? EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA

Does democracy help babies survive in sub‐Saharan Africa? By using retrospective fertility surveys conducted in 28 African countries, I compare the survival of infants born to the same mother before and after democratization to disentangle the effect of democracy from that of changes in population characteristics, which is infeasible with country‐level statistics on infant mortality. I find that infant mortality falls by 1.2 percentage points, 12% of the sample mean, after democratization in the post‐Cold War period. Relevant aspects of democracy appear to be the combination of multiparty elections and leadership change.     

A MODEL OF ETHNIC CONFLICT

We present a model of conflict in which discriminatory government policy or social intolerance is responsive to various forms of ethnic activism, including violence. It is this perceived responsiveness—captured by the probability that the government gives in and accepts a proposed change in ethnic policy—that induces individuals to mobilize, often violently, to support their cause. Yet, mobilization is costly and militants have to be compensated accordingly. The model allows for both financial and human contributions to conflict and allows for a variety of individual attitudes (“radicalism”) towards the cause. The main results concern the effects of within‐group heterogeneity in radicalism and income, as well as the correlation between radicalism and income, in precipitating conflict.     

EMERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE OF INEFFICIENT STATES

We present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics. The society consists of rich and poor. The rich are initially in power, but expect to transition to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats. By choosing an inefficient state structure, the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics, so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy. Moreover, the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time. Intuitively, an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one. When the poor come to power in democracy, they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats. Anticipating this, when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state, bureaucrats support the rich, who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats. We obtain that the rich–bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support. The model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality, when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values, and when individuals are sufficiently forward‐looking.     

Financial Globalization and the Governance of Domestic Financial Intermediaries

We model a small open economy in which both domestic financial intermediaries and entrepreneurs face incentive constraints, as in Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) , to study the general equilibrium impact of various types of capital inflows on the efficiency and governance of domestic banks. Banks have an advantage in monitoring firms, but the latter can collude with banks and offer side‐payments to reduce the intensity of monitoring. Opening up to international capital flows makes domestic banks’ capital scarcer relative to uninformed capital, thus increasing the relative cost of monitoring. We show that capital account liberalization has ambiguous effects on the governance of the domestic financial system by sometimes increasing firms’ incentives to collude with banks. We characterize the conditions under which governance is more likely to deteriorate after opening up the capital account, and discuss the effects on investment, productivity and output. We also analyze the effects of foreign direct investment in the corporate and banking sectors. Stylized facts are consistent with the predictions of the model.     

中国共产党的先进性是具体的历史的

江泽民同志在“5·3 1”讲话、“十六大”报告中 ,强调指出党的先进性是具体的历史的 ,也就是与时俱进。这是马克思主义世界观的根本要求 ,是时代的根本要求。只有这样 ,才能始终做到“三个代表”。     

表见合伙之价值评判——兼新新《台伙企业法》第76条

2007年6月1日开始实施的新《合伙企业法》是一部非常有效地法律，但其最大缺陷是仍然没有规定表见合伙制度。表见合伙与表见代理、与民事欺诈是有明显区别的，不能用表见代理与民事欺诈解决实践中的表见合伙纠纷。新《合伙企业法》第76条的规定让人困惑，像似表见合伙，实则不然。建立表见合伙制度更有利于保障交易公平和安全，彰显善意第三人的利益，充分救济善意第三人的权利。因此，我国应当建立表见合伙制度。