Cross-validation of the screening scale in an adult protective services sample

Adult Protective Services (APS) professionals are often called on to assess decision-making capacity when investigating financial exploitation. Previous research found that in consecutive APS cases, a decision-making screening scale (LFDSS) also detected financial exploitation. The purpose of this study was to apply the clinical cutoff scores derived from the previous study to a new sample of APS cases. Using a sample of 105 participants, from APS workers across 5 counties this study investigated the clinical utility of the LFDSS to detect financial exploitation based on ratings by APS professionals using the scale. Results demonstrate that the LFDSS has excellent internal consistency and clinical utility properties. This paper provides support for use of the LFDSS as a reliable and valid instrument. Instructions for use of the LFDSS are included in the article, along with information about online support tools.     

欧盟知识产权跨界禁令与竞争规则研究

《布鲁塞尔规则》2001年取代了《布鲁塞尔公约》,成为新的欧盟指令来规范相关的跨界国际私法的争议。欧盟委员会2004年针对适用《欧洲经济共同体条约》第81条的规定颁布了配套的指令TTBER和适用这个指令的指南。指令第3条规定了两个协议合作的企业市场份额门槛的认定标准,这个标准取代了过去的分类方法,在欧洲引起广泛的讨论。欧盟知识产权跨界禁令和竞争规则研究,突破了知识产权的地域性原则,完善了知识产权的竞争规则,并提供了相应的法律救济,有助于中国政府指导自己的企业与欧盟开展贸易。     

不可扼杀的顽强生命——从当前国际金融危机再论马克思主义命运

由美国次贷危机引发的世界性金融危机以及由金融危机发展而来的经济危机,充分揭示了资本主义制度的寄生性、腐朽性,进一步证明了马克思主义关于资本主义必然灭亡、社会主义必然胜利的结论的科学性,更加证明马克思主义仍然具有强大生命力。主要表现在：资本主义制度无法克服其自身固有矛盾;马克思的经济理论及其巨著《资本论》声誉大振;社会主义社会在曲折中不断前进。     

欧共体竞争法的实施机制及对我国的启示

欧盟理事会第1/2003号条例取代了1962年第17号条例,废除了原有的事前申报制度,实现了欧共体竞争法实施的非集权化,加强了欧盟委员会的调查权,由此确立了“非集权”的竞争法实施机制①。在新机制下,委员会负责制定和发展欧共体的竞争政策,实施欧共体竞争法的任务由各成员国承担。作为世界上最先进的竞争法体系之一,欧共体竞争法的最新发展对我国竞争法制的确立有重要的借鉴意义。     

建立中国(上海)自由贸易试验区动因及其经济效应分析

上海自贸试验区的建立,不是着眼于一城市、一区域的发展,而是力图通过开放转变政府角色、推动制度创新,突破金融领域的改革难点,从而带来"制度红利",充分运用市场调配资源的高效为我国社会主义建设事业服务。上海要实现建成金融中心、贸易中心的宏伟目标,必须从自贸试验区开始,从根本上摒除要素流动的障碍,协调好与经济腹地,与香港、深圳前海等区域的关系,实现区域经济协同发展。上海自贸试验区的建成,必将进一步推动上海服务业产业集聚,推动上海金融中心、航运中心、贸易中心更上一个能级,辐射长江流域甚至更广阔的地域。     

Pre-decisional information acquisition: Why do we pay too much for information? Brief report

People tend to acquire more information while making their decisions than a rational and risk-neutral benchmark would predict. We conduct a carefully designed experiment to derive five plausible reasons for pre-decision information overpurchasing. The results show that overpurchasing of information can be almost entirely explained by systematic information processing errors (misestimation or incorrect Bayesian updating), possibly caused by biased intuitive decision processes. Other factors, such as overoptimism about the validity of the new information, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and curiosity about (irrelevant) information, play at most a minor role. Our results imply that information overacquisitions are mainly driven by the overestimation of the usefulness of additional information.     

Financial Intermediation Modernization in Countries with Transition Economy

During the modern phase of economic reforms directed at the establishment of market economy, many countries with transition economies face the challenge of solving the issue of formation and rational usage of internal sources of financing the real sector of the economy, as well as attracting considerable volume of direct foreign investment. In general, financial market imperfections hold back innovation and growth, and that public policy can complement financial markets. Therefore, the most relevant issue at the present time is the formation of attendant and complex supervision institutions, as well as an exigency of innovative economy governance as mainframe principles for further banking system elaboration and financial sector development in general. We have taken Armenia as a case study for transition economy as far as Armenia is currently in the stage of capital market development through integration into international financial markets.      

Exploitation aversion: When financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Studies of the principal-agent relationship find that monetary incentives work in many instances but that they can also backfire. Various mechanisms for this failure have been examined (e.g., intrinsic motivation, image concerns). We posit that an aversion to being exploited, i.e., being used instrumentally for another’s benefit, can also cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment we find that compliance is lower for exploitative principals compared to neutral ones despite using the same contracts. To corroborate our results we show that surveyed “exploitation aversion” mediates this effect. Our results have implications for the design and implementation of incentives within organizations.     

Markets or networks: Households’ choice of financial intermediary in Western China

We argue that households’ choice of financial intermediary is conditioned by households’ social network structures and socioeconomic status. Analyses show that households’ social network size and network composition affect their choices by limiting the quality and quantity of information, resources, and social influence one can access through social ties. Moreover, we find that high-SES families favor formal intermediaries due not only to their richer financial knowledge, higher affordability, and greater capacity to repay loans, but also to their high demands and special types of financial needs that can hardly be satisfied by embedded resources.     

从第三方支付发展看上海国际金融中心建设

互联网时代第三方支付的发展,揭示了企业"控制用户信息流以控制支付流,控制支付流以控制资金流;获得用户网络接入权胜过获得资本所有权,获得数据投入量胜过获得资金投入量"的新规则。大平台日益成为金融机构控制用户信息流、获得用户网络接入权的重要载体,在平台组合上加载信用有关数据流日益成为形成金融机构风险管理能力的重要生产资料。在互联网时代推进上海国际金融中心建设,既要继续重视金融机构集聚,更要注重鼓励企业赢得全国性用户网络接入权,加强平台组合,增强信用数据流。上海应依托自贸试验区推进互联网金融监管创新;牵头建立长三角征信联盟集团公司;搭建本地金融机构网聚平台。