欧共体竞争法的实施机制及对我国的启示

欧盟理事会第1/2003号条例取代了1962年第17号条例,废除了原有的事前申报制度,实现了欧共体竞争法实施的非集权化,加强了欧盟委员会的调查权,由此确立了“非集权”的竞争法实施机制①。在新机制下,委员会负责制定和发展欧共体的竞争政策,实施欧共体竞争法的任务由各成员国承担。作为世界上最先进的竞争法体系之一,欧共体竞争法的最新发展对我国竞争法制的确立有重要的借鉴意义。     

建立中国(上海)自由贸易试验区动因及其经济效应分析

上海自贸试验区的建立,不是着眼于一城市、一区域的发展,而是力图通过开放转变政府角色、推动制度创新,突破金融领域的改革难点,从而带来"制度红利",充分运用市场调配资源的高效为我国社会主义建设事业服务。上海要实现建成金融中心、贸易中心的宏伟目标,必须从自贸试验区开始,从根本上摒除要素流动的障碍,协调好与经济腹地,与香港、深圳前海等区域的关系,实现区域经济协同发展。上海自贸试验区的建成,必将进一步推动上海服务业产业集聚,推动上海金融中心、航运中心、贸易中心更上一个能级,辐射长江流域甚至更广阔的地域。     

Pre-decisional information acquisition: Why do we pay too much for information? Brief report

People tend to acquire more information while making their decisions than a rational and risk-neutral benchmark would predict. We conduct a carefully designed experiment to derive five plausible reasons for pre-decision information overpurchasing. The results show that overpurchasing of information can be almost entirely explained by systematic information processing errors (misestimation or incorrect Bayesian updating), possibly caused by biased intuitive decision processes. Other factors, such as overoptimism about the validity of the new information, risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and curiosity about (irrelevant) information, play at most a minor role. Our results imply that information overacquisitions are mainly driven by the overestimation of the usefulness of additional information.     

Financial Intermediation Modernization in Countries with Transition Economy

During the modern phase of economic reforms directed at the establishment of market economy, many countries with transition economies face the challenge of solving the issue of formation and rational usage of internal sources of financing the real sector of the economy, as well as attracting considerable volume of direct foreign investment. In general, financial market imperfections hold back innovation and growth, and that public policy can complement financial markets. Therefore, the most relevant issue at the present time is the formation of attendant and complex supervision institutions, as well as an exigency of innovative economy governance as mainframe principles for further banking system elaboration and financial sector development in general. We have taken Armenia as a case study for transition economy as far as Armenia is currently in the stage of capital market development through integration into international financial markets.      

Exploitation aversion: When financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Studies of the principal-agent relationship find that monetary incentives work in many instances but that they can also backfire. Various mechanisms for this failure have been examined (e.g., intrinsic motivation, image concerns). We posit that an aversion to being exploited, i.e., being used instrumentally for another’s benefit, can also cause incentives to fail. Using an experiment we find that compliance is lower for exploitative principals compared to neutral ones despite using the same contracts. To corroborate our results we show that surveyed “exploitation aversion” mediates this effect. Our results have implications for the design and implementation of incentives within organizations.     

Coordinating contracts for a financially constrained supply chain

We consider a financially constrained supply chain in which a supplier (leader) sells products to a retailer (follower) who has no access to bank financing due to her low credit rating. However, the supplier can borrow from a bank and offer trade credit to the retailer to alleviate her financial constraint. Failure to pay off a bank loan or trade credit incurs a variable default cost. We analyze the centralized version of the supply chain to obtain new coordination requirements. We then examine whether revenue-sharing, buyback, and all-unit quantity discount contracts can coordinate our supply chain. We show that the all-unit quantity discount contract fails to coordinate. However, the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts can coordinate the supply chain, but only when the supply chain has a sufficient total working capital. Moreover, they cannot allocate profit flexibly unless the supplier has a large enough working capital. Finally, we design a generalized revenue-sharing contract that coordinates the supply chain with flexible profit allocation, and also show by numerical examples its superiority over the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts.     

Markets or networks: Households’ choice of financial intermediary in Western China

We argue that households’ choice of financial intermediary is conditioned by households’ social network structures and socioeconomic status. Analyses show that households’ social network size and network composition affect their choices by limiting the quality and quantity of information, resources, and social influence one can access through social ties. Moreover, we find that high-SES families favor formal intermediaries due not only to their richer financial knowledge, higher affordability, and greater capacity to repay loans, but also to their high demands and special types of financial needs that can hardly be satisfied by embedded resources.     

从第三方支付发展看上海国际金融中心建设

互联网时代第三方支付的发展,揭示了企业"控制用户信息流以控制支付流,控制支付流以控制资金流;获得用户网络接入权胜过获得资本所有权,获得数据投入量胜过获得资金投入量"的新规则。大平台日益成为金融机构控制用户信息流、获得用户网络接入权的重要载体,在平台组合上加载信用有关数据流日益成为形成金融机构风险管理能力的重要生产资料。在互联网时代推进上海国际金融中心建设,既要继续重视金融机构集聚,更要注重鼓励企业赢得全国性用户网络接入权,加强平台组合,增强信用数据流。上海应依托自贸试验区推进互联网金融监管创新;牵头建立长三角征信联盟集团公司;搭建本地金融机构网聚平台。     

浙江非公企业劳资矛盾与工会调节作用研究——基于农民工租住地工会的实证研究

随着社会经济的发展,非公有制经济对我国经济的贡献越来越大,非公有制企业的劳资关系问题也日益突出.今天的中国,尽管工会面临着种种困境,但工会的作用仍然很重要.当前迫切需要解决的是工会代表工人利益的有效性问题.农民工租住地工会通过组建工会的方式吸纳农民工精英进入工会管理层,并动员农民工参与社区的公共生活,逐渐使他们产生了“社区认同”,农民工管理发生了由社会被动防控与管理型向主动引导、服务、建设型的转变,由分割向融合的转变,破解工会在农民工集聚的地方如何组织管理与协调劳资矛盾,促成了社区的和谐与稳定.探讨市场经济条件下企业外工会力量的成长或许能为中国工会转型提供一些借鉴和帮助,为转型期创新社会管理提供有益探索.     

产品质量内部性问题的政府管制

文章引入了对产品质量的分析,将产品质量和数量作为并列的因素进行考察,着重分析了产品质量的内部性问题,并进一步提出了单纯的较大的交易成本和单纯的不对称信息,都不能解释产品质量内部性问题产生的根源,与信息不对称紧密联系的较大的交易成本才是其根源。如何降低这种交易成本就成为政府对产品质量内部性进行管制,提高消费者福利水平的管制重点。