CRITICAL PERIODS DURING CHILDHOOD AND ADOLESCENCE

We identify the ages that constitute sensitive (or critical) periods in children's development towards their adult health status, skills, and human capital. For this, we use data on families migrating into Sweden from countries that are poorer, with less healthy conditions. Late‐life health is proxied by adult height and other adult outcomes. The relation between siblings’ ages at migration and their adult outcomes allows us to estimate the causal effect of conditions at specific childhood ages. We effectively exploit that, for siblings, the migration occurs simultaneously in calendar time but at different developmental stages (ages). We find evidence that the period just before the puberty growth spurt constitutes a critical period for adult height and we find related critical periods for adult cognition, mental health, and education.     

Do Interactions between Unemployment Insurance and Sickness Insurance Affect Transitions to Employment?

Previous research suggests that there are substantial interactions between the unemployment and sickness insurance in Sweden. Moral hazard arises in the interplay between these insurance systems, as by reporting sick an unemployed person can postpone unemployment insurance expiration and sometimes receive considerably higher benefits. I examine whether these interactions affect the transition rate to employment. To do this I use a reform that greatly reduced the incentives to transfer to sickness benefits. Although there is evidence that this reform effectively lowered the incidence of sick reports among the unemployed, I do not find that the reduced sick report rate in turn affected the transition rate to employment.     

Vacation Leave,Work Hours,and Wages: New Evidence from Linked Employer–Employee Data

This paper provides new evidence on the determinants of vacation leave and its relationship to hours worked and hourly wages by examining the case of Canada. Previous studies from the USA, using individual‐level data, have revealed that annual work hours fall by around 53 hours for each additional week of vacation used. Exploiting a linked employer–employee dataset that allows to control for detailed observed demographic, job, and firm characteristics, we find instead that annual hours of work fall by only 29 hours for each additional week of vacation used. Our findings support the hypothesis that pressure at work may lead employees to use more vacation days but also causes them to work for longer hours.     

Unionization Structures in International Oligopoly

We examine how competition in international markets affects a union's choice of wage regime, which can be either uniform or discriminatory. Firms are heterogeneous with regard to international competition. When unions choose their wage regimes sequentially, a discriminatory outcome becomes more likely when international competition increases. However, for intermediate levels a union may stick with a uniform wage regime even if the rival union adopts a discriminatory regime. When competition is sufficiently intense, both unions revert to the discriminatory regime. Paradoxically only in those latter instances all parties (consumers, workers, and firms) may be better off (each in aggregate) if all unions adopt a uniform wage regime. We conclude that union incentives to coordinate their wage regimes should then also become largest.     

A Causality Analysis of Economic Growth and Union Density in European Countries

In this paper, we analyse the relationship between union density and economic growth using a Granger causality analysis and shocks analysis with vector autoregression model. We find that the Granger causality goes from the growth rate to the unionization rate in four of the 11 European countries under study. France bucks the trend: it is the only country in which union density influences economic growth, moreover in a positive way.     

ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH AND MORAL HAZARD

We analyze the interaction between intertemporal incentive contracts and search frictions associated with on‐the‐job search. In our model, agency problems call for wage contracts with deferred compensation. At the same time workers do on‐the‐job search. Deferred compensation improves workers' incentives to exert effort but distorts their on‐the‐job search decisions. We show that deferred compensation is less attractive when the value to the worker–firm pair of on‐the‐job search is high. Moreover, the interplay between search frictions and wage contracts creates feedback effects. If firms in equilibrium use contracts with deferred compensation, fewer firms with vacancies enter the on‐the‐job search market, and this in turn reduces the distortions created by deferred compensation. These feedback effects between the incentive contracts used and the activity level in the search markets can lead to multiple equilibria: a low‐turnover equilibrium where firms use deferred compensation, and a high‐turnover equilibrium where they do not. Furthermore, the model predicts that firms are more likely to use deferred compensation when search frictions are high and when the gains from on‐the‐job search are small.     

The Determinants and Some Consequences of Unemployed Workers' Wage Demands

This paper studies the determinants and consequences in the early stages of the hiring process of unemployed workers' wage demands using direct data on workers' wage requests. We show that most unemployed workers want a wage close to their previous wage, and thus much more than they get in unemployment benefits. However, some groups, such as women, tend to demand lower wages. Moreover, we find that workers with high wage demands are contacted by firms less often than otherwise similar workers with lower wage demands. Thus, our results suggest that too high wage demands may contribute to high unemployment.     

The Motherhood Wage Penalty and Its Determinants: A Public–Private Comparison

We investigate whether public and private sector employees bear a different wage penalty for having children. According to our estimates, the total motherhood wage penalty is much larger in the private than in the public sector. Nevertheless, in both sectors, we find no unexplained penalty once we control for potential determinants of the family pay gap, namely, a reduced labour supply of mothers, child‐related career interruptions, less access to management positions, and adjustments in working conditions. Finally, only child‐related career interruptions play a different role in explaining the motherhood wage penalty in each sector.