The Mathematics of Electoral District Allocation in New Zealand

This paper outlines the implicit conceptual basis of New Zealand's electoral district allocation, as embodied in the Electoral Act 1993. It puts the words of the Act into simple mathematical formulae and describes how these concepts are implemented in the Government Statistician's electoral calculations, with examples from the 1997 calculations. The paper shows how the Māori Option affects the number of Māori electoral districts, and describes an unexpected effect of the Option on the number of General electoral districts.     

退出、呼吁与地方公共事务治理：一个分析性框架的建构

改革开放以来,中国在经济建设上取得巨大的成绩,却在公共事务领域遇到诸多治理难题。对此,经济学家常常依托“用脚投票”机制,在地方政府竞争框架下展开解读;而政治学家和社会学家则依托“用手投票”机制,强调政治社会过程中的各种力量及其作用机制。借助赫希曼的“退出-呼吁”理论,本文构建了一个融合这两种机制的理论模型,以图捕捉其作用的条件。基于该模型,进一步把地方公共事务治理视为一个社会各部门共同参与、联合生产的过程,详细剖析了“用手投票”机制发挥作用的三条机理路径。基于面板数据,本文还以因特网普及率作为“用手投票”能力的代理变量,对呼吁机制在约束地方政府腐败行为方面的作用进行了初步检验。研究结果表明,理解中国故事需要同时考虑退出和呼吁机制,相关制度设计应维持两者的平衡。     

我国上市公司治理中控股股东侵权行为及法律规范研究

全球经济一体化背景下,公司治理结构问题成为各国普遍关注的重大课题。在经济转轨时期,我国上市公司治理问题有其特殊性,基本的公司治理缺陷表现为控股股东的“一股独大”问题,形式上为控股股东对其他股东和公司的侵权行为(即权利滥用)。从制度根源分析,股权结构的不合理导致控股股东的人格缺失和行为异化。从法律规范角度看,首先要强化控股股东的诚信义务,尤其是注意义务。其次,对控股股东的投票表决权进行适当的约束,防止控股股东的权利滥用行为,可采用的投票表决机制有:完善股东投票代理制度,建立累积投票制度、类别股东表决制度和表决权排除(回避)制度等。最后,建立民事责任赔偿机制和加强对控股股东的监管也是十分必要的。     

The Budget-Voting Paradox

The budget-voting paradox states that, when social alternatives are proper subsets of a finite set of decisions, choosing decision-wise according to the majority rule may select an alternative that is covered in the majority tournament among alternatives. Individual preferences are defined on single decisions, and are extended to preferences over the alternative set by means of a preference extension rule. We prove the existence of the paradox for any rank-based, monotone, and independent extension rule.      

Plurality Rule Works In Three-Candidate Elections

In the citizen–candidate approach each citizen chooses whether or not to run as candidate. In a single-peaked preference domain, we find that the strategic entry decision of the candidates eliminates one of the most undesirable properties of Plurality rule, namely to elect a poor candidate in three-candidate elections since as we show, the Condorcet winner among the self-declared candidates is always elected. We find that the equilibria with three candidates are basically 2-fold, either there are two right-wing candidates and a left-wing candidate who wins the elections (or its symmetric), or there is a right-wing candidate, a left-wing candidate, and a candidate located in between the two others who becomes winner. We also show that when four or more candidates enter the contest, Plurality rule can elect the Condorcet-loser among the self-declared candidates.      

Disenfranchised Not ‘Deficient‘: How the (Neoliberal) State Disenfranchises Young People

Young people's declining electoral participation has been considered a problem in a range of democracies, including Australia. In this paper I examine youth electoral participation through the eyes and voices of young marginalised Australians. In the policy arena young people's electoral participation is usually considered a subject for education policy. Here I make the case for considering it as an issue for social policy, and as a welfare issue. In this context I examine the effects of neoliberalism and Australia's shrinking welfare state on young people's citizenship and ability to access the franchise. Whilst acknowledging the liberal roots of neoliberalism I argue that whereas the neoliberal state identifies young people's political disengagement as a problem, and constructs participation using the language of ‘choice‘, that its own social policies act to create barriers to the franchise for young people and thus effectively disenfranchise them.     

Signaling and Election Motivations in a Voting Model with Common Values and Responsive Candidates

In this paper we focus on strategic voting behavior when both an election and a signaling motivation affect voters' behavior. We analyze a model of elections with two candidates competing on a one‐dimensional policy space. Voters are privately and imperfectly informed about a common shock affecting the electorate's preferences. Candidates are assumed to choose policy in response to information gleaned from election results and according to exogenous factors that may lead to polarization in candidates' policy choices. We analyze a subset of symmetric equilibria in which strategies are symmetric to candidates' names and private signals (CSS equilibria). We show that signaling and election motivations pull voters to vote in different directions. We provide conditions that show the relation between the amount of information aggregated in the election and the motivation that influences voting behavior the most. Finally, we show that when candidates are responsive and polarized, all CSS equilibria are inefficient in the limit.     

股权分置改革与分类表决机制

在股权分置情况下,流通股股东的权益得不到保障,社会公众股股东难以对公司进行有效的监督,也不利于上市公司内部治理结构的完善。分类表决机制赋予流通股股东更多自我保护的权益,建立起非流通股股东与流通股股东的对话机制,形成投资者对公司经营层的有效制约,提高上市公司的治理水平,弥补股权分置导致的股市的体制性缺陷,为股权分置改革提供了制度准备,对我国正在进行的股权分置改革起到有力的推动作用。作为一种制度创新,分类表决机制应在实施过程中得到不断完善。     

Voting to belong: the inevitability of systemic Islamophobia

In this article, I connect Muslim American voting practices to the ‘good Muslim’ trope. Tracing participation of members of Islamic Representative Organizations (IRO’s) in election cycles from 2000 to 2016, I argue that elections have been a site for Muslim Americans to negotiate a sense of belonging in the U.S. My research reveals deep cynicism about the transformative potential of elections and a sense that systemic Islamophobia (i.e. militarism and surveillance) were perceived as inevitable. IRO members opted instead to vote as a way to articulate the presence of Muslims in the U.S.; for instance, Muslims ought to ‘make a statement’ by voting against Donald Trump or for the first woman candidate. In this way, voting can be understood as an articulation of a ‘good Muslim’ subjectivity through which IRO members seek legitimacy within, rather than a dismantling of, an Islamophobic milieu.     

Mobilisation through early activation and school engagement – the story from Scotland

This paper explores the experience of 16–17 year olds participating in the Scottish independence referendum and discusses whether it can be seen as positive or negative considering civic attitudes and participation. Using data from two comprehensive and representative surveys of 14–17 year olds, it engages empirically with claims about young people's alleged political (dis-)interest and provides qualifications for commonly believed stories of young people as mere recipients of information given to them by parents and teachers.

The paper develops a positive view of young people's engagement in the referendum process and suggests that inputs from parents and schools actually have distinguishable effects on young people, who do not simply ‘follow the lead’ of others uncritically. The analyses suggest that the discussion of political issues in the classroom (rather than the simple delivery of civics-style classes per se) may act as a positive factor in the political socialisation of young people, but suggests that further research is required to examine these effects beyond the specific context of the Scottish independence referendum in particular in relation to questions about whether reducing the voting age to 16 could be expected to generally lead to positive outcomes.