从两个公式看累积投票制的适用

2006年1月1日开始实施的《公司法》明确规定股份公司在选举董事、监事时可实行累积投票制,原意是更好地维护中小股东的权益,然而从两个简单的公式即可看出累积投票制的实施必然会遇到一些困难。     

我国直接选举制度若干问题的讨论

我国《选举法》关于在直接选举中“选区全体选民的过半数参加投票,选举有效”的规定,在市场经济条件下遇到了挑战。为保证选区全体选民的过半数参加投票而规定的召开选举大会、委托投票、代写选票等程序安排也与选举自由、秘密投票、一人一票原则相背。笔者主张,在直接选举中,选举只有合法非法之分,没有以参加投票选民是否过选区全体选民的半数来定有效无效之别,采用相对多数制,废除委托投票,缩小代写选票选民的范围等来完善我国的直接选举制度。     

费用分摊、选票分配与业主财富转移

运用制度经济理论和分析方法,考察了不同费用分摊方式与不同选票分配规则组合情形下业主之间的财富转移问题,以及选用不同的投票决定规则水平对业主间财富转移问题的影响.结果显示,业主个人的经济利益(收益与费用分摊)和相应的选票数的差异越大,财富被侵蚀的机会就越大.为有效避免财富转移问题并使项目实施有效率,在具有不同面积分布的小区里,选用不同的选票分配规则和决定规则是必要的.     

Incorporation vs. Separation:

This article examines the approach to the study of women and politics in the People's Republic of China and assesses the impact of gender studies (or lack of it) on women and the larger part of society in China. The author argues that most materials for studying women and politics in China emanate from the office of the All-China Women's Federation, an appendage of the Chinese Communist Party, and not from political science textbooks. This approach, however, falls short of addressing major political and economic problems facing women of China.     

“What's the Matter With Kansas?” A Sociological Answer

Thomas Frank's book poses a question: Why do working people in Kansas vote for Republican candidates when supporting them is antithetical to their economic interests? This article analyzes the statistical evidence for such alleged deviant voting and finds support for his thesis that the working class does vote Republican. Also supported is his principal causal suggestion for this hypothesized “backlash,” the decline in average county population. But both variables lack a supporting theory. A “structural ecological” explanation for both facts is introduced that claims that the fear that whites experience as the white population shrinks causes the backlash reaction and the Republican vote that Frank describes. Statistical tests support the alternative explanation and illustrate the difference between Frank's ethnography‐based arguments and the approach that most sociologists use.     

An Experimental Study of Collective Deliberation

We study the effects of deliberation on collective decisions. In a series of experiments, we vary groups' preference distributions (between common and conflicting interests) and the institutions by which decisions are reached (simple majority, two‐thirds majority, and unanimity). Without deliberation, different institutions generate significantly different outcomes, tracking the theoretical comparative statics. Deliberation, however, significantly diminishes institutional differences and uniformly improves efficiency. Furthermore, communication protocols exhibit an array of stable attributes: messages are public, consistently reveal private information, provide a good predictor for ultimate group choices, and follow particular (endogenous) sequencing.     

One Person,Many Votes: Divided Majority and Information Aggregation

This paper shows that information imperfections and common values can solve coordination problems in multicandidate elections. We analyze an election in which (i) the majority is divided between two alternatives and (ii) the minority backs a third alternative, which the majority views as strictly inferior. Standard analyses assume voters have a fixed preference ordering over candidates. Coordination problems cannot be overcome in such a case, and it is possible that inferior candidates win. In our setup the majority is also divided as a result of information imperfections. The majority thus faces two problems: aggregating information and coordinating to defeat the minority candidate. We show that when the common value component is strong enough, approval voting produces full information and coordination equivalence: the equilibrium is unique and solves both problems. Thus, the need for information aggregation helps resolve the majority's coordination problem under approval voting. This is not the case under standard electoral systems.     

Combinatorial Voting

We study elections that simultaneously decide multiple issues, where voters have independent private values over bundles of issues. The innovation is in considering nonseparable preferences, where issues may be complements or substitutes. Voters face a political exposure problem: the optimal vote for a particular issue will depend on the resolution of the other issues. Moreover, the probabilities that the other issues will pass should be conditioned on being pivotal. We prove that equilibrium exists when distributions over values have full support or when issues are complements. We then study large elections with two issues. There exists a nonempty open set of distributions where the probability of either issue passing fails to converge to either 1 or 0 for all limit equilibria. Thus, the outcomes of large elections are not generically predictable with independent private values, despite the fact that there is no aggregate uncertainty regarding fundamentals. While the Condorcet winner is not necessarily the outcome of a multi‐issue election, we provide sufficient conditions that guarantee the implementation of the Condorcet winner.     

Rotten Parents and Disciplined Children: A Politico‐Economic Theory of Public Expenditure and Debt

This paper proposes a dynamic politico‐economic theory of fiscal policy in a world comprising a set of small open economies, whose driving force is the intergenerational conflict over debt, taxes, and public goods. Subsequent generations of voters choose fiscal policy through repeated elections. The presence of young voters induces fiscal discipline, that is, low taxes and low debt accumulation. The paper characterizes the Markov‐perfect equilibrium of the voting game in each economy, as well as the stationary equilibrium debt distribution and interest rate of the world economy. The equilibrium can reproduce some salient features of fiscal policy in modern economies.     

论民主形式与“记名票决”

人民当家作主的生活方式是民主内容;"票决"是民主形式,是当今民主集中制、直接民主、间接民主、协商民主和自治的集中体现。"票决"是"票决"参与者以手势、姿势、仪式、声音、文字、网投、公投等行使权利和意思表示,"票决"有公开票决和秘密票决两种。"票决"历经前资本主义、资本主义和社会主义三个阶段;"票决"从公开"票决"逐步向秘密"票决"过渡;但是,凡是能够被量化的"权利"例如股权表决,可以实行"记名票决"。青岛市市北区浮山实业总公司以其股份"记名票决"建立了经济民主制度。