蒋廷黻著《中国近代史》学术影响源探析--以所受"新史学"及马士的影响为中心

蒋廷黻的中国近代史研究虽然受美国"新文学"诸大师的影响不小,但更重要的是受到了美国汉学家马士的影响.此种影响,主要表现在对近代史的分析框架和某些重要论断上,但不是简单地承袭,而是结合中国历史文化的实际进行了相应的改进,并在档案文献的使用等方面补正了马士的缺陷,为此后中国近代史的研究奠定了基础.     

DICTATORS AND THEIR VIZIERS: ENDOGENIZING THE LOYALTY–COMPETENCE TRADE‐OFF

The possibility of treason by a close associate has been a nightmare of most autocrats throughout history. More competent viziers are better able to discriminate among potential plotters, and this makes them more risky subordinates for the ruler. To avoid this, rulers, especially those who are weak and vulnerable, sacrifice the competence of their agents, hiring mediocre but loyal subordinates. Furthermore, any use of incentive schemes by a personalistic dictator is limited by the fact that all punishments are conditional on the dictator’s own survival. We endogenize loyalty and competence in a principal‐agent game between a dictator and his viziers in both static and dynamic settings. The dynamic model allows us to focus on the succession problem that insecure dictators face.     

EMERGENCE AND PERSISTENCE OF INEFFICIENT STATES

We present a theory of the emergence and persistence of inefficient states based on patronage politics. The society consists of rich and poor. The rich are initially in power, but expect to transition to democracy, which will choose redistributive policies. Taxation requires the employment of bureaucrats. By choosing an inefficient state structure, the rich may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics, so reducing the amount of redistribution in democracy. Moreover, the inefficient state creates its own constituency and tends to persist over time. Intuitively, an inefficient state structure creates more rents for bureaucrats than would an efficient one. When the poor come to power in democracy, they will reform the structure of the state to make it more efficient so that higher taxes can be collected at lower cost and with lower rents for bureaucrats. Anticipating this, when the society starts out with an inefficient organization of the state, bureaucrats support the rich, who set lower taxes but also provide rents to bureaucrats. We obtain that the rich–bureaucrats coalition may also expand the size of bureaucracy excessively so as to generate enough political support. The model shows that an equilibrium with an inefficient state is more likely to arise when there is greater income inequality, when bureaucratic rents take intermediate values, and when individuals are sufficiently forward‐looking.     

CONTROL RIGHTS IN COMPLEX PARTNERSHIPS

This paper develops a theory of the allocation of authority between two players who are in a complex partnership, that is, a partnership which produces impure public goods. We show that the optimal allocation depends on technological factors, the parties’ valuations of the goods produced, and the degree of impurity of these goods. When the degree of impurity is large, control rights should be given to the main investor, irrespective of preference considerations. There are some situations in which this allocation is optimal even if the degree of impurity is very low as long as one party’s investment is more important than the other party’s. If the parties’ investments are of similar importance and the degree of impurity is large, shared authority is optimal with a greater share going to the low‐valuation party. If the importance of the parties’ investments is similar but the degree of impurity is neither large nor small, the low‐valuation party should receive sole authority. We analyze an extension in which side payments are infeasible. We check for robustness of our results in several dimensions, such as allowing for multiple parties or for joint authority, and apply our results to interpret a number of complex partnerships, including those involving schools and child custody.     

The bias of the mle of box's degrees of freedom correction factor for correlation in anova

Approximate expressions for the mean and variance of the MLE of Box's 2-way ANOVA degrees of freedom factor are given for the case when the usual F test for column effects is appropriate even though there is correlation across columns. A simulation study is performed showing the approximations are good for a variety of numbers of rows and columns. The results confirm that the estimated degrees of freedom factor is badly biased when no factor at all should be used.     

东北军论析

东北军诞生于东北易帜后,在九一八事变后开始分化,其中大部分东北军奉命人关。在西安事变后,东北军则进一步分化,在国民政府的分化政策下,最终解体。东北军虽然是东北的地方军队,却经历和参与了民国时期所有的重大事件,并是国内唯一一支经历14年抗日的军队。东北军虽然是服务于民国政治的政治军事集团,但却具有政治意识淡薄和封建意识较浓的特点。     

Leadership with Imperfect Monitoring

This paper provides experimental evidence on how monitoring intensity shapes the impact of leadership instruments like leading-by-example and punishment. The results show that, with low monitoring intensity, neither leading-by-example nor punishment increases cooperation if the leader can already send nonbinding signals about desired behavior. We identify two different reasons for this effect. Regarding leading-by-example, it is the cautiousness of the leader. Leaders are reluctant to recommend cooperative behavior and act accordingly, even though followers are particularly reciprocal in this context. Regarding punishment, it is the level of monitoring that matters. Monitoring of individual follower behavior increases the cooperation of leaders and followers across all treatments, but in particular, if the leader can punish uncooperative behavior. This result implies that monitoring in itself does not have a negative impact on the inclination to cooperate. It suggests that any motivational crowding out effect derives from a leader’s choice of monitoring, as it signals low trust in the followers. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications.