Job insecurity and work outcomes: The role of psychological contract breach and positive psychological capital

Job insecurity has received growing attention from researchers because it poses serious challenges for organisations and for society as a whole. However, there are insufficient studies about the processes through which job insecurity affects outcomes as well as potential ways to reduce its negative impact. This study focuses on the relationship between job insecurity and individual-level outcomes (in-role performance and organisational deviance) and examines if (a) job insecurity is positively and/or negatively related to work outcomes, (b) psychological contract breach acts as a mediator of the relationship between job insecurity and work outcomes, and (c) positive psychological capital (PsyCap) buffers the job insecurity–work outcomes relationship via psychological contract breach. With a sample of 362 employee–supervisor dyads, in which the outcome measures were collected from the supervisors, we found support for our hypotheses. Specifically, we found a moderated mediation effect, whereby PsyCap moderates the negative indirect relationship of job insecurity on outcomes through psychological contract breach.     

Coordinating contracts for a financially constrained supply chain

We consider a financially constrained supply chain in which a supplier (leader) sells products to a retailer (follower) who has no access to bank financing due to her low credit rating. However, the supplier can borrow from a bank and offer trade credit to the retailer to alleviate her financial constraint. Failure to pay off a bank loan or trade credit incurs a variable default cost. We analyze the centralized version of the supply chain to obtain new coordination requirements. We then examine whether revenue-sharing, buyback, and all-unit quantity discount contracts can coordinate our supply chain. We show that the all-unit quantity discount contract fails to coordinate. However, the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts can coordinate the supply chain, but only when the supply chain has a sufficient total working capital. Moreover, they cannot allocate profit flexibly unless the supplier has a large enough working capital. Finally, we design a generalized revenue-sharing contract that coordinates the supply chain with flexible profit allocation, and also show by numerical examples its superiority over the revenue-sharing and buyback contracts.     

销售商的努力影响需求变化的供应链的合约

本文首先重新考察报童模型,认识设计使供应链达到合作的合约的内在机制。在此基础上,提出一个设计供应链合约的一般模型,然后利用此模型分析在销售商的努力影响需求变化的情形下使供应链达到合作的合约的设计框架,同时提出一个在销售商的努力影响需求变化的情形下使供应链达到合作的合约。     

供应链合作及其契约研究

供应链合约是影响供应链整体绩效的重要因素,已引起众多学者的关注。本文对供应链合作进行了博弈分析,得出了不同合约下的均衡结果及相关结论,同时通过两种合约的比较探讨了利益共享合约的优越性。最后,文章也介绍了订立合约的影响因素及方法。     

基于挣值的项目管理多业绩指标激励合同研究

应用EVM中两个基本业绩测度(计划差异和成本差异)建立一个多任务委托代理项目管理模型,并给出确定合同参数的计算方法。进一步,给出了最优激励强度之间的关系:当代理人两种努力相互替代(互补,独立)时,相应的激励强度之间也存在着替代(互补,独立)关系。最后,分析了外生参数的变化对这种替代(互补)关系中的替代(互补)程度的影响。结果表明,最优激励强度之间的替代(互补)程度随着代理人努力之间的替代(互补)程度、代理人风险规避程度和代理人用于降低实际成本努力的边际相对风险的增加而增加,但随着代理人用于提高挣值的努力的边际相对风险的增加而减小。     

基于多目标加权灰靶决策模型的节能服务公司选择研究

用能方对节能服务公司（Energy Service Company,ESCO）的选择关系到合同能源管理（Energy Performance Contracting,EPC）能否顺利实施。从用能方的角度,采用灰色系统理论中的多目标加权灰靶决策模型,对存在多决策目标的ESCO选择问题进行研究。通过层次分析法确定ESCO的11个决策目标的决策权数,根据综合效果测度值的比较,最终实现最优对策的选择。本文为用能方的ESCO选择问题提供了一种新的思路。     

平台竞争、排他性协议与竞争瓶颈

在很多双边市场中,经常出现平台一边的用户与平台之间产生利益纠纷的现象,例如顺丰速运与菜鸟网络之间的纠纷等,本文从理论模型的角度研究了这种经济现象。文章通过将双边市场的用户分为视平台有差异和无差异两种类型,研究了平台如何掠夺视平台无差异的用户所有剩余的问题。研究发现,平台厂商有与视平台无差异的用户签订排他性协议的激励;无论签订排他性协议与否,这类用户都将被掠夺所有剩余,产生了所谓的"竞争瓶颈";排他性协议带来的福利效应并不明确,当平台的边际成本和交叉外部性参数较大时,排他性协议的签订能够提升社会总福利。     

基于数量柔性契约的双源应急物资采购定价模型

针对灾害事件发生的不确定性以及灾害发生后应急物资需求量的爆发式增长,本文设计了一个政府主导的基于数量柔性契约的双源应急物资采购模型。在存在一个现货市场的情况下,政府除了常规采购外,还会与供应方签订一份数量柔性契约,用以建立政企联合储备应急物资的合作关系。通过数理推导,本文发现灾害事件发生概率,政府自身储备量,现货市场采购价格会对双方决策产生重要影响,并给出三个影响因素在满足不同条件时政企双方的最优决策,同时进一步分析了这三个因素对政府采购成本与供应方利润的影响。最后,通过数值模拟的方式对所得结论进行了验证。本文的研究为政府与企业构建联合储备应急物资的合作关系提供了指导与依据。     

信息不对称下价格随机的应急数量折扣契约研究

以市场需求和市场价格随机波动的二级供应链为研究对象,寻找其在信息不对称条件下绩效优化的路径。通过显示原理分别构建生产成本和销售成本信息不对称时应急供应链的数量折扣契约模型,得到最优订货量与最佳批发价策略。通过具体的算例加以验证,分析了信息不对称程度对供应链上成员及整个供应链绩效的影响。研究结果表明：当突发事件造成市场价格随机波动和市场需求变化时,供应链上的跟随者能从隐瞒私人信息中获利。但当市场需求增大时,整个供应链绩效受损,反之则反是。这与以往研究在市场需求随机、市场价格固定和信息不对称条件下的结论迥异。     

产需不确定下基于零售商风险规避的三级供应链组合契约模型

针对产需不确定下单一供应商、制造商和风险规避的零售商组成的三级供应链系统,建立了分散和集中情况下的最优决策模型。通过设计风险共担和GL组合契约实现了三级供应链的协调。讨论了风险规避零售商的最优订购决策,分析了风险规避对供应链期望效益的影响。比较了风险规避和风险中性两种情况下零售商的最优决策。探讨了组合契约的协调问题及契约参数之间的关系。研究表明供应链的期望利润随着产需不确定的增加而减少,风险规避下零售商的期望利润低于风险中性时的期望利润,零售商的期望利润随着风险规避程度的加大而减少,零售商最优订购量随风险规避程度的增加而变化。最后数值算例验证了模型和契约协调的有效性。