从"现实性"范式之争看马克思与黑格尔哲学通约的限度

"现实性"范式是马克思与黑格尔哲学之争的关键.在马克思看来,黑格尔将"现实性"与"普通经验世界的定在"相区别,从而提出了一种有别于传统哲学的"现实性"概念.其内涵是,以实体的抽象形式去先行规定现实世界的丰富内容,并由此演绎出以国家的普遍目的去预设市民社会本质的先验法哲学.马克思认为,黑格尔因为颠倒了"本质"领域与"现实性"领域的真正关系,而他辩证法的"交互-中介"特性却又无法调和两极间的根本对立,这就造成了黑格尔"现实性"概念的本质缺陷.恩格斯虽然把握了黑格尔"现实性"是一个辩证运动的过程,但他却把黑格尔的辩证法错误理解为某类线性知识发展观和自然科学式的渐进真理.实际上,黑格尔提出了一种不同于自近代笛卡尔以来的自然科学和几何学式线性认知论的真理观--圆圈式的认识论.真理的理念作为一个在历史中让精神不断自我显现的过程,构成了历史与认识之间的螺旋上升和循环.黑格尔的本体论虽然加入辩证法的否定性因素,但是其内涵依然是本质决定论,但他的知识论却以反向运动的过程来揭示本体论的能动性,正是通过这样一种结合了自己本体论与知识论正反运动的双向进程,黑格尔已经不再是马克思所批判的那种意义上的实体决定论.     

交互认识论：群众路线的新思路

群众路线的认识论是交互认识论,强调了“干-群”双主体之间的对等性、互动性和主体性原则,因而彰显了群众的主体性地位,摒弃了主客体对立的认识论思路,是历史唯物主义在认识论与本体论、辩证法上相一致的表达。通过交互认识,领导与群众形成共同知识与共同信念,在一个不断信息更新、信念修正、信息域和知识域增大的动态过程中,实现领导与群众的利益与责任的一致、手段与目标的一致。     

法律解释学的主观主义批评与哲学解释学的回应

认为哲学解释学把法律解释学引向主观主义陷阱并严重破坏了法律的确定性,这个批评是从制度之维和认识论之维展开的。制度之维的批评从中国司法制度不够完善反推法律解释学决不能借鉴带有主观主义色彩的哲学解释学;认识论之维的批评主张哲学解释学所说的事情本身不足以区分合理与不合理的前见,因而不能使法律认识有效地避开主观主义陷阱。然而,哲学解释学的经典文献《真理与方法》的相关内容证明了事情表现构成了前见合理与否的判准和法律认识的“证实”标准,从而对主观主义的批评构成了有力的回应。据此,法律解释学未来的发展方向应是一门以哲学解释学的本体论为基地的、隶属于法律认识论的法律解释学,而不是返回到以传统认识论为基础的法律解释方法学。     

悖论与"自指"

悖论的构成与我们对某些语句可以自我指称的认定密切相关.认为某个语句可以自指,这是一回事,但事实上这个语句是否可能自指,则是另一回事;而语句自指事实上是不可能的.由此,便会获得对悖论的一种根本不同的理解.     

异中见同、同异互动、求同存异——Fillmore & Kay的构块语法理论研究的哲学思考

本文从认识论的角度研讨Fillmore & Kay的构块语法理论,尝试提出语言学研究的"同异律"--异中见同、同异互动、求同存异.我们认为,同异律是人们的认识规律在语言学研究中的反映.对一种语言现象的研究,应当在观察其特殊性的基础上归纳其内在的普遍特征,然后用普通的语法规则对这种现象做出合理的解释.     

博弈论的逻辑和认知基础

当代博弈论研究的重要课题是其逻辑和认知基础问题。知识模型的提出,澄清了博弈均衡与认知条件的关系。关于共同知识、共同信念的分析开拓了博弈论分析视野,推进了对冲突和合作的科学理解。从博弈均衡分析到认知逻辑分析、交互主体认识论的发展,表明博弈论的逻辑、认知以及哲学基础的深化,预示它正在成为社会科学的统一分析框架。     

生成性思维视域中的基础教育教学范式转型

思维方式的变革是教学改革的必然要求.传统教育的许多弊病是与本质主义思维方式相联系的.以生成性思维的基本精神观照教学生活,从而进行课堂教学的范式转型是学校文化重建的重要体现.其主要方面是:由既定的外在目标到内在的生成性目标;由高控制的流程到建构生成的过程;由空洞的内容传递到回归儿童的生活世界;由以目标为中心的标准式评价到走向理解的生成性评价.为此教师应具有新的角色定位和教学意识.     

Theorizing the social: Émile Durkheim's theory of force and energy

This paper offers a new interpretation of Émile Durkheim's The Elementary Forms of Religious Life (1912) as the basis for reconsidering the Tarde–Durkheim debate of 1903 and the distinctions between a theory of social force and a theory of social assemblage. Resisting traditional interpretations of Durkheim's scientism, this essay traces how concepts of force and energy are centrally developed in Elementary Forms to draw new lines between epistemology to ontology for twentieth-century theory. I argue that Durkheim develops an ‘energetic epistemology’ that conceives of the human capacity for shared meaning as a product of invested energy in the form of continually enacted and evolving material practice, thought, and attention. According to Durkheim, when a member of a collective perceives a god or feels belief, he or she actually perceives the accumulated energy of on-going creation and maintenance of objects and ideas by members of a collective. Sacred objects, images, and ideas bear the trace of collective energy the more they are carefully crafted, maintained in spaces that are specially arranged, and written into behavioural codes. This reading of Durkheim allows us to consider him in a lineage of social constructivists and, particularly, in relation to Ludwik Fleck, who has been largely confined to different theoretical discussions when his contributions to sociology have been acknowledged at all. By reconsidering Durkheim, we have occasion to rethink his sociology and understand how he redrew the lines between thought and action, between epistemology and ontology, through the material framework of energy and force.     

歧路上的辩证逻辑

中国的辩证逻辑研究在苏联哲学问题编辑部《逻辑问题讨论总结》误导下,抛弃了形式逻辑,只研究认识过程中的辩证思维阶段,走上了歧途。恩格斯的“辩证逻辑”,是“辩证的逻辑”的误译。辩证逻辑不仅名不正,言也不顺:研究对象和研究方法都偏离了黑格尔奠基的大方向。     

Fuzzy epistemology: Decolonizing the social sciences

This article first argues that the social sciences need to be decolonized, as the current epistemologies and research methodologies are too narrowly based on the European and North American experiences and hence unable to adequately capture non-European experiences and realities. I then argue that decolonizing dominant social science epistemology means freeing it from its Aristotelian foundation. The next step undertaken is to discuss five non-Western epistemologies from West Africa, China, Melanesia, India, and South America. Building on the work of Jimi Adesina (2002), I find that all five share a fuzzy perception of reality, allowing for statements that are non-exclusive, non-discrete, and hence fuzzy. I propose an operationalization of these fuzzy epistemologies by applying Charles Ragin's Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fscqa).