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石绍斌 《宁波大学学报(人文科学版)》2013,(4):104-107
当前公共体育设施特许经营的困境,在于经营模式的认知和抉择。特别行政许可注重经营者条件而忽视了经营目的,以致无法实现制度设置的意图;公共服务外包注重供给的效率而忽视市场逐利的风险,以致政府处于道德失范的困境;政府购买注重服务的保障而忽视财政供给的不足,以致政府处于被诘难的境地;公私合作旨在引进民间资本、缓解政府财政不足、实现公共服务的提供,符合特许经营的制度设计。 相似文献
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特许经营限制竞争行为法律研究 总被引:8,自引:0,他引:8
范在峰 《北京大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》2002,39(6):94-98
从特许经营的概念和表现形式出发,阐明了特许经营限制竞争行为所具有的积极意义和必要性,在此基础上重点研究了特性经营限制竞争行为的合法范围和条件,指出应当从受许人现实中所处的弱势地位出发,禁止特许人任意扭曲自由竞争的行为,强调在立法上把保护受许人的合法权益作为重点。 相似文献
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从所有权的角度看,特许经营在本质上是经销店经营者购买经销店的所有权,包括剩余控制权和剩余收益权,其目的是激励经销店经营者在经销店专用资产上进行无形投资。这一所有权视角有助于我们更深刻地理解关于特许经营的各种假说,如监督成本假说、成本控制假说、搜寻成本假说、适应性优势假说、管理激励假说、人力资本约束假说和无形资产分布假说等。 相似文献
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According to the property rights approach,decision rights have to be allocated accordingto the distribution of intangible knowledge assetsbetween the franchisor and franchisee andownership rights have to be assigned according to theresidual rights of control (residual decisionrights). Since residual income rights are diluted infranchising relationships, ownership rightsinclude not only residual income rights (initial fees androyalties) but also complementary ownershipsurrogates to simulate the motivation effect of undilutedownership rights. Therefore, under a propertyrights perspective, an efficient contract structure infranchise relationships implies co-locationbetween knowledge assets and decision rights andcomplementarity between residual decision andownership rights. The more important the franchisor's(franchisee's) system-specific assets (localmarket knowhow) for the generation of residual surplus, themore decision and complementary ownership rightsshould be transferred to the franchisor(franchisee). Three hypotheses were derivedfrom the property rights approach and tested in the Germanfranchise sector. The empirical results arepartly supportive of the hypotheses. 相似文献
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