上市公司信息披露的一个经济博弈分析

运用博弈论的基本原理,建立监管者、管理者和投资者的上市公司信息披露三方博弈模型,以管理者的决策策略为切入点,从不完全信息静态博弈、动态博弈两个角度,对上市公司信息披露问题进行了研究。通过分析揭示了三方博弈模型的博弈均衡结果,说明应提高上市公司的信息披露条件,指出单纯加大事前监管和事后检查都不能够提高上市公司信息披露质量,监管者要采取“两手都要抓,两手都要硬”的策略;同时,在给定监管环境下,加大惩罚力度,提高资本市场的有效性都有助于提高上市公司信息披露质量。     

不完全契约、非对称信息与合作社经营者激励——农民专业合作社“委托—代理”理论模型的构建及其应用

我国农民专业合作社内部的委托—代理关系有其自身的特点,通过对符合我国农民专业合作社运行实践的委托—代理理论模型的构建及理论分析可知,合作社代理人努力行为的激励与其自身经营农产品占合作社经营农产品总量的比重、对互惠关注的敏感性程度和占有合作社盈余分配的比例等因素存在正相关关系。合作社内部产生委托—代理问题的根源在于合作社内部的不完全契约和非对称信息,为避免合作社经营者可能采取的隐藏信息和隐藏行动的机会主义行为,建议从信号传递和信号甄别的角度对合作社内部的相关契约加以改进。     

西方金融创新理论述评

西方对金融创新首先提出理论解释的是约束引致假说和管制理论。约束引致假说认为金融创新是银行试图降低与特定资产负债表约束关联的成本。管制理论认为金融创新是管制者和被管制者之间持续的斗争。不完全市场理论认为新金融产品仅仅是金融工具特定因素组合的变化。证券设计和不完全市场模型是以一般均衡理论对金融创新过程模型化。目前尚无金融创新普遍认可和统一的理论。     

不完全要素市场对收入分配的影响研究

迅速扩大的收入分配差距已经成为影响社会和谐的一个主要问题,要素市场的不完全性在收入分配差距不合理扩大的过程中起到了至关重要的作用,这就需要通过完善要素市场来公平收入分配。     

特定的文学作品与普遍的社会心理--从《孔雀东南飞》所表现的婆媳矛盾说起

《孔雀东南飞》是一出家庭悲剧 ,但在中国封建社会的土壤中产生的这一悲剧在全世界却具有普遍性。在老年寡妇和她的儿子、儿媳所组成的非完整的扩大家庭中 ,婆婆和儿媳争夺她们共同关心的男子的情感 ,是这个家庭内的永恒难题。家庭内的情感争夺与社会制度和民族传统并无必然联系。     

Construction of incomplete Sudoku square and partially balanced incomplete block designs

Abstract

The present article deals with the study of association among the elements of a Sudoku square. In this direction, we have defined an association scheme and constructed incomplete Sudoku square designs which are capable of studying four explanatory variables and also happen to be the designs for two-way elimination of heterogeneity. Some series of Partially Balanced Incomplete Block (PBIB) designs have also been obtained.     

Recent developments in D-optimal designs

In the paper, some issues concerned with the determining spring balance weighing designs satisfying the criterion of D-optimality under the assumption measurement errors are uncorrelated and they have the same variances are discussed. In addition, highly D-efficient spring balance weighing designs are also considered. Some conditions under which any spring balance weighing design is regular D-optimal or highly D-efficient are proved. What is more, new construction methods of regular D-optimal and highly D-efficient spring balance weighing designs are presented.     

集体耕作制时期农村人口增长分析

通过文献参阅,运用现代经济学和社会学相关理论和方法,探索性地分析集体耕作制时期,农地产权残缺、社会的高度封闭性及平均分配主义的影响和中国农村人口的快速增长。改革开放30年来,影响中国农村人口快速增长的诸因素和人口低生育水平反弹的压力基本消除。面对人口长期负惯性增长的新趋势,中国应及时调整生育政策。     

Ratio-Scale Measurement with Intransitivity or Incompleteness: The Homogeneous Case

In the homogeneous case of one-dimensional objects, we show that any relation that is positive and homothetic can be represented by a ratio-scale and a unique and constant biasing factor. This factor may favor or disfavor the preference for an object over another. In the first case, preferences are complete but not transitive and an object may be preferred even when its value is lower. In the second case, preferences are asymmetric and transitive but not negatively transitive and it may not be sufficient for an object to have a greater value to be preferred. In this manner, the biasing factor reflects the extent to which preferences may depart from a maximization process.     

Experimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior and Equilibrium Selection

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a general network structure. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability, this framework applies to a wide variety of settings. We examine behavior and equilibrium selection. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique; when there are multiple equilibria, general features of networks, such as connectivity, clustering, and the degree of the players, help to predict informed behavior in the lab. People appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs (social efficiency), but there are forces that moderate this attraction: (1) people seem content with (in the aggregate) capturing only the lion's share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss, and (2) uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information.