不完全契约视角下的工程项目风险分担框架研究

以往关于工程项目风险分担的研究多集中于技术层面,将风险分担视为静态的一次性活动,从而弱化甚至忽视了其制度属性。本研究从不完全契约的视角重新审视工程项目的风险分担,将其划分为缔约阶段的风险初次分担和履约过程中的风险再分担两个联动过程,强调前者天然的不完备性和对后者的规范作用,以及后者固有的治理属性和对前者的弥补与调节作用。风险分担整体框架的构建有利于充分发挥其在合同中的激励功能以及在履约过程中的治理作用,改善工程项目风险分担的效率和效果。     

考虑溢出效应的互补品企业间广告决策模型研究

具有需求信息优势的企业常常将广告投入作为市场需求信号,有选择地向其互补品生产企业传递需求信息,以刺激其增加广告投入,通过溢出效应获取更大收益。针对这一问题,本文建立了考虑溢出效应的互补品企业间广告决策的信号博弈模型,得到了分离均衡和混同均衡的存在条件,分析了均衡状态下企业的最优广告决策和收益,讨论了企业的广告策略选择。结果表明,分离均衡下,具有信息优势的制造商无法利用广告投入信号刺激其互补品制造商增加广告投入。混同均衡下,只有当市场需求为低时,具有信息优势的制造商能够利用广告投入信号,刺激其互补品制造商增加广告投入,通过溢出效应获得更大收益。最后,通过一个数值算例验证了有关结论的有效性。     

Sample size determination for testing equality in frequency data under an incomplete block crossover design

When there are more than two treatments under comparison, we may consider the use of the incomplete block crossover design (IBCD) to save the number of patients needed for a parallel groups design and reduce the duration of a crossover trial. We develop an asymptotic procedure for simultaneously testing equality of two treatments versus a control treatment (or placebo) in frequency data under the IBCD with two periods. We derive a sample size calculation procedure for the desired power of detecting the given treatment effects at a nominal-level and suggest a simple ad hoc adjustment procedure to improve the accuracy of the sample size determination when the resulting minimum required number of patients is not large. We employ Monte Carlo simulation to evaluate the finite-sample performance of the proposed test, the accuracy of the sample size calculation procedure, and that with the simple ad hoc adjustment suggested here. We use the data taken as a part of a crossover trial comparing the number of exacerbations between using salbutamol or salmeterol and a placebo in asthma patients to illustrate the sample size calculation procedure.     

需求不确定条件下的制造商订单分配模型

制造商的订单分配作为供应链模型微观层面的重要组成部分,对提升整个供应链效率有很大影响,但需求层面的不确定因素加大了订单分配的难度。以按比例分配为原则,讨论在需求不确定条件下完全信息与不完全信息两类多供应商-单制造商的订单分配模型。重点研究完全信息条件下各方的分散决策和集中决策,由于后者能避免各参与方对其他决策方的边际影响,所以能够实现供应链总利润的最大化;其次又将不完全信息引入模型,讨论制造商如何通过折算因子结合已有信息对供应商的私人信息进行估计,进而做出决策。最后以需求服从正态分布为例对两类模型进行验证。     

Competition in Financial Innovation

This paper examines the incentives offered by frictionless markets to innovate asset‐backed securities by owners who maximize the assets' values. Assuming identical preferences across investors with heterogeneous risk‐sharing needs, we characterize economies in which competition provides insufficient incentives to innovate so that, in equilibrium, financial markets are incomplete in all (pure strategy) equilibria, even when innovation is essentially costless. Thus, value maximization does not generally result in complete markets.     

Experimental Games on Networks: Underpinnings of Behavior and Equilibrium Selection

In this paper, we describe a series of laboratory experiments that implement specific examples of a general network structure. Specifically, actions are either strategic substitutes or strategic complements, and participants have either complete or incomplete information about the structure of a random network. Since economic environments typically have a considerable degree of complementarity or substitutability, this framework applies to a wide variety of settings. We examine behavior and equilibrium selection. The degree of equilibrium play is striking, in particular with incomplete information. Behavior closely resembles the theoretical equilibrium whenever this is unique; when there are multiple equilibria, general features of networks, such as connectivity, clustering, and the degree of the players, help to predict informed behavior in the lab. People appear to be strongly attracted to maximizing aggregate payoffs (social efficiency), but there are forces that moderate this attraction: (1) people seem content with (in the aggregate) capturing only the lion's share of the efficient profits in exchange for reduced exposure to loss, and (2) uncertainty about the network structure makes it considerably more difficult to coordinate on a demanding, but efficient, equilibrium that is typically implemented with complete information.     

上市公司信息披露的一个经济博弈分析

运用博弈论的基本原理,建立监管者、管理者和投资者的上市公司信息披露三方博弈模型,以管理者的决策策略为切入点,从不完全信息静态博弈、动态博弈两个角度,对上市公司信息披露问题进行了研究。通过分析揭示了三方博弈模型的博弈均衡结果,说明应提高上市公司的信息披露条件,指出单纯加大事前监管和事后检查都不能够提高上市公司信息披露质量,监管者要采取“两手都要抓,两手都要硬”的策略;同时,在给定监管环境下,加大惩罚力度,提高资本市场的有效性都有助于提高上市公司信息披露质量。     

从集合论看商品的市场赋价——调研宣传以及生产的逻辑

经济不断为数学“立法”的同时,数学也不断为经济提供非直觉现象的研究工具。在数学和经济不断渗透的背景下,跳过传统商品赋价理论,从集合角度重新审视了商品的赋价问题,得出商品的价格包括在消费者正确识别的商品功能集合中被赋的价格,在识别错位的功能集合中被赋的价格以及在扩充的功能集合中被消费者赋的价格三部分;同时顺便考察了厂商的宣传调研以及生产的逻辑,给出为什么商品的生产价格并不总是和市场价格相切合的解释。     

不完全契约、非对称信息与合作社经营者激励——农民专业合作社“委托—代理”理论模型的构建及其应用

我国农民专业合作社内部的委托—代理关系有其自身的特点,通过对符合我国农民专业合作社运行实践的委托—代理理论模型的构建及理论分析可知,合作社代理人努力行为的激励与其自身经营农产品占合作社经营农产品总量的比重、对互惠关注的敏感性程度和占有合作社盈余分配的比例等因素存在正相关关系。合作社内部产生委托—代理问题的根源在于合作社内部的不完全契约和非对称信息,为避免合作社经营者可能采取的隐藏信息和隐藏行动的机会主义行为,建议从信号传递和信号甄别的角度对合作社内部的相关契约加以改进。     

婚约的性质和效力

婚约作为人类社会中一项法律制度,有着悠久的历史,在我国可追溯到西周。由于立法者对婚约的误读,我国现行婚姻法没有对婚约作出立法规定,而在我们现实生活中婚约仍然大量存在,并呈现出不同于古代婚约的许多新特征。就婚约性质而言,婚约是具有一定效果意思的表示行为,具有伦理性的特点,宜归为亲属法上的契约;就婚约的效力特征来说,基于对自由价值的保护,婚约作为一种亲属法上的契约,其权能受到限制,不得基于婚约提起缔结婚姻的诉讼或者缔结婚姻的判决不予执行,无强制力,因此,是类似自然债务的不完全债权。