论道德的供求关系

如同经济学的供求关系一样,社会道德水平的状况与道德的有效供给之间有着内在的关联.道德的多元化特征与社会利益的多元化需求是一致的,多元化的利益需求引发多元化的道德需求,缺乏有效的道德供给,特别是缺乏有效的主流道德供给,是道德危机产生的原因.而主流道德的有效供给取决于社会当前及未来的政治、经济走向和社会文化底蕴,以及宣传教育等等手段.     

The self as the locus of morality: A comparison between Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead's theories of the moral constitution of the self

This paper provides a critical comparison of two leading exponents of the relationship between morality and selfhood: Charles Taylor and George Herbert Mead. Specifically, it seeks to provide an assessment of the contribution each approach is able to make to a social theory of morality that has the self at its heart. Ultimately, it is argued that Taylor's phenomenological account neglects the significance of interaction and social relations in his conceptualisation of the relationship between morality and self, which undermines the capacity of his framework to explain how moral understandings and dialogic moral subjectivity develop in a world of shared meaning. I then argue that Mead's pragmatist interactionist approach overcomes many of the flaws in Taylor's framework, and offers a grounded conceptualisation of the relationship between self and morality that is able to provide a basis for a properly social account of moral subjectivity.     

从委婉语对比看英汉民族价值观和道德观的不同

英汉民族的历史、政治和思维方式不同,英汉委婉语所反映的价值观和道德观也不一样,通过对比分析英汉委婉语,透析中西方文化差异,可加深对英语文化的了解,学会正确使用英语委婉语,增强跨文化交际能力。     

风险投资主体、银行和创业企业家三方委托代理研究

研究创业企业家、风险投资主体努力程度的影响因素和他们之间的双向道德危害风险,并从风险管理的角度解释创业企业家难以从银行得到贷款的原因,在Casamana的研究基础上,通过赋予纯金融机构明确的现实定义,构建风险投资主体、创业企业家、银行三方参与的委托代理模型.得出双向道德风险下的最优权益分配.研究表明,若只有银行投资或银行和风险投资主体同时投资时,存在风险限制,当风险高于限制时,创业企业家不可能贷款成功;若只有风险投资主体投资时,则没有风险限制;若银行和风险投资主体同时投资,他们权益分配的最高限制将低于只有一方投资时所得权益分配的最高限制,风险限制高于只有银行投资时的风险限制;若机构在既无资金也无非资金贡献的情况下瓜分风险投资利益,将导致创业企业家努力程度降低;银行、风险投资主体和创业企业家三方参与风险投资时,风险投资主体的最优权益安排与风险投资主体和创业企业家的生产力有关,随着风险投资主体生产力的增大而增大,随着创业企业家生产力的增大而减小.     

合同线性化与线性化合同

本文讨论了不对称信息下委托代理关系中合同的线性化与线性化的合同。我们的出发点是代理人之间的能力差异,由此诱发了同时存在的逆向选择和道德风险问题,为处理这一问题我们得到一个产出呈凹性的支付合同,并对其线性化,考虑到这一参数线性合同系的不稳定性,我们最终以无参数的线性合同来替代,从而更为接近现实中使用的合同。     

Default and Punishment in General Equilibrium1

We extend the standard model of general equilibrium with incomplete markets to allow for default and punishment by thinking of assets as pools. The equilibrating variables include expected delivery rates, along with the usual prices of assets and commodities. By reinterpreting the variables, our model encompasses a broad range of adverse selection and signalling phenomena in a perfectly competitive, general equilibrium framework. Perfect competition eliminates the need for lenders to compute how the size of their loan or the price they quote might affect default rates. It also makes for a simple equilibrium refinement, which we propose in order to rule out irrational pessimism about deliveries of untraded assets. We show that refined equilibrium always exists in our model, and that default, in conjunction with refinement, opens the door to a theory of endogenous assets. The market chooses the promises, default penalties, and quantity constraints of actively traded assets.     

企业组织中人力资本道德风险因素分析

基于市场里的企业是“一个人力资本与非人力资本的特别合约”的观点,就人力资本的道德风险问题进行了研究。认为影响人力资本道德风险的因素主要有诚实履行合约后的正常收益、道德风险行为被发现的概率、贴现因子、道德风险行为的额外收益以及道德风险行为被发现后的次优收益。并且以预期收益为目标建立了数学模型,分析人力资本道德风险行为动机与影响因素之间的关系,提出了相关的激励、约束及协作策略。最后,讨论了随机因素的影响。     

Beyond Technical Competence: The Loyalty Factor

This study discusses an attribute of leadership that is beyond technicalcompetence. Defines `Loyalty' as an unwavering commitment to colleagues,organizations, and to oneself. Clarifies the development of a loyalty and theformation of operational principles are synergetic for ethical behavior.Explains `Loyalty' and the manner in which it differs from unethical, illegal,or immoral behavior. Depicts `loyalty' as an essential behavior that promotesand supports quality leadership. Provides guidance, techniques, and examplesthat can be used to enhance leadership skills. Establishes a sound philosophyto increase the probability for long-term success and professionalfulfillment. Includes quotes from contemporary as well as historical leaders.     

非对称信息条件下成本控制模型研究

运用委托代理理论方法探讨了信息不对称条件下,生产管理者如何激励生产者努力降低成本的问题。信息不对称情况下,管理者不能观测到生产者为降低成本而付出的努力,因此管理者需要对生产者进行激励。管理者根据自己的要求和生产者的自报数确定了一个合约基数,并建立了满足生产者个体理性约束和激励相容约束条件下的管理者期望效用最大化模型,分别以奖励系数和惩罚系数为决策主量。运用进化规划算法作了仿真计算。     

对人生价值观几个问题的探讨

探讨人生价值观的热门话题,应明确和解决３个问题：１．价值、人的价值及人生价值的概念;２．马克思主义关于人生价值观的两个基本命题,即个人价值和社会价值的统一、道义价值和功利价值的统一;３．“人生的价值在于贡献”的价值导向