刍议企业管理者战略思维的养成

我们许多管理者在企业发展过程中只要赚钱什么都干。殊不知,世界上尽管有许多可赚的钱,但属于你的毕竟有限。尤其在经济环境巨变之际,我们更需要通过运用良好的战略思维来明确企业的目标,引领企业的发展。     

Estimating Fatality Reductions from Increased Safety Belt Use

Fatality reductions from increases in safety belt use are estimated taking into account that drivers who change from being nonusers to being users have lower accident involvement rates than the remaining nonusers, a process referred to as "selective recruitment." Analytical functions are derived which express expected fatality reductions in terms of changes in safety belt use rates from an initial rate. The function parameters are determined by requiring that computed average crash rates for nonusers be 53% higher than the rates for users, a recently determined empirical value. These functions show that, depending on the initial use rate and use rate increase, selective recruitment may increase or decrease expected fatality reductions. However, effects are relatively small, in no case exceeding +/- 5.3%.     

新形势下科技成果转化的障碍及对策

从高校与科研院所、企业和其他三个方面分析了新形势下影响我国科技成果转化的多种障碍 ,提出了促进我国科技成果产业化操作性较强的九个方面的相应对策     

从中美苏战略三角到中美俄战略三角

自20世纪60年代以来,在中美苏(俄)三个大国之间先后形成了两个独特而复杂的战略三角关系。两大战略三角对世界范围的国际关系发挥了极其重大的作用。但由于它们形成于不同的时代,具有不同的性质、内涵、结构和走向,三大国在其中的地位、处境、作用和影响也不尽相同,因此中美俄战略三角并不是中美苏战略三角的简单恢复或延续。     

Choosing Choices: Agenda Selection With Uncertain Issues

We study selection rules: voting procedures used by committees to choose whether to place an issue on their agenda. At the selection stage of the model, committee members are uncertain about their final preferences. They only have some private information about these preferences. We show that voters become more conservative when the selection rule itself becomes more conservative. The decision rule has the opposite effect. We compare these voting procedures to the designation of an agenda setter among the committee and to a utilitarian social planner with all the ex interim private information.     

Evaluation of the green supply chain management practices: a fuzzy ANP approach

Environmentally responsible manufacturing, green supply chain management (GSCM), and related principles have become important strategies for companies to achieve profit and gain market share by lowering their environmental impacts and increasing their efficiency. As environment has become a key strategic consideration in supply chains, this study examines the components and elements of GSCM and suggests a novel GSCM evaluation framework. It also provides a real-case study of Ford Otosan, one of the pioneering companies about environmental subjects in Turkey, to illustrate the industrial application of our theoretical assessment model. The identified components are integrated into a strategic assessment and evaluation tool using analytical network process (ANP). The dynamic characteristics and complexity of the GSCM analysis environment make the ANP technique a suitable tool for this study. Moreover, to cope with ambiguity and vagueness of the decision maker's evaluations, the fuzzy extension of the ANP method is preferred.     

基于双层粒子群算法的上下游企业决策动态博弈

在寡占市场结构下,企业决策的相互影响效应更为显著。此时,企业融资决策与产量决策不仅仅影响自身利润,而且会影响到其竞争对手和供应商,即企业决策的策略性效应。本文建立一个考虑产品替代性与市场环境波动内外因素的上下游企业决策动态博弈模型,针对该决策的非线性二层规划特点,设计了双层粒子群算法,并利用计算机模拟技术对企业决策进行分析。研究发现,第一,产品替代性对下游企业具有“竞争效应”,对上游企业生产与利润的下降具有“放大效应”,与债务融资有限责任效应相比,产品替代性的“竞争效应”对下游企业的产量博弈和利润影响更大,另外,债务有限责任效应与债务破产效应左右了产品替代性对下游企业破产均衡临界点的影响。第二,市场环境波动对企业产量决策和融资决策的影响与Wanzenried^[1]一致,而在影响下游企业利润和上游企业利润方面并不一致。第三,针对负债融资和无负债融资两种情形,不论产品替代性较低还是较高,较高的市场波动程度都能促使负债企业考虑债务的战略性作用,且下游企业的负债融资存在“Prisoner’s Dilemma”现象,上游企业的垄断市场地位则加强了下游企业负债融资“放大效应”对其利润的影响。     

战略联盟的范围、治理与稳定性间关系的实证研究

本文从联盟伙伴间的关系视角出发,分析了战略联盟的合作范围和治理类型对伙伴间关系稳定性的影响.由于稳定性是一个抽象且难以用显性指标直接测量的变量,本文把它构建为一个二阶因子结构,并用企业间信任、相互依赖和冲突解决这三个一阶因子来度量它.在此基础上,通过问卷调查获得127家德国联盟企业的数据,并对提出的假说进行了检验,分析结果表明合资企业比非股权契约联盟更有可能享有稳定的伙伴间合作关系,而联盟的范围即联盟协议中所包含的合作活动的多少对联盟稳定性没有显著的影响.     

企业战略柔性效用机理及其决策模型研究

采用Makadok理性期望模型分析了战略柔性在提供信息、降低运营成本等方面对竞争优势的作用机理,及其与组织资源在创造竞争优势过程中的关系;在此基础上,以不确定性环境下市场需求作为随机变量,构建了企业略柔性水平决策模型.     

基于差异产品的政府最优R&D补贴策略研究

本文建立考虑产品差异的三阶段双寡头博弈模型:第一阶段政府选择R&D(Research and Development)补贴率,第二阶段企业确定自己的R&D水平,第三阶段企业确定产品价格进行伯川德竞争。根据双寡头在第二和第三阶段是否合作,给出了R&D竞争、R&D卡特尔、共同实验、技术共享联盟和研究共同体等五种R&D策略,得到了相应的政府最优R&D补贴率。研究表明,当技术溢出程度较低且产品水平差异不大时,政府给予采用R&D竞争策略企业的补贴率不高于采用R&D卡特尔策略的企业;当技术溢出程度较高且产品水平差异较大时,结果则相反。在政府进行最优补贴后,从促进技术进步、扩大企业规模以及社会福利最大化的角度来看,五种R&D策略中,共同实验最差,技术共享联盟和研究共同体则最优。