人性与理性的挣扎--从方言与标准英语之间的互换看梅勒斯的形象特征

《查特莱夫人的情人》( 1 92 8)是劳伦斯的最后一部小说 ,也是欧美文坛上最令人震惊、最引起争执的书。自发表以来 ,文学界对该小说的评论褒贬不一 ,对其中的人物更是认识不同。《查特莱夫人的情人》中各主要人物都处于某种挣扎之中。查特莱夫人的情人即梅勒斯是人性与理性挣扎中尤为突出的中心人物。本文将以梅勒斯与希尔达的一段会话为例 ,通过他在方言与标准英语之间的互换 ,分析梅勒斯与希尔达的关系及梅勒斯的人物特征 ,以此来更好地把握作者的创作意图。     

哲学视阈中的有限政府——兼论有限政府理念对当代中国政治发展之意义

在哲学的视阈中,可从自然权利论、人性论和有限理性论三个维度探究有限政府理念建构的学理基础。自然权利具有至上性,是国家权力的本源和基础。要防止政府作恶就必须以权力制约权力和以权利制约权力。人兼有善恶两重性,国家权力最主要的任务就是防恶,防恶是扬善的前提和基础。人类理性具有自身的限度,不存在永恒的绝对真理,不存在全知全能的政府。建构有限政府是突破中国政治现代化困境的出路所在。     

论哈贝马斯的理性观

面对传统理性的分裂和缺失,哈贝马斯没有放弃对理性的追求,而是在分析沟通行为与生活世界的过程中,在语言行为的基础上,建构起了不同于传统理性观的沟通理性。他以沟通理性为核心概念剖析现代西方社会理性化的矛盾,提出了解决现代社会的各种病症的方案。哈贝马斯的沟通理性理论补充和拓展了以往理性观的内涵,他的理性观也为西方理性指出了一条走出困境的可供选择的途径。     

王阳明心学思想中非理性之维对德育的理念启示

在传统德育乃至现代的形式化德育当中,程朱理学占据着非常重要的地位,其侧重点在于理性至上,强调理性对于个体单向的塑造,从而导致理性愈来愈成为异己的、强制的力量。而王阳明心学在不忽视理性的前提下,给予了非理性因素应有的地位和重视,落实到德育领域,非理性之维更是实现道德有效性的途径之一,这在一定程度上为今天的德育提供了理念上的启示。     

中国法学实证研究客观性难题求解——韦伯社会科学方法论的启示

以实证研究方法为特色的中国法治实践学派日益受到关注。中国法学研究方法正处于转型之中,实证研究方法将成为法学研究的常规范式。一些学者对法学实证研究的客观性提出质疑。求解实证研究的客观性难题可以从马克斯·韦伯那里得到启发。韦伯对社会科学的客观性研究具有代表性,认为人文社会科学可以做到“价值无涉”。韦伯主张的客观性以价值关联为前提,以客观可能性为基础,以对理想类型的应用和超越为实现路径。在法学研究中,运用指向客观性的社会科学研究方法具有必然性,这是由法学研究对象的广泛性以及法学对法律的批判功能决定的。法学实证研究并不排斥主流的规范研究,两者应互相补充,这也是中国法治实践学派的基本立场。中国法学实证研究要实现客观性,需要兼顾证实与证伪,注重文献的积累、理解的逻辑以及实践。中国法治实践学派的目标是要在韦伯方法论基础上实现创新和超越。     

Economic Modeling Triggers More Efficient Planning: An Experimental Justification

Consider a firm as an organization that needs to efficiently coordinate several specialized departments in an uncertain environment. Decision making involves collective planning sessions and decentralized operational processes. In this setting this paper explores the role of economic modeling through an experimental game. Results support the idea that economic modeling favors higher performance. Economic modeling facilitates the emergence of common knowledge and the decomposition of a group decision problem into individual decision problems that are meaningfully interrelated. This paper was presented at the Porquerolles Summer School on Cognitive Sciences, September 2001.     

Status quo bias in decision making

Most real decisions, unlike those of economics texts, have a status quo alternative—that is, doing nothing or maintaining one's current or previous decision. A series of decision-making experiments shows that individuals disproportionately stick with the status quo. Data on the selections of health plans and retirement programs by faculty members reveal that the status quo bias is substantial in important real decisions. Economics, psychology, and decision theory provide possible explanations for this bias. Applications are discussed ranging from marketing techniques, to industrial organization, to the advance of science.     

Models for estimating discount rates for long-term health risks using labor market data

This article utilizes evidence from job choices involving fatality risks to estimate individual discount rates for adverse health outcomes. The study compares the results from five distinct models for estimating discount rates from labor market data. The estimated discount rates range from 1% to 14% with confidence intervals that usually include financial market rates for the same period. This result, and consistent findings of significant compensating differentials for fatality risk, provide strong support for life-cycle models of individual rationality in the choice of job risks. Discounted value-of-life estimates are also developed and compared to the crosssection estimates that are more prevalent in the literature.     

文化侵略与文化守卫--论19世纪后半期儒家反洋教的意义及其教训

近代中国,基督教强制性输入与儒家士绅的顽强抵制,衍生出中西两大文化"法"与"理"的冲突与张力,且由这种冲突与张力引发了一个个教案并最终导致义和团运动的发生.诚然,儒家反洋教具有反抗列强文化侵略和捍卫儒教中国的双重文化意义,但由于盲目排外的"文化义和团"心态,同时也扭曲了中外文化正常交流的管道.总结这一历史教训,对于面临全球化与本土化困惑的我们,警惕强势文明文化、宗教与价值观的强制性输入和避免"文化义和团心态"具有重要意义.     

The individual rationality of maintaining a sense of justice

Let us say that an individual possesses aprincipled preference if she prefers satisfying her preferences without violating the principles of justice governing her community to satisfying her preferences by violating these principles. Although living among possessors of principled preferences benefits individuals, maintaining such a preference is individually costly. Further, individuals can benefit from others possessing principled preferences without themselves possessing one. In this paper, I argue that occupying a choice situation which mirrors key aspects of our own situation, maximizing rationality requires individuals to develop and maintain principled preferences.To establish that maintaining a principled preference is individually rational for the occupants of such a choice situation, I define a range of individual strategies for them, model their choice of individual strategies as a game, and argue that this game involves an equilibrium in which all of its participants would choose to develop and maintain a principled preference.