企业战略差异度与融资约束 ——基于信息不对称视角的研究

融资约束问题一直是学术界和实务界关注的焦点,企业经营战略的实施会对融资风险产生重要影响.基于2007—2018年中国A股非金融类上市公司数据,从信息不对称这一视角实证检验了企业战略差异度对融资约束的影响.研究发现:(1)企业战略差异度与融资约束显著正相关,即战略差异度越大,企业所面临的融资约束越严重;(2)信息不对称在战略差异度和融资约束之间发挥着中介作用;(3)战略差异度与融资约束的正相关关系在非国有企业、未被"四大"审计的企业、分析师关注度较低的企业以及在经济政策不确定性较高的情况下更加显著.研究结论表明,对于战略差异度较大的企业,要充分重视可能带来的融资约束问题,尤其是在经济政策不确定性较高之时.企业可通过聘请高质量审计机构、吸引更多分析师关注等外部治理手段缓解战略差异度对融资约束的不利影响.     

Term Structures of Credit Spreads with Incomplete Accounting Information

We study the implications of imperfect information for term structures of credit spreads on corporate bonds. We suppose that bond investors cannot observe the issuer's assets directly, and receive instead only periodic and imperfect accounting reports. For a setting in which the assets of the firm are a geometric Brownian motion until informed equityholders optimally liquidate, we derive the conditional distribution of the assets, given accounting data and survivorship. Contrary to the perfect‐information case, there exists a default‐arrival intensity process. That intensity is calculated in terms of the conditional distribution of assets. Credit yield spreads are characterized in terms of accounting information. Generalizations are provided.     

Efficiency,Equilibrium, and Asset Pricing with Risk of Default

We introduce a new equilibrium concept and study its efficiency and asset pricing implications for the environment analyzed by Kehoe and Levine (1993) and Kocherlakota (1996). Our equilibrium concept has complete markets and endogenous solvency constraints. These solvency constraints prevent default at the cost of reducing risk sharing. We show versions of the welfare theorems. We characterize the preferences and endowments that lead to equilibria with incomplete risk sharing. We compare the resulting pricing kernel with the one for economies without participation constraints: interest rates are lower and risk premia depend on the covariance of the idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks. Additionally, we show that asset prices depend only on the valuation of agents with substantial idiosyncratic risk.