Foreign Direct Investment,Trade, and Skilled Labour Demand in Eastern Europe

In this paper, we study the effects of inward foreign direct investment (FDI) and trade on relative skilled labour demand in Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic. Our estimates show significant heterogeneity in the FDI effect across the three economies: the effect is always significantly positive for Hungary, weakly negative for Poland, and negligible for the Czech Republic. As to trade, we find much more homogeneity in coefficient estimates, which are generally negative for all countries, although significant only in the case of Hungary.     

SOCIAL COMPARISON AND EFFORT PROVISION: EVIDENCE FROM A FIELD EXPERIMENT

Social comparison has potentially far reaching consequences in many economic domains. We conducted a field experiment to examine how social comparison affects workers' effort provision if their own wage or that of a co‐worker is cut. Workers were assigned to groups of two, performed identical individual tasks, and received the same performance‐independent hourly wage. Cutting both group members' wages caused a decrease in performance. But when only one group member's wage was cut, the affected workers decreased their performance more than twice as much as when both workers' wages were cut. This finding indicates that social comparison among workers affects effort provision because the only difference between the two wage‐cut treatments is the other group member's wage level. In contrast, workers whose wage was not cut but who witnessed their group member's pay being cut displayed no change in performance relative to the baseline treatment in which both workers' wages remained unchanged. This indicates that social comparison exerts asymmetric effects on effort.     

DEEP FINANCIAL INTEGRATION AND VOLATILITY

We investigate the relationship between foreign direct ownership of firms and firm‐ and region‐level output volatility using a novel panel data set for European countries. We document a positive, highly robust, relationship between firm‐level foreign ownership and volatility of value added. This relationship holds cross‐sectionally and in panels with firm fixed effects where the relationship captures within‐firm variation over time. Considering domestic firms with assets in foreign countries, we document that it is international diversification, rather than the nationality of the owner, that explains this positive correlation. Our results can also be found at the aggregate level, where we show that region‐level volatility is correlated positively with foreign investment in the region. We show that this positive relation between aggregate volatility and foreign investment can be explained by the granularity of the firm size distribution and the fact that foreign ownership is concentrated among the largest firms.     

KNOWING THE RIGHT PERSON IN THE RIGHT PLACE: POLITICAL CONNECTIONS AND RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

We use a political economy model of Schumpeterian growth with entry to investigate how an incumbent politician can strategically use the level of red tape to acquire incumbency advantage. By setting sufficiently high red tape, the politician induces the incumbent firm in the intermediate sector to invest in political connections, which are valued also by voters, who recognize that bureaucratic costs can be reduced by connected firms. Within this framework, we study the Markov perfect equilibria of an infinitely repeated game among politicians, firms, and voters, and show that all equilibria are characterized by investments in political connections and the re‐election of the incumbent politician. Political connections may prevent entry of advanced competitors and cause the economy to lag behind the technological frontier. Our model provides a possible explanation for the persistence of inefficient democracies and political barriers to technology development, where these reflect shared rather than conflicting interests.     

INSTITUTION‐INDUCED PRODUCTIVITY DIFFERENCES AND PATTERNS OF INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL FLOWS

This paper studies theoretically how the cross‐country differences in the institutional quality (IQ) of domestic credit markets shape the patterns of international capital flows when such IQ differences also cause productivity differences across countries. IQ affects productivity by changing productivity–agency‐cost trade‐offs across heterogeneous investment projects. Such institution‐induced productivity differences are shown to have effects on the investment and capital flows that are opposite of exogenous productivity differences. This implies that the overall effect of IQ could generate U‐shaped responses of the investment and capital flows. Among other things, this means that capital could flow from middle‐income countries to both low‐income and high‐income countries, and that, starting from a very low IQ, a country could experience both a growth and a current account surplus after a successful institutional reform. More generally, the results here provide some cautions when interpreting the empirical evidence on the role of productivity differences and institutional differences on capital flows. It also calls into question the validity of treating the degree of financial frictions as a proxy for the quality of financial institutions, as commonly done in the literature.     

SOVEREIGNS,UPSTREAM CAPITAL FLOWS,AND GLOBAL IMBALANCES

We construct measures of net private and public capital flows for a large cross‐section of developing countries considering both creditor and debtor side of the international debt transactions. Using these measures, we demonstrate that sovereign‐to‐sovereign transactions account for upstream capital flows and global imbalances. Specifically, we find that (i) international net private capital flows (inflows minus outflows of private capital) are positively correlated with countries' productivity growth, (ii) net sovereign debt flows (government borrowing minus reserves) are negatively correlated with growth only if net public debt is financed by another sovereign, (iii) net public debt financed by private creditors is positively correlated with growth, (iv) public savings are strongly positively correlated with growth, whereas correlation between private savings and growth is flat and statistically insignificant. These empirical facts contradict the conventional wisdom and constitute a challenge for the existing theories on upstream capital flows and global imbalances.     

反哺农业:寻求社会公平发展的有效途径

文章提出“三农”问题的实质是现代化过程中农民与其他社会利益主体之间的利益关系。目前,我国已进入工业反哺农业的时代。通过构建农村公共服务体系,实现城乡社会公平发展;依靠乡镇企业发展,实现劳动力转移促农,农产品加工和产业化经营促农;建农补农实现反哺促农;小城镇建设与乡镇企业发展相互促进实现以城带乡促农。     

基于产业示范站的科技扶贫模式及其减贫效应

探索促进区域经济增长和贫困人口减贫相结合的科技扶贫模式,是我国目前精准扶贫战略实施的重点。以西北农林科技大学产业示范站科技扶贫模式为例,从理论层面分析了其减贫机制,并运用陕西省3个国家扶贫开发重点县748份微观农户调研数据,实证检验了科技扶贫的减贫效应。研究发现:(1)产业示范站科技扶贫模式具有显著减贫效应,即农户通过参与农业科技培训、主导产业示范、农业信息服务和产业组织化带动4种扶贫方式,不仅能提高其家庭农业收入,也能降低家庭贫困发生的概率;(2)不同科技扶贫方式的减贫效应存在显著差异,其中农业科技培训的减贫效应较为突出,而农业信息服务的减贫效应有待进一步提升;(3)建档立卡贫困户科技扶贫参与度低于非贫困户。因此,地方政府应加大财政支持与组织保障的力度,引导高校优势科技资源与贫困地区特色产业精准对接,借鉴“西农模式”为深入推进区域精准扶贫战略提供科技支撑。     

The Firm as a Means of Concealing Information

The aim of this paper is to demonstrate that a firm may owe its continued existence to its attempts to conceal information from its competitors about the unknown characteristics of a certain factor, not just to its savings on market transaction costs, its team‐working, risk‐sharing, or the encouragement of ex ante specific investment. This is because the existence of a firm contract severs the relationship between the factor market and the product market, thereby making it difficult for outsiders to observe the marginal contribution of the intermediate factor and make statistical inferences about the factor's unknown characteristics. Furthermore, an optimal contract is determined by a trade‐off not only between traditional risk‐sharing and incentive, but also between the incentive and information concealing. Finally, we show that this latter kind of trade‐off also affects the position of the optimal boundary of the firm.     

On asymptotics of multivariate integrals with applications to records

Let { X _n ,n≥1} be a sequence of iid. Gaussian random vectors in R ^d , d≥2, with nonsingular distribution function F. In this paper the asymptotics for the sequence of integrals I _F,n (G _n )?n∫ _{R ^d} G _n ^n?1( X ) dF( X ) is considered with G _n some distribution function on R ^d . In the case G _n =F the integral I _F,n (F)/n is the probability that a record occurs in X ₁,…, X _n at index n. [1] Gnedin, A.V. 1998. Records from a Multivariate Normal Sample. Statist. Probab. Lett., 39: 11–15. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] obtained lower and upper asymptotic bounds for this case, whereas [2] Ledford, W.A. and Twan, A.J. 1998. On the Tail Concomitant Behaviour for Extremes. Adv. Appl. Probab., 30: 197–215. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar] showed the rate of convergence if d=2. In this paper we derive the exact rate of convergence of I _F,n (G _n ) for d≥2 under some restrictions on the distribution function G _n . Some related results for multivariate Gaussian tails are discussed also.