劳伦斯的阿芙罗狄特情结

戴·赫·劳伦斯一生崇拜阿芙罗狄特,他津津乐道的血意识其实是阿芙罗狄特精神的现代阐释,而小说《查特莱夫人的情人》则是对这种精神的形象表达,隐喻作者一贯坚持的只有性爱才能拯救人类的思想主题。     

Voluntary income sharing and the design of unemployment insurance

This paper uses a model of search unemployment to discuss the interaction between publicly provided insurance and informal insurance through voluntary income sharing, e.g., between spouses. Income sharing reduces the optimal level of public unemployment insurance. While it is always individually rational for partners to share income, the effect of voluntary income sharing on welfare will be negative unless partners can either observe each other's search behavior or are sufficiently altruistic towards each other. The model is also used to examine a family-based policy. The welfare gains from using such policy are argued to be small. Received: 14 December 2000/Accepted: 5 November 2001     

无政府主义认识论的再认识

人们之所以不断地误解无政府主义认识论,其主要根源是忽视了它是侧重反面论证的治疗性理论。"怎么都行"不是费耶阿本德对于科学研究方法和准则的描述和提倡。他不过是以一种非常戏剧化的修辞学方式表达一个朴素的真理:任何规则都有其局限性。无政府主义认识论的修辞学特点:隐喻和反证法的大量使用也是其理论内容的本质体现。从修辞学策略的角度看,无政府主义认识论不是费耶阿本德心目中的真理,只是他用于治疗目前人类思想疾病的良药。理论除了具有正面的建设性功能之外,还具有反面消解的治疗性功能。     

Family size and optimal income taxation

This paper studies the role of family size in the design of optimal income taxation. We consider a second best setting where the government observes the number of children and the income of the parents but not their productivity. With a linear tax schedule the marginal tax rate is shown to decrease with the number of children, while the relationship between the demogrant and family size appears to be ambiguous. With two ability levels, optimal non-linear income tax implies zero marginal tax rates for the higher ability parents; low ability parents have positive marginal tax rates that decrease with family size. Received: 4 September 2000/Accepted: 17 May 2001     

氢化非晶硅膜的光学特性

用辉光放电法制备了氢化非晶硅(a-Si:H)膜,并对其光电导、光吸收特性进行了研究。结果表明,a-Si:H膜具有良好的光电导和光吸收性,是一种理想的廉价太阳能电池材料。     

ECONOMIC SCIENCE AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE

When policymakers and private agents use models, the economists who design the model have an incentive to alter it in order to influence outcomes in a fashion consistent with their own preferences. I discuss some consequences of the existence of such ideological bias. In particular, I analyze the role of measurement infrastructures such as national statistical institutes, the extent to which intellectual competition between different schools of thought may lead to polarization of views over some parameters and at the same time to consensus over other parameters, and finally how the attempt to preserve influence can lead to degenerative research programs.     

HOW DO ELECTORAL SYSTEMS AFFECT FISCAL POLICY? EVIDENCE FROM CANTONAL PARLIAMENTS, 1890–2000

Using a new data set on Swiss cantons since 1890, we analyze how the adoption of proportional representation affects fiscal policy. In line with economic theory, we show that proportional systems shift spending toward broad goods (like education and welfare benefits) but decrease spending on geographically targetable goods (like roads). We find little evidence that proportional representation increases the overall size of government. An analysis of the underlying theoretical mechanisms reveals that proportional representation increases electoral turnout, left‐wing representation, and political fragmentation. These changes in political representation explain a substantial share of the rise in education spending, but a small share of the rise in welfare spending or the decline in road expenditures.     

UNCERTAIN DEMAND,CONSUMER LOSS AVERSION,AND FLAT‐RATE TARIFFS

We consider a model of firm pricing and consumer choice, where consumers are loss averse and uncertain about their future demand. Possibly, consumers in our model prefer a flat rate to a measured tariff, even though this choice does not minimize their expected billing amount—a behavior in line with ample empirical evidence. We solve for the profit‐maximizing two‐part tariff, which is a flat rate if (a) marginal costs are not too high, (b) loss aversion is intense, and (c) there are strong variations in demand. Moreover, we analyze the optimal nonlinear tariff. This tariff has a large flat part when a flat rate is optimal among the class of two‐part tariffs.     

UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE AND CULTURAL TRANSMISSION: THEORY AND APPLICATION TO EUROPEAN UNEMPLOYMENT

This paper emphasizes the two‐way causality between the provision of unemployment insurance and the cultural transmission of civicness. The returns to being uncivic are increasing in the generosity of unemployment insurance; but this generosity is decreasing in the number of uncivic individuals. In this context, I determine the evolution of preferences across generations and show that cultural heterogeneity is sustained over the long‐run. The dynamics of cultural transmission can generate a long lag between the introduction of unemployment insurance and an increase in people's willingness to live off government‐provided benefits. Hence, it offers an explanation to the ‘European unemployment puzzle’ due to the coexistence of generous unemployment insurance and low unemployment in the 1950s and 1960s.     

To Leave an Area After Disaster: How Evacuees from the WTC Buildings Left the WTC Area Following the Attacks

How people leave a devastated area after a disaster is critical to understanding their ability to cope with risks they face while evacuating. Knowledge of their needs for communications about these risks is particularly crucial in planning for emergency responses. A convenience sample of 1,444 persons who survived the World Trade Center (WTC) attacks on September 11, 2001 were surveyed to ascertain their initial and ultimate destinations once they had left the buildings, how they arrived there, the role of types of obstacles they encountered, and the need for information and the seeking of other people as potential factors in influencing the process of leaving immediately. This survey was part of a larger, original survey. Results showed differences in how people traveled by mode to initial and ultimate destinations, how immediately they left the area, and factors associated with when they left. How they traveled and when they left were associated with where people lived, their tendency in times of stress to seek out other people including who they knew in the immediate area (e.g., co‐workers or friends), the physical conditions surrounding them, and the importance to some of waiting for more information. Many people indicated they did not leave immediately because they had no information about where to go or what services would be available to them. Perceptions and communications about risks they were facing were reflected in the choices they considered in how and when to leave the area. These findings have numerous ramifications for understanding and guiding personal behavior in catastrophic situations.