Strategic Decisions of New Technology Adoption under Asymmetric Information: A Game‐Theoretic Model*

In this paper we explore strategic decision making in new technology adoption by using economic analysis. We show how asymmetric information affects firms' decisions to adopt the technology. We do so in a two‐stage game‐theoretic model where the first‐stage investment results in the acquisition of a new technology that, in the second stage, may give the firm a competitive advantage in the product market. We compare two information structures under which two competing firms have asymmetric information about the future performance (i.e., postadoption costs) of the new technology. We find that equilibrium strategies under asymmetric information are quite different from those under symmetric information. Information asymmetry leads to different incentives and strategic behaviors in the technology adoption game. In contrast to conventional wisdom, our model shows that market uncertainty may actually induce firms to act more aggressively under certain conditions. We also show that having better information is not always a good thing. These results illustrate a key departure from established decision theory.     

BARGAINING WITH SHARED INFORMATION*

This paper formulates and analyzes models of two-party bargaining behavior where each side possesses private information about its preferences that is unavailable to the other. We examine the strategic behavior that bargainers might exhibit when disclosing information either to an arbitrator or to each other. Our results show that when bargaining is over one issue, it is relatively uncomplicated analytically to calculate the optimal strategy, but, despite this, even sophisticated bargainers tend to make wrong assumptions about the behavior of others and to use strategies that are far from optimal. When the bargaining encompasses several factors, computation of optimal strategies becomes very cumbersome and the use of an optimal strategy does not gain a bargainer much over what he could have achieved with truthful revelation. Thus, in theory, truthful revelation is not the best course of action to adopt for a bargainer interested in maximizing individual gain, but in practice the alternatives may involve mistaken assumptions about the behavior of others and may therefore turn out to be inferior to truthful revelation.     

公司清算障碍初探

公司在其法人资格终止前必须依法进行清算以保护公司债权人利益和社会整体利益,然而实际生活中却大量存在清算遇有障碍无法开展的状况。因此,有必要从理论上对清算障碍的具体表现形式与成因进行全面分析,并研究清算障碍的预防与解决之道。     

Social context and network formation: An experimental study

Recently, there has been increasing interest in determining which social network structures emerge as a consequence of the conscious actions of actors. Motivated by the belief that “networks matter” in reaching personal objectives, it is a natural assumption that actors try to optimize their network position. Starting from the notion that an optimal network position depends on the social context, we examine how actors change their networks to reach better positions in various contexts. Distinguishing between three social contexts (a neutral context, a context in which closed triads are costly, and a context in which closed triads are beneficial), theoretical results predict that emerging networks are contingent on the incentives that are present in these contexts. Experiments are used to test whether networks that are theoretically predicted to be stable are also stable experimentally. We find that emerging networks correspond to a large extent with the predicted networks. Consequently, they are contingent on the incentives present in various social contexts. In addition, we find that subjects tend to form specific stable networks with a higher probability than predicted, namely, efficient networks and networks in which everyone is equally well off.     

Optimal Offer Strategies in Mergers and Acquisitions*

This paper models the corporate takeover process as a bargaining game under certainty. During the takeover process, an acquirer is generally uncertain about the minimum price the target shareholders will accept. Normally, a takeover is concluded after a sequence of offers have been made. This paper derives optimal offer strategies for the buyer at each stage of this bargaining game under uncertainty. Uncertainty about the target's minimum acceptable price is represented by a probability distribution. Optimal offer strategies depend on the probability distribution of the minimum acceptable price, which can change during the offer process.     

新形势下高校预算管理存在的问题及解决措施

随着高校发展速度的加快,办学规模不断扩大,高校旧的预算管理模式呈现出了诸多不适应当前形势的情况,通过分析高校发展的现状和预算管理中存在的问题,从建立高校预算管理的组织体系、构建科学的管理体制、加强预算执行力度和约束力、健全绩效考核评价体系、坚持科学发展几个方面,完善高校的预算管理工作,推动高校各项事业的快速健康发展。     

大学生择业观念的引导研究

择业观念是影响大学生择业的重要因素。本文针对大学生存在的不良择业观念的表现,分析其产生的原因,提出解决大学生不良择业观念的对策,引导学生树立正确的择业观念。     

人的自由与审美教育--席勒美育思想探析

席勒在其<美育书简>中,极力寻求改造人的新方法,认为只有通过审美教育和在游戏冲动中,人性才能得到完美的实现.他论述了现代人人性的分裂以及他对和谐的追寻;认为审美活动是人的感性、理性和谐运动的结果;指出未来是审美的王国,这是人类所追求的最高目标.正是从席勒开始,在美学理论和教育实践中,美育才真正确立了它独立的地位,并明确地将体育、智育、德育与美育区别开来.     

退耕还林还草工程实施中经济利益补偿的博弈分析

作者利用博弈论对退耕还林还草工程牵涉的中央政府、地方政府和农户各方的利益关系进行分析。农户与政府的博弈结果表明,农户与作为整体的政府进行博弈有多个纳什均衡点,要充分调动农户的积极性,政府应选择较高的补偿方式。中央政府与地方政府的博弈结果表明,纳什均衡(不努力,不努力)是各地方政府博弈的结果,而这一策略同时也是占优战略均衡,但无法达到帕累托最优(努力,努力),也就是既节约中央的财政资金,又充分发挥各地区的潜力;要实现帕累托最优,中央必须建立有效的激励监督机制,既要激励合理,又要经常监督,把地方的努力程度作为确定转移支付量的一个重要依据。     

农村公共物品提供机制的内在矛盾及其解决思路

农村公共物品包括 :(1)可持续发展类公共物品 ;(2 )农村经济发展公共物品 ;(3 )农村社会基础设施类公共物品。农村公共物品提供机制有其内在矛盾 ,为有效解决农村公共物品严重不足的现状 ,应对自上而下的传统决策机制进行制度改革 ,在增加政府财政投入的同时 ,多渠道地为农村公共物品的生产筹集资金