语篇中指称选择的认知语用解释

叙述语篇中的指称选择主要受到三个因素的影响:指称距离,指称对象是否引起歧义,指称对象与话题焦点的关系。这三个因素归根结底可以从心理学方面得到解释。人类的记忆系统和认知特点决定了人类对指称选择的认知加工方式。     

On Fuzzy Expressions in English

In this paper I attempt to explain my general understanding of fuzzy expressions in language, and I take English as an example. Fuzziness is one of the basic characteristics of language. It differs from generality, ambiguity and vagueness. There are many examples of fuzzy expressions in English. I supply examples of color words, some adjectives and linguistic hedges. Finally I attempt to explain fuzziness from pragmatic point of view.     

不确定条件下个性化产品提货时间损失规避行为模型

研究在不确定条件下,决策者风险规避行为对决策的影响,利用前景理论对决策者的风险规避行为进行建模,分析风险规避决策者的决策值与完全理性决策者的决策最优值的偏差。并以个性化产品销售企业最佳提货时间设置为例,通过建模和分析发现：当货物提前到达的边际损失大于延时到达的边际损失时,决策者越是进行风险规避,他设置的提货时间就越比风险中立者设置的最优提货时间小;当货物提前到达的边际损失和延时到达的边际损失相等时,不管决策者如何进行风险规避,他设置的提货时间都和风险中立者设置的最优提货时间相等;当货物提前到达的边际损失小于延时到达的边际损失时,决策者越是进行风险规避,他设置的提货时间就越比风险中立者设置的最优提货时间大。     

Effects of Outcome and Probabilistic Ambiguity on Managerial Choices

Information ambiguity is prevalent in organizations and likely influences management decisions. This study examines, given imprecise probabilities and outcomes, how managers make choices when they are provided with single-figure benchmarks. Seventy-nine MBA students completed two experiments. We found that, in a decision framed as a decision under certainty involving an ambiguous outcome, the majority of the subjects were ambiguity prone in the loss condition and switched to ambiguity aversion in the gain condition. However, in the presence of probabilistic ambiguity in a decision under risk, this expected switching pattern was shown only when the difference in riskiness between the two choice options (in the loss condition) was perceived to be relatively small. In a companion study, we used a written protocol approach to identify factors that affect decision makers' investment choices when faced with ambiguous outcomes. Protocols frequently mentioned that the ambiguous outcome option was risky, even in the case which was framed as a decision under certainty in the problem statement. In a decision under risk with ambiguous outcomes, the combination of probabilistic risk and outcome ambiguity was seen as even more risky.     

An Experimental Test of Loss Aversion

This paper experimentally investigates a preference condition for loss aversion in the framework of cumulative prospect theory (CPT). We propose the concepts of absolute and relative loss premiums in order to measure the extent of loss aversion and to derive notions of increasing, constant, and decreasing loss aversion. While in only one of the 28 choice situations analyzed loss neutrality and loss seeking can be rejected, about 51% of all choices are loss averse and, due to the large extent of loss aversion revealed by these choices, the average loss premium is positive for most choice situations. Female subjects exhibit both a more frequent occurrence and a larger extent of loss aversion.     

E-Capacities and the Ellsberg Paradox

Ellsberg's (1961) famous paradox shows that decision-makers give events with known probabilities a higher weight in their outcome evaluation. In the same article, Ellsberg suggests a preference representation which has intuitive appeal but lacks an axiomatic foundation. Schmeidler (1989) and Gilboa (1987) provide an axiomatisation for expected utility with non-additive probabilities. This paper introduces E-capacities as a representation of beliefs which incorporates objective information about the probability of events. It can be shown that the Choquet integral of an E-capacity is the Ellsberg representation. The paper further explores properties of this representation of beliefs and provides an axiomatisation for them.     

生成音位学重音规则解析交际英语歧义现象

运用“生成音位学”的基本原理和规则,可揭示词语结构元素的内在特征和元素的组织方式及其规律,并解析交际英语中连读、同音异义及句法结构等引起的歧义问题。生成音位学重音规则对指导交际英语和处理语音歧义问题的研究有着重要的意义,同时也为二语使用者处理交际语言歧义问题提供了理论依据。     

On the Effect of Risk Aversion in Bimatrix Games

Nash equilibria with identical supports are compared for bimatrix games that are different with respect to the risk aversion of player 2. For equilibria in 2× 2-bimatrix games and for equilibria with efficient supports in coordination games it is established for which cases increased risk aversion of player 2 benefits or hurts player 2.     

Insurer ambiguity and market failure

A series of studies investigate the decision processes of actuaries, underwriters, and reinsurers in setting premiums for ambiguous and uncertain risks. Survey data on prices reveal that all three types of these insurance decision makers are risk averse and ambiguity averse. In addition, groups appear to be influenced in their premium-setting decisions by specific reference points such as expected loss and the concern with insolvency. This behavior is consistent with a growing analytical and empirical literature in economics and decision processes that investigates the role that uncertainty plays on managerial choices. Improved risk-assessment procedures and government involvement in providing protection against catastrophic losses may induce insurers to reduce premiums and broaden available coverage.This article is part of a larger effort supported by the National Science Foundation on The Role of Insurance, Compensation, Regulation, and Protective Behavior in Decision Making about Risk and Misfortune. We greatly appreciate the many helpful comments and suggestions by our colleagues on the project: Jon Baron, Colin Camerer, Neil Doherty, Jack Hershey, Eric Johnson, and Paul Kleindorfer. Support from NSF Grant #SES8809299 is gratefully acknowledged.     

Paying to improve your chances: Gambling or insurance?

Will a more risk-averse individual spend more or less to improve probabilities, say on marketing efforts that enhance the chance of a sale? For any two payoffs and starting probabilities, the answer is unfortunately indeterminate. However, interpreting gambling as increasing small chances of good outcomes and insurance as reducing small chances of bad outcomes, the more risk-averse individual will pay less (more) to gamble (insure). We find a critical switching probability that depends on the individuals and outcomes involved. If the good outcome is less (more) likely than this critical value, the expenditures represent gambling (insurance).