Dilemmas of an Economic Theorist

What on earth are economic theorists like me trying to accomplish? This paper discusses four dilemmas encountered by an economic theorist: The dilemma of absurd conclusions: Should we abandon a model if it produces absurd conclusions or should we regard a model as a very limited set of assumptions that will inevitably fail in some contexts? The dilemma of responding to evidence: Should our models be judged according to experimental results? The dilemma of modelless regularities: Should models provide the hypothesis for testing or are they simply exercises in logic that have no use in identifying regularities? The dilemma of relevance: Do we have the right to offer advice or to make statements that are intended to influence the real world?     

Monetary Discounting of Delayed Consequences Predict Employment Nudity: Exotic Dancers Versus Waitresses

The present study examined temporal monetary discounting rates among exotic dancers, waitresses who are required to wear revealing uniforms, and waitresses at a local restaurant where revealing clothes are not part of work attire. Current findings indicate that exotic dancers and waitresses who are required to wear revealing clothing discounted significantly more than waitresses at restaurants where provocative dress is not required. These results suggest that the type of job held may predict impulsivity, with nude or risqué occupations indicating steeper patterns of overall discounting.     

Assessing noninferiority: Evaluating efficacy of a new treatment without complete data

The FDA released the final guidance on noninferiority trials in November 2016. In noninferiority trials, validity of the assessment of the efficacy of the test treatment depends on the control treatment's efficacy. Therefore, it is critically important that there be a reliable estimate of the control treatment effect—which is generally obtained from historical trials, and often assumed to hold in the current setting (the assay constancy assumption). Validating the constancy assumption requires clinical data, which are typically lacking. The guidance acknowledges that “lack of constancy can occur for many reasons.” We clarify the objectives of noninferiority trials. We conclude that correction for bias, rather than assay constancy, is critical to conducting valid noninferiority trials. We propose that assay constancy not be assumed and discounting or thresholds be used to address concern about loss of historical efficacy. Examples are provided for illustration.     

Strategic Appraisal of Environmental Risks: A Contrast Between the United Kingdom's Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change and its Committee on Radioactive Waste Management

In this article, we compare two high‐profile strategic policy reviews undertaken for the U.K. government on environmental risks: radioactive waste management and climate change. These reviews took very different forms, both in terms of analytic approach and deliberation strategy. The Stern Review on the Economics of Climate Change was largely an exercise in expert modeling, building, within a cost‐benefit framework, an argument for immediate reductions in carbon emissions. The Committee on Radioactive Waste Management, on the other hand, followed a much more explicitly deliberative and participative process, using multicriteria decision analysis to bring together scientific evidence and stakeholder and public values. In this article, we ask why the two reviews were different, and whether the differences are justified. We conclude that the differences were mainly due to political context, rather than the underpinning science, and as a consequence that, while in our view “fit for purpose,” they would both have been stronger had they been less different. Stern's grappling with ethical issues could have been strengthened by a greater degree of public and stakeholder engagement, and the Committee on Radioactive Waste Management's handling of issues of uncertainty could have been strengthened by the explicitly probabilistic framework of Stern.     

Temptations and Dynamic Consistency

The objective of this article is to test a prediction of the quasi-hyperbolic model. The test is innovative in that it uses an experimental implementation in which there are two treatments: a forward market and a spot market. In each of these markets goods and activities are sold. The good and activities sold are investment goods or activities and temptation goods or activities. The prediction of the quasi-hyperbolic model is that in the spot (forward) market participants will buy more temptation (investment) goods and activities than in the forward market and less investment (temptation) good and activities. This prediction is not confirmed by the data, and hence is at odds with previous experiments which have shown support for the hyperbolic model. We speculate on the reasons for this.     

时间偏好不一致委托代理问题的优化与决策

现有讨论委托代理问题涉及将不同时点收益和成本折现时,几乎毫无例外的选择唯一能代表时间偏好一致的折现函数—指数折现.本文放松时间偏好一致这一假设,选择能反映时间偏好不一致的准双曲折现函数一ββδ作为代理人折现函数,分析收益由努力程度和外部因素共同作用,代理人的成本和收益发生在不同时点时,委托人如何制定激励合同使得代理人努力工作且委托人获得最大利润.研究发现,最优合同与代理人的现期偏好参数β和对未来现期偏好参数的认知β有关,委托人从时间偏好一致的代理人获取的利润高于时间偏好不一致的代理人,从悲观部分幼稚型获取利润小于成熟型,但从成熟型和乐观部分幼稚型获取的利润相同.     

Measuring Intergenerational Time Preference: Are Future Lives Valued Less?

Prior research has estimated intergenerational time preferences by asking respondents to choose between hypothetical life saving programs. From such choices, researchers have concluded that the public heavily discounts the lives of people in future generations. However, using a multiversion survey involving 401 respondents, I show that imputed intergenerational time preferences can be dramatically affected by the specific question that is asked. Different elicitation procedures can yield widely varying results by evoking or suppressing various relevant considerations (such as uncertainty). Many formats revealed no preference for current generations over future generations.     

Stubbornness,Power, and Equilibrium Selection in Repeated Games with Multiple Equilibria

Axelord’s [(1970), Conflict of Interest, Markham Publishers, Chicago] index of conflict in 2 × 2 games with two pure strategy equilibria has the property that a reduction in the cost of holding out corresponds to an increase in conflict. This article takes the opposite view, arguing that if losing becomes less costly, a player is less likely to gamble to win, which means that conflict will be less frequent. This approach leads to a new power index and a new measure of stubbornness, both anchored in strategic reasoning. The win probability defined as power constitutes an equilibrium refinement which differs from Harsanyi and Selten’s [(1988), A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press, Cambridge] refinement. In contrast, Axelrod’s approach focuses on preferences regarding divergences from imaginary outmost rewards that cannot be obtained jointly. The player who is less powerful in an asymmetric one-shot game becomes more powerful in the repeated game, provided he or she values the future sufficiently more than the opponent. This contrasts with the view that repetition induces cooperation, but conforms with the expectation that a more patient player receives a larger share of the pie.